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The purpose of this study is to ascertain and explain the effectiveness of Roma political 
activism in contesting state oppression in Macedonia and Serbia. More specifically, this 
thesis seeks to investigate the divergent treatment of Roma communities in the 
respective states by analyzing the role of state institutions, civil society, political parties 
and international organizations. The thesis seeks to provide a multi-level analysis of 
Roma mobilization in Macedonia and Serbia by addressing the domestic and 
international factors that influence Roma political activism, and relies on two main 
theoretical concepts within the social movement literature: the Political Opportunity 
Structure (POS) model and ‗transnational advocacy networks.‘  
The POS model is a comprehensive framework to assess if Roma political activism has 
been effective in Macedonia and Serbia. This study uses the following components to 
describe the domestic factors that may facilitate or constrain Romani activism in the 
respective states: state repression and/or facilitation, institutional access, influential 
domestic and international allies. This thesis attempts to provide a detailed analysis of 
movement dynamics by taking into account the inter-relationship between actors and 
contesting groups. The limitations of the domestic opportunity structure regarding Roma 
advocacy in Macedonia and Serbia are outlined by describing the political context 
concerning minority inclusion, institutional mechanisms, and NGO/political party 
activities. 
As domestic opportunity structures are ‗closed,‘ Roma activists and NGOs seek 
international allies to influence and change domestic policy on Roma inclusion. This 
study, while recognizing the importance of other international initiatives, specifically 
focuses on various institutions of the European Union as the main international actor 
influencing Roma inclusion policies in Eastern Europe. The thesis outlines the main EU 
initiatives on Roma inclusion to provide an overview of the opportunities and challenges 
in the international arena. Furthermore, it analyzes the interaction between international 
and civil society organizations assessing the effectiveness of the ‗transnational advocacy 
 
 
networks.‘ Finally, the thesis provides a comparative analysis of Roma political activism 
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Roma Identity, Marginalization and Exclusion 
1.1 Introduction 
The Roma are perhaps the most marginalized, disadvantaged, and persecuted group 
among the world‘s ethnic communities, and are, often the targets of discrimination in the 
areas of employment, health, education and housing. Across Europe, anti-Gypsyism is 
prevalent, and racism toward Roma has gained currency as a legitimate belief. 
Throughout history, Roma have been subjected to official policies of extermination 
(most directly during the Holocaust), assimilation, forced resettlement, and the 
sterilization of women. As a result of extensive discrimination and persecution over the 
centuries, many Roma communities remain isolated and impoverished, not gaining 
socio-economic equality within their societies. In contradiction to the belief that Roma 
are social deviants; morally and ethnically disreputable, involved in criminal activities, 
and taking advantage of social benefits, Roma activists and leaders have attempted to 
mobilize and improve the situation of their community since the early twentieth century. 
Romani political leaders sought inclusion in national parliaments (predominately in 
Central and Eastern Europe) and IGOs, such as the League of Nations.
1
  
In the 1960s, goals of Roma activists were the formation of a Romani state, Holocaust 
reparations, and international recognition of the community. The aims of improving 
living conditions, and promoting the Roma cultural identity, while recognized as 
priorities, remained secondary to nationalist aspirations. Mobilization efforts eventually 
led to the formation of the First World Romani Congress in April 1971, including 
participants worldwide. At this time, efforts of activists also led to the development of 
the first transnational Romani organization - the International Romani Union (IRU).
2
 By 
                                                          
1
 Klimova-Alexander, Ilona. The Romani Voice in World Politics: The United Nations and Non-State 
Actors. (England: Ashgate Publishing, 2005) pp. 14-15 
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 Ibid, p. 17 Subsequent IRU meetings occurred in Geneva (1978), Goettingen (1981), Warsaw (1990), 




the 1970s, a significant change occurred as the idea of an autonomous Romani nation 
was marginalized, with very few Romani activists promoting the nationalist cause. 
Transnational links fostered the development of local and national Romani organizations 
in Western Europe (as Romani activism was generally prohibited in Communist 
countries). The proliferation of Roma organizations in Eastern Europe occurred only 
after 1989. The IRU was a preliminary attempt to create a permanent Romani umbrella 
organization, but has not been very effective due to limited financial resources and 
personnel. The organization generally remains inactive between World Congress 
meetings, only infrequently lobbying various governments and international 
organizations. In the mid-1980s, Rudko Kawczinsky separated from the IRU, openly 
challenging the leadership at the IVth International Roma Congress in 1990. In the same 
year, Kawczinsky established the Roma National Congress (RNC) promoting a ‗radical 
politics‘ (sit-ins, street protests). The separation of the RNC instigated political conflict 
within the IRU, and various realignments among the national organizations, resulting in 
numerous political reforms and renewal within the organization.
3
 However, the IRU is 
the dominant organization that promotes the idea of a Romani nation, the Roma flag and 
anthem, and national day (8 April) adopted by the Congress in 1971.
4
  
It is only quite recently that international organizations such as the European Union 
(EU) have recognized Roma inclusion as an issue of humanitarian concern and political 
significance. In 2007, the European Council, as the foremost political institution of the 
EU, addressed the situation of Roma communities.  In 2008 a Roma Summit was 
organized by the European Commission as the first high-level conference focusing on 
Roma issues. The Decade of Roma Inclusion (2005 – 2015), an initiative with the 
support of many international institutions, such as the World Bank, United Nations, and 
Council of Europe, specifically focused on improving the situation of Roma 
                                                          
3
 ―The Decade of Roma Rights: Interview with Nicolae Gheorghe.‖ Roma Rights 2-3, (ERRC: November, 
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communities in Eastern Europe.
5
 In addition, many international NGOs have 
documented the extensive discrimination and racial violence towards the Roma 




There has also been a burgeoning of academic literature on Roma issues. Earlier 
scholarly work focused on an anthropological understanding of ‗Gypsy‘ communities, 
predominately examining cultural traditions, identity, and socialization patterns.
7
 Few 
authors, however, have analyzed the political activism and mobilization of the Roma 
community within Central and Eastern Europe.
8
 This study is also unique in its case 
study selection; few researchers have studied Romani mobilization in Macedonia and 
specifically, Serbia (although encompassing one of the largest Roma populations in the 
former Yugoslavia) remains under-examined. This thesis seeks to provide an addition to 
the literature on Roma studies, as well as the work on ethnic mobilization, minority 
rights and social movements. The thesis draws on both sociological and political 
academic disciplines to present a comprehensive understanding of the issues. 
Although this study has adopted a dominant theoretical approach, the political 
opportunity structure model (POS), to understanding Roma political activism in 
Macedonia and Serbia, it attempts to provide a multi-level analysis by examining 
international advocacy efforts, utilizing the literature on transnational networks and 
norm socialization.   
                                                          
5
 Decade countries include: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Macedonia, Montenegro, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, and Spain. See romadecade.org for further 
information 
6
 See for instance reports by the European Roma Rights Centre (ERRC), Human Rights Watch (HRW), 
and Amnesty International 
7
 See Okely, J. The Traveller-Gypsies (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), C. Silverman. 
―Negotiating Gypsiness: Strategy in Context.‖ The Journal of American Folklore. 101.401 (Jul – Sep 
1988), Acton, T. and G. Mundy (eds.) Romani Culture and Gypsy Identity (Hertfordshire: University of 
Hertfordshire Press, 1997). 
8
See for instance, Vermeersch, P. The Romani Movement: Minority Politics and Ethnic Mobilization in 
Contemporary Central Europe. (Berghahn Books: Oxford, 2006), Barany, Z. The East European Gypsies: 
Regime Change, Marginality and Ethnopolitics. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 
Friedman, E. ―Political Integration of the Romani Minority in Post-Communist Macedonia,‖ in Southeast 




1.2 Research Question  
The purpose of this study is to ascertain and explain the effectiveness of Roma political 
activism in contesting state oppression in Macedonia and Serbia. It seeks to investigate 
the divergent treatment of Roma communities in the respective states by analyzing the 
role of state institutions, civil society, political parties and international organizations. 
There are two hypotheses underlying this study that will be investigated: i) Roma 
mobilization is likely to succeed when the domestic political opportunity structure is 
favourable ii) A ‗closed‘ domestic political opportunity structure shifts the focus of 
Roma activism to the international level. The main research question this thesis seeks to 
address is how effective are Roma political activists in contesting state oppression in 
Macedonia and Serbia? 
Additional questions addressed in this study include:  
 Has the political opportunity structure in Macedonia and Serbia facilitated or 
constrained Roma advocacy? 
 Do institutional mechanisms exist at the domestic level to promote Roma 
inclusion? 
 Are Roma political parties and civil society actors coordinated in their actions to 
promote Roma issues? 
Regarding the transnational sphere, the following questions are of relevance:  
 How has the internationalization of Roma advocacy affected movement activity? 
 What instruments are available to international institutions to guarantee state 
compliance on international obligations and are they effective? 
 How do international institutions and social movement actors (transnational 
advocacy networks) seek to influence and change Roma-related policy in 






1.3 Roma Mobilization: Domestic and International Theoretical 
Approaches 
The thesis seeks to provide a multi-level analysis of Roma mobilization in Macedonia 
and Serbia. To address the domestic and international factors that influence Roma 
political activism, the study relies on two main theoretical perspectives within the social 
movement literature: the Political Opportunity Structure (POS) model and ‗transnational 
advocacy networks.‘ The POS model provides a comprehensive framework to 
understanding how marginalized communities can challenge political institutions. The 
following components will be used to assess if Roma political activism has been 
effective: state repression and/or facilitation, institutional access, influential domestic 
and international allies. While discussing structural conditions at the macro level, 
previous studies have not accounted for the inter-relation between components.
9
 This 
thesis attempts to provide a more detailed analysis of movement dynamics by taking into 
account the inter-relationship between actors and contesting groups.
10
 
International institutions since the 1990s have demonstrated an increasing interest in 
Roma inclusion, specifically in Eastern Europe. It is thus necessary to account for the 
conditions at the international level that may facilitate or constrain Roma activism. This 
study, while recognizing the importance of other international initiatives,
11
 specifically 
focuses on various institutions of the European Union as the main international actor 
influencing Roma inclusion policies in Eastern Europe. Transnational advocacy scholars 
have analyzed how domestic activists may circumvent the state to build alliances with 
                                                          
9
See C. Tilly. From Mobilization to Revolution. (Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley, 1978). D. McAdam. 
―The Political Process Model,‖ in Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 1930-1970. 
(Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1982).  S. Tarrow. Power in movement: Social 
movements and contentious politics. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998). 
10
 See J. Goldstone. ―More Social Movements or Fewer? Beyond Political Opportunity Structures to 
Relational Fields.‖ Theory and Society. 33.4 (2004) 
11
 See for example, initiatives by the Open Society Institute (OSI), United Nations Development Program 





international allies to influence domestic governments.
12
  International allies are 
especially important in ‗closed regimes‘ such as Macedonia and Serbia that suppress 
domestic activism. This thesis also integrates literature on norm socialization to analyze 
how domestic governments may be influenced by international actors.
13
 The processes 
of instrumental adaption, argumentation, rhetorical entrapment and action are examined 
to illustrate international and domestic negotiation on Roma inclusion. 
1.4 Who are the Roma?  
As stated by well known activist and international civil servant Andrzej Mirga, ―you 
may not know who we are, but we do.‖
 14
 This statement conveys the sentiment that 
anyone who thinks of themselves as Roma can be defined as such, without the specific 
demarcations that generally indicate ‗belonging‘ to an ethnic group or nation-state. As 
will be argued in the following chapter, defining a Roma identity has often been an 
external imposition by state authorities and international institutions seeking to control 
the population. Ethnic categories and state mechanisms such as the census allow for ‗the 
exercise of racial governmentality ... to fashion racialized knowledge,‖ emphasizing the 
differences among social groups.
15
 The ‗ambiguous‘ Roma identity essentially 
contradicts dominant Western modes of political organization. It is not the purpose of 
this thesis to provide a historical account of the Roma people. However, a brief note is 
necessary to provide some background knowledge of the community. In attempting to 
provide some definition of a Roma identity, Vermeersch offers the following overview: 
―a historical diaspora (with origins in the Punjab region and common patterns of 
migration from this region to Europe and other continents), a group characterized by a 
typical culture and lifestyle (common cultural practices such as elements of religion, 
                                                          
12
 M. Keck and K. Sikkink. Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics. 
(Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1998) 
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 T. Risse and K. Sikkink. ―The socialization of international human rights norms into domestic practices: 
introduction,‖ in eds. T. Risse, S. Ropp, and K. Sikkink The Power of Human Rights: International Norms 
and Domestic Change. (Cambridge University Press, 1999) 
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 Andrejz Mirga in Stewart, M. ―Introduction,‖ in Multi-Disciplinary Approaches to Romany Studies. 
(Budapest: Central European University Press, 2010) pp. 1-12 
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habits, rules of cleanliness, musical traditions and interpretations of the world through 
the lenses of Romipen – Romani values), and a biological kinship, group or race.‖
16
 It is 
important to note, however, that Roma, like other ethnic groups do not have a monolithic 
identity. There are many linguistic and cultural differences within the Roma community. 
Factors such as geographic location, educational level, and economic status also impact 
internal self-identification and relations with others. According to an Ethnobarometer 
study, Roma individuals identified the following attributes as ‗defining‘ their identity: ―a 
feeling passed on by parents, others‘ identification/reaction, participation in a variety of 
common rituals and customs, cultural values, and speaking a dialect of Romani.‖
17
  
Many academics and activists trace the origins of the Roma people from 9-14
th
 century 
India. Generally, the community is referred to as a ‗non-territorial nation,‘ 
geographically dispersed with a population ranging from 12-15 million.
18
 In Western 
Europe, Roma are derogatively assigned the label ‗gypsy,‘ or alternatively, in the CEE 
region referred to as ‗tsiganes,‘ ‗gitano,‘ ‗Zingari,‘ etc. The term ‗Roma‘ encapsulates 
various social groups, such as the Manush, Rudari, Ludari, Lingurari, Boyash, Beash, 
Banyash, Kale/Kaale, and Romanichal found in numerous countries.
19
  While the term 
‗Roma‘ is widely used among academic and political elites, it is not always recognized 
as a form of identification among communities in Eastern Europe.  
1.5 Inter-group Dynamics 
Many Roma communities in Eastern Europe are isolated from central areas and inhabit 
segregated spaces that inhibit communication with other social groups. This accordingly 
promotes the construction of constricted boundaries and ‗ethnic localism.‘
20
 Historically, 
and in contemporary Macedonian and Serbian society, Roma communities have at times 
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 See Vermeersch in Klimova-Alexander, I. op.cit., p. 13 
17
 See Memedova, A., Plaut, S., Boscoboinik, A., Giordano, C., ―Roma Identities in Southeast Europe: 
Macedonia.‖ Ethnobarometer, (Rome: Utta Wickert-Sili, 2005), p. 37 
18
 Project on Ethnic Relations (PER)―Roma and the Question of Self-Determination: Fiction and Reality‖ 
(Princeton, 2003) 
19
 Klimova-Alexander, I. op.cit., p. 30 
20
Wimmer, A. ―The Making and Unmaking of Ethnic Boundaries: A Multilevel Process Theory.‖ 




maintained a distance from the ‗Gadje‘ (non-Roma) society that is often characterized as 
morally and ethically corrupt. There is much suspicion and caution among the Roma in 
relation to ‗outsiders‘ who at times are seen as threatening, especially as many Gadje are 
representative of authority figures (police, social workers, teachers) that can inflict harm 
or ‗negatively‘ influence community values.
21
  
Another factor determining Roma self-identification was the perception of 
discrimination based on ethnicity – which all respondents in the Ethnobarometer Study 
had experienced. In attempting to participate in Macedonian and Serbian societies, at 
times, Roma have also adopted alternative public ethnic identities; disassociating from 
negative group stigma. Wimmer refers to this process as ‗repositioning.‘
22
 The 
hierarchical order is not contested, rather the individual and less often the entire ethnic 
category, seek to change their status within the boundary system.
23
 Alternatively, a 
strategy of repositioning is ‗passing;‘ reconstructing one‘s identity to fit the dominant 
social category. For example, some interviewees in Macedonia and Serbia described 
having knowledge of light-skinned professional Roma ‗passing,‘ for fear of disrepute 
within their community; effectively making their ‗Gypsyness‘ disappear.
24
 Thus, ―the 
construction of skin colour becomes an alternative formulation of the difference between 
Gypsy and non-Gypsy. In these cases, the tone of skin is the mark of the 
uncontestability, the reinforcement, and the permanent presence of colour.‖
25
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 Interview with Vitomir Mihaljovic, Member of Parliament Democratic Party (DS) and President of the 
National Council for Roma, Belgrade, Serbia, June 6, 2009 and Nadja Kocic, Roma Education Fund, 
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 Horvath, K. ―Passing: Rebeka and the Gay Pride. On the Discursive Boundaries and Possibilities of 
Skin Colour.‖ Multi-Disciplinary Approaches to Romany Studies. (Budapest: Central European University 
Press, 2010), p. 127 In an evocative article, Horvath demonstrates how the skin colour of Roma 
individuals is articulated through their sexuality, by providing a narrative of a young Roma girl whose 
beauty is ‗exotic‘ within the context of participating in a Hungarian gay pride parade, yet she contests the 
often negative characterizations of her ‗darkness‘ on the Roma settlement. The author also describes a 
relationship between a non-Roma man and Romani woman, not accepted by his family because skin 




As noted by Nadja Kocic, Roma Education Fund (REF) representative in Serbia, one 
strategy to contest anti-Gypsyism is for professional Roma and the younger generation 
to assert and be proud of their identity. She states,  
“hopefully in five or six years time we will have this Roma intellectual elite who will 
probably make a change. Some of them will remain Roma -- some of them will not -- but, 
I think most of them will. There are some changes regarding this Roma ethnic identity. 
You can meet many young Roma people who are not ashamed to be saying that they are 
Roma, which is an excellent difference from ten - fifteen years ago. And, I think that it is 
the influence of these huge Roma and pro-Romani civil society organizations. It would 
be good if this remains -- not only in Serbia, but also in Montenegro, Bosnia, Croatia, 
and Macedonia. That is something new. It was already happening in Bulgaria and 
Turkey twenty years ago. But, that is something totally new for here.”
26
 
1.6 Dominant Group Perceptions of Roma 
Anti-Gypsyism as a definition is not widely recognized; Nicolae attempts to define it as  
―a very specific form of racism, an ideology of racial superiority, a form of dehumanization and of 
institutionalized racism. It is fuelled by historical discrimination and the struggle to maintain power 
relations that permit advantages to majority groups. It is based, on the one hand, on imagined fears, 
negative stereotypes, and myths, and, on the other, on denial or erasure from the public conscience of a 
long history of discrimination against the Roma. Prejudices against Roma clearly go beyond racist 




The dehumanization of Roma can be viewed as a ‗legitimating myth‘ that reinforces 
social group hierarchies, validates abusive behaviour toward the community and goes 
beyond racial categorization and negative stereotypes.
28
 As Roma are defined as less 
than human, human rights are not an entitlement for the minority. The belief that Roma 
are inferior to Europeans is not only shared by Europeans, but, perhaps more 
importantly, anti-Roma sentiment is shared by Roma.
29
 The more successful the 
dominant group is in promoting self-derogatory ideology within the subordinate social 
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group, the more intact the social hierarchy.
30
 Perceptions of the Roma community in 
many Eastern European countries illustrate what Barth refers to as a ‗pariah group.‘ The 
Roma identity ―imposed a definition on social situations which gave very little scope for 
interaction with persons in the majority population and simultaneously as an imperative 
status represented an inescapable disability that prevented them from assuming the 
normal statuses involved in other definitions of the situation of interaction.‖
31
 
Historically and presently, the Roma identity has been characterized in multiple ways; 
romanticized in fiction and television, ‗admired‘ for their fortune telling and musical 
abilities.
32
  A recent statement by the Romanian prime minister (2007) depicts the 
racism and sexism that exist among members of the elite and general society.
33
 
Comments by French President Sarkozy (2010) concerning settlement evictions and 




Although there is constant interaction between Roma and non-Roma in Macedonia and 
Serbia, both groups are led to believe they live in parallel spheres. Roma in post-socialist 
states are generally ‗ignored;‘ unless constructed as a ‗problem‘ to mainstream 
communities. This is changing however, as there is greater interest and involvement by 
international organizations. Rather than perceiving Roma to be a ‗threat,‘ to the state or 
society, there is aversion on a personal level; characterizing Roma as ‗lazy,‘ ‗dishonest‘ 
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 A respondent to the question of Roma/non-Roma relations in 
Macedonia explained:  
―Roma, all the time, were with the Macedonians. Roma are voting for Macedonians and 
they are closer with Macedonians then they are with, for example, Albanians. 
Macedonians in some ways love Roma because they are good people, peaceful people 
and loyal people. But, should we be proper? A Macedonian person could not stand to 
see a Roma person as better than them, to know more than he/she does, to be more 
worthy, to be in a better position than he or she is ... A Macedonian loves you only if you 




1.7 What are they advocating for? 
The aims and objectives of Roma political activism are two-fold: One is to alleviate 
poverty in Roma communities by improving housing, accessibility to health care and 
education, as well as providing employment opportunities. Many activists have therefore 
focused on civil registration activities to ensure that Roma have the necessary 
documents to access state services such as birth certificates, identity documents and 
health insurance.
37
 On the other hand, Roma seek public and political participation in 
their societies through representation in national parliaments, government institutions, 
and decision making bodies. Often Roma cannot make free and informed choices in 
elections due to undemocratic practices by mainstream political parties.  In many CEE 
countries, Roma also seek to promote awareness among law enforcement institutions to 
prevent excessive use of force and respect for human rights. It is also of consequence, as 
many NGO and international organization reports have emphasized, that the precarious, 
position of Romani women is addressed.
38
 Overall, one of the main priorities of the 
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movement is to combat racism and discrimination which impacts the subordination of 
Roma in all spheres of interest.
39
 
1.8 Roma in the Post-Yugoslav Context 
The nation building process in the former Yugoslavia was not conducive to minority 
integration, despite the rhetoric of ‗brotherhood and unity.‘ A unique hierarchical 
structure based on ethno-nationality recognized the differences among ‗nations,‘ 
‗nationalities,‘ and smaller ‗ethnic communities,‘ signifying the inclusive/exclusive 
character of Yugoslav identity. Roma defined as an ‗ethnic community,‘ were 
effectively at the bottom of the national hierarchy.
40
 These categorizations have 
subsequently determined, and negatively impacted contemporary inter-ethnic relations in 
the former Yugoslav republics.  
In analyzing the position of Roma in the former Yugoslavia, it is also important to note 
how labour relations impacted the construction of Roma as a ‗subservient class.‘ This 
was most readily apparent in the Romanian principalities where Roma were effectively 
‗slaves‘ and ‗important resources to be used and exploited‘ until the mid-nineteenth 
century. The variations in state policy toward Roma were determined by structural 
conditions affecting labour usage. Thus, capitalist developments in the West led to the 
expulsion of Roma, who were regarded as ‗unproductive nomads.‘ Comparatively, in 
Eastern Europe, attempts were made to ‗settle‘ the Roma population, in order to most 
effectively make use of their labour. Although Romani labour was essential in CEE 
economies, discrimination and segregation perpetuated and maintained their subordinate 
position. Mirga and Gheorghe have argued that it was the social identity of Roma at the 
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lowest stratum of the labour force and not their ethnicity that defined their 
marginalization in the former CEE region.
41
 
During the communist period, Roma benefitted from the restructuring of CEE 
economies, influenced by Soviet-style command economies; rapid industrialization 
required a large unskilled work force. Roma now had the capability of earning similar 
wages to other citizens, and few also took advantage of obtaining educational 
qualifications; later forming part of the small, yet influential group of intellectuals, 
leaders and activists in Eastern Europe. Although Roma achieved limited integration 
during this period, socialist ideologies prescribing the abandonment of ethnic identities, 
and the specific perception of Roma culture as a ‗relic from the past,‘ forced many 
attempting to transcend their marginal position, to hide their identity. Socialist policies 
promoting assimilation further compounded feelings of inferiority and self-derogation.
42
 
The Roma in the post-Yugoslav context are in a further disadvantaged position, as 
democratization and the transition to a market based economy have exacerbated socio-
economic inequalities. Since the end of the socialist period, the role of the state has 
changed dramatically in Eastern Europe. The ‗Charter of Paris for a New Europe‘ 
adopted in 1990 encompasses Europe‘s new liberal democratic order that respects 
minority rights and economic freedom. The Charter however, conceives of human rights 
as an extremely ambiguous and flexible principle. Civil and political rights pertain to 
every individual, but the document asserts that all individuals have the right ―to enjoy 
economic, social and cultural rights.‖
43
 Social and economic rights according to the 
Charter are not universal, but dependent on the specific jurisdiction. Specifically in the 
case of Macedonia and Serbia, Roma have the highest rate of unemployment, inadequate 
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access to health care, social benefits and housing.
44
 Roma children, across the SEE 
region have the lowest levels of school enrolment.
45
  
The exclusionary nationalist ideology in Serbia deserves special attention as the republic 
was the primary aggressor in perpetuating ethnic conflict as Yugoslavia fragmented 
along ethnic/national lines. By the 1980s, the multinational Yugoslav state had 
disintegrated with increasing conflict among its republics. Revived nationalism in 
Serbia‘s intellectual sphere was readily promoted by Slobodan Milosevic, who in the fall 
of 1987 led an insurgency to take leadership of the Communist Party. Milosevic 
challenged the political ideas of Tito‘s regime by promoting pre-socialist nationalist 
concepts of the Serbian nation.
46
 The vision of a ‗greater Serbia‘ was promoted by 
Serbian intelligence forces, the Serbian Orthodox Church, and political leadership in 
control of the media. Serbian national consciousness was invoked by promoting the idea 
of a unique culture and identity, and most importantly relied on hatred of other Yugoslav 
people. Political elites invoked the idea that Serbia was threatened and hated in 
Yugoslavia – current and historical grievances formed the basis of this repertoire. 
Exclusionary nationalist rhetoric included ideas such as Yugoslavia as a Serbian 




Nationalist movements in Serbia have mobilized constituents based on ethnic identity; 
non-Serb is equated with anti-Serb.
48
 Presently, racism and discrimination against 
visible minorities has increased, and ‗gypsies‘ have been the targets of physical assault 
by neo-Nazi groups and civilians.
49
 In 2001, after a Roma rally in Novi Sad, Serbia, 
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Marija Milosevic daughter of former President Slobodan Milosevic described Serbia as 
―a concentration camp ruled by Gypsies, Jews, Tzintzars and Turks.‖
50
 Discrimination 
against the Roma is also promoted by the media. In 2003, a local Serbian newspaper 
published a ‗joke‘ about killing Roma; a joint civil action suit was filed by the ERRC 
and Romani civil organizations in Belgrade.
51
 
It is not the purpose of this thesis to compare Macedonian and Serbian national identities 
– however, it can be proposed that although Macedonians have asserted a strong ethnic 
identity; generally, as a consequence of aggressive neighbouring states,
52
 nationalist 
fervour and antagonistic sentiment toward other Yugoslav identities and minority groups 
has been less salient. Macedonia in comparison to other SEE states has often been 
portrayed by academics, civil society representatives and politicians as a ‗multi-ethnic, 
tolerant‘ state concerning minority communities. Although Roma are not the subjects of 
‗overt racism,‘ a sophisticated, hidden racism exists that has perpetuated 
institutionalized marginalization of the community.
53
 Roma are often characterized as 
‗loyal citizens,‘ yet remain politically irrelevant and the most disadvantaged minority 
group in the state.  
1.9 Thesis Outline 
The theoretical chapter provides a conceptual framework and analytical tools to analyze 
Roma political activism in Macedonia and Serbia. The chapter reviews the studies on 
nationalism, ethnic categorization, and development discourse to demonstrate the 
problematic of identity construction in assessing ethnic conflict and the exclusion of 
Roma communities. In order to focus on the emancipatory potential of Roma activists, it 
is necessary to review the social movement literature on political opportunity structures, 
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transnational advocacy networks, and norm socialization to analyze how marginalized 
communities can challenge political institutions and advocate effectively. 
The third chapter outlines the research design of the study. Some preliminary definitions 
are introduced relating to the research question, as well as the key variables utilized in 
the study to evaluate the political opportunity structure in Macedonia and Serbia. The 
benefits and limitations of the ‗case study approach‘ are discussed, and various data 
collection methods are outlined. 
Chapters four and five describe the domestic factors that may facilitate or constrain 
Roma activism in Macedonia and Serbia. In each of the case studies, there is a brief 
review of the political context concerning minority inclusion. The chapters proceed to 
outline the institutional mechanisms for Roma inclusion that often do not facilitate the 
promotion of Roma issues. In addition, the role of Romani civil society organizations, 
political parties and domestic/international allies are discussed to evaluate if advocacy 
has been effective in the respective states. 
Chapter six evaluates the opportunities and challenges in the international arena, 
focusing on the main EU initiatives and compliance instruments on Roma inclusion. The 
chapter proceeds to evaluate the interaction of international institutions and civil society 
in impacting domestic policy on Roma, as well as considering domestic responses to the 
‗transnational advocacy network.‘ 
The final chapter of the thesis includes a comparative analysis of the case studies.  The 
chapter proceeds to evaluate Roma mobilization as ‗collective action‘ and also discusses 








Theoretical Perspectives on Roma Mobilization 
 
2.1 Introduction 
The main aim of this chapter is to provide a multi-level analysis of Roma mobilization in 
Macedonia and Serbia. The study will rely on the Political Opportunity Structure (POS) 
model
1
 to address the domestic factors that influence Roma claims-making in the 
respective states. The literature on ‗transnational advocacy networks‘
2
 and ‗norm 
socialization‘
3
 will be utilized to evaluate the international dynamics of Roma activism. 
Previous to discussing the various components of the theories, the chapter will review 
the literature on nationalism, ethnic categorization and development to problematize 
identity construction in relation to analyzing internal conflict and the exclusion of Roma 
communities. In particular, the literature discusses how dominant perceptions of Roma 
identity do not allow for an emancipatory politics. It therefore becomes necessary to 
review the literature on social movements to analyze how marginalized communities 
attempt to challenge political institutions and advocate for their claims. 
The chapter will proceed to outline the main components of the POS model (institutional 
arrangements, resources, allies, and elites) and the interrelation between factors.  In 
order to comprehensively assess Roma mobilization, it should not only be limited to 
domestic activism, but also recognized in the international sphere. Transnational 
advocacy networks enable a study of how domestic activists in alliance with 
international actors attempt to influence domestic power structures. Finally, the literature 
on norm socialization is integrated to operationalize how international institutions 
influence Roma inclusion policy in Macedonia and Serbia. 
                                                          
1
 See C. Tilly and S. Tarrow. Contentious Politics. (London: Paradigm Publishers, 2007) 
2
 M. Keck and K. Sikkink. Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics. (Ithaca 
and London: Cornell University Press, 1998) 
3
 T. Risse and K. Sikkink. The Power of Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic Change. 





This study seeks to examine six main research questions in relation to the 
interaction between domestic actors, international institutions and social movement 
activity:  
 Has the political opportunity structure in Macedonia and Serbia facilitated or 
constrained Roma advocacy? 
 Do institutional mechanisms exist at the domestic level to promote Roma 
inclusion? 
 Are Roma political parties and civil society actors coordinated in their actions to 
promote Roma issues? 
 How has the internationalization of Roma advocacy affected movement activity? 
 What instruments are available to international institutions to guarantee state 
compliance on international obligations and are they effective? 
 How do international institutions and social movement actors (transnational 
advocacy networks) seek to influence and change Roma-related policy in 
Macedonia and Serbia?  
 
2.2 PREVIOUS EXPLANATIONS 
Nationalism Literature 
A recurrent theme throughout Kaplan‘s work
4
 is that ethnic conflict in the Balkan region 
is the result of racial and ancient hatred between Serbians and Albanians. While Kaplan 
provides an interesting narrative, his analysis is superficial by overlooking the 
underlying political factors that account for internal conflict between the two majority 
groups. Kaplan‘s work can be criticized for not providing a multi-level analysis of ethnic 
conflict; that is the domestic and international political factors that contribute to Roma 
oppression in Macedonia and Serbia. In this sense, the author‘s analysis is simplistic, by 
solely relying on the idea of ‗ancient hatred‘ to depict the situation between Albanians 
and Serbians. In contrast, Brown provides a different theoretical focal point to analyze 
internal conflict. The author outlines four main political factors that underlie internal 
conflict: ―discriminatory political institutions, exclusionary national ideologies, inter-
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group politics, and elite politics.‖
5
  Brown posits that internal conflict is more likely if a 
political transition is occurring and especially when a state is in the process of 
democratization.
6
 While Kaplan covers the historical reasons for internal conflict 
between Albanian and Serbian groups (‗ancient hatred‘), he does not account for 
processes of democratization that may have perpetuated ethnic conflict.  
Brown argues that the prospect for internal conflict depends on the national ideology in 
a particular country. In the case of Macedonia and Serbia, both national identity and 
citizenship are based on ethnic affiliation, rather than the idea that national citizenship 
provides all individuals equal rights. Ethnic nationalism is based on culture, rather than 
political institutions. Thus, ethnic nationalism prevails when existing political 
institutions are weak and no viable, alternative state structure exists.
7
  
While Gellner (1983), Smith (1991), and Hutchinson (2001) make important 
contributions to the debate on nationalism, their analysis is not sufficiently 
comprehensive in explaining how ethnic nationalism excludes minority groups. Gellner 
acknowledges the importance of nationality in defining the individual and national 
culture as the mode of communication that connects a community of strangers. Although 
he recognizes the importance of evoking the past in affirming national identity, there is 
no acknowledgment of ethnicity as an important factor that affirms collective identity 
during the nation building process.   
Ethno-symbolists, such as Smith and Hutchinson are in agreement with modernists such 
as Gellner that nations are a recent phenomenon in their physical consolidation, high 
vernacular cultures, and self determination.
8
 However, Smith and Hutchinson differ in 
their assessment when stating that the main concerns of nations are with identity and 
                                                          
5
 M. Brown. ―The Causes of Internal Conflict,‖ in ed. M. Brown. Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict. 
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2001), p. 8. 
6
 R. de Nevers. ―Democratization and Ethnic Conflict,‖ in ed. M. Brown Ethnic Conflict and International 
Security. (Princeton New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1993) 61-78. See also, K. Newland.―Ethnic 
Conflict and Refugees,‖ in ed. M. Brown Ethnic Conflict and International Security. (Princeton New 
Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1993) pp. 143-164.  
7
 See M. Brown, op.cit., p. 9 
8
 J. Hutchinson. ―Nations and Culture,‖ in eds., M. Guibernau and J. Hutchinson, Understanding 






 Hutchinson explains that warfare, economic decline, and migration have all 
challenged the physical and cultural existence of a population. By incurring a collective 
imagination that invokes identification with the historic nation that embodies ―myths, 
symbols and culture,‖ individuals are able to overcome historical circumstances and 
unite to find their collective purpose. Thus, for ethno-symbolists ―culture … means not 
just symbols, traditions or rituals, but rather the meanings and orientations to collective 
action that these evoke.‖
10
 
Focusing on the aspect of national identity construction, Smith outlines six main 
characteristics of an ethnic community: ―a collective proper name, a myth of common 
ancestry, shared historical memories, one or more differentiating elements of common 
culture, an association with a specific ‗homeland,‘ and a sense of solidarity for 
significant sectors of the population.‖
11
 While these attributes are relevant for describing 
the collective identity of most ethnic groups, in the case of Roma, there is only minimal 
relation to any one characteristic. One of the main criticisms of the national and ethnic 
identity literature is its basis on Western European ideals of national belonging and 
‗imagined communities.‘
12
 The case of Roma is unique, precisely because there is no 
Romani nation-state. Hence, the community‘s precarious position as ‗illegal migrants‘ in 
many European states.
13
 Romani existence is further problematized in Macedonia and 
Serbia as the community does not belong to the dominant ethnic categories – the 
‗naturalized‘ ethnic groups of post-Yugoslav nations. Although viewed as a 
homogeneous ethnic group by ‗outsiders,‘ how Roma perceive themselves and in 
relation to others is a complex process.
14
 Thus, the concept of ‗ethnie‘ or ‗ethnic 
community‘ as suggested by Smith, does not have relevance when analyzing the case of 
Roma oppression and mobilization. 
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Ethnic Categorization and Boundary Making 
The term ‗Roma,‘ signifying the inclusion of communities with varying cultural and 
linguistic attributes, is a response to state imposition and insistence that the ‗Roma‘ 
community has a singular voice and vision.
15
 The ‗Roma‘ risk political alienation unless 
a unified identity is displayed; despite the fact that no ethnic community has a 
monolithic identity. Attempts to define a ‗Roma identity‘ are a response to the nation-
state system that seeks to control its population through the categorization of individuals 
and construction of salient boundaries.
16
 The literature on nationalism does not include a 
discussion of how the creation of ethnic identity categories presents a specific 
construction of reality – state mechanisms such as the census allow for the expansion 
and maintenance of this illusion. Thus, ―categories are central to the state‘s exercise of 
racial governmentality; censuses have constituted a formative governmental technology 
in the service of the state to fashion racialized knowledge ...‖
17
Assigning individuals to a 
singular category creates the myth of a shared identity and emphasizes the differences 
among categories. Instead of perceiving social groups as circumstantial the census 
promotes categorization and boundary making.
18
    
A further critique of the nationalism literature is the limited interrogation of key 
assumptions that only perpetuate Western modes of political organization and power 
structures. For example, the literature does not include a conceptual analysis of how 
divisions are created and maintained among ‗ethnic communities.‘ The ‗natural‘ 
phenomenon of national and ethnic identity, and everyday primordialist assumptions as 
proposed by Kaplan‘s analysis, can be critiqued by reviewing the work of constructivists 
such as Barth (1969), Fearon and Laitin (2000), Wimmer (2008) that acknowledge the 
social construction of identity and its impact on inter-ethnic relations. The authors refute 
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the idea of ‗eternal hostility;‘ the idea that conflict ensues because of enduring 
characteristics and enmities between ethnic groups. As noted by Barth in a seminal 
essay, ethnic boundaries are defined by differences and not the cultural characteristics of 
the social group.
19
 Expanding on Barth‘s ideas, Wimmer introduces a multilevel model 
of ethnic boundary making presenting different strategies of ethnic boundary 
construction used by actors in various social contexts. As defined by Wimmer, a 
boundary:  
―displays both a categorical and a social or behavioral dimension. The former refers to acts of social 
classification and collective representation; the latter to everyday networks of relationships that result 
from individual acts of connecting and distancing. On the individual level, the categorical and the 
behavioral aspects appear as two cognitive schemes. One divides the social world into social groups—
into ―us‖ and ―them‖—and the other offers scripts of action—how to relate to individuals classified as 
―us‖ and ―them‖ under given circumstances. Only when the two schemes coincide, when ways of 
seeing the world correspond to ways of acting in the world, shall I speak of a social boundary (975).‖
20
  
It is important to note that the concept of boundary does not intend to restrict definitions 
and belonging to an ethnic group; boundaries are variable dependent on the societal and 
institutional context. As Silverman notes ―there has been ... a tendency to study Gypsies 
context-free, that is, as an isolated, bounded group. This tendency reflects the 
conventional concept of an ethnic group which implies that members have more 
frequent ... contact with each other than ... with outsiders.‖
21
 However, Gypsies although 
maintaining a strict boundary between members and non-members, conduct informal 
and formal relations with non-Gypsies. Thus, any account of Gypsy ethnicity must focus 
on the interaction between Gypsy and non-Gypsy culture. This is especially interesting, 
concerning the Gypsy identity, which depending on the context may reflect mainstream 
stereotypes of the group. For example, Gypsy fortune tellers encourage the stereotype of 
the exotic, foreign healer that meets the expectations of non-Gypsies, as it is more 
profitable to advertise this image. Furthermore, by presenting a superficial image of the 
Gypsy culture, the group is able to hide the in-group culture.
22
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An analysis of Gypsy culture and identity demonstrates how ‗race‘ is an ideological 
construct, and a historical process. ‗Gypsiness‘ as a racial/ethnic category has been 
defined differently depending on the social structure, dominant ideology, historical 
context, and geographical location. As a mechanism to overcome this challenge, Gypsies 
have negotiated their identity depending on the oppressive structure in place at a specific 
time.  For instance, Gypsies may ‗assimilate‘ adopting cultural traits such as clothing, 
music, language, and occupation without identifying with non-Gypsy culture. The 
characteristics have no meaning, beyond their significance for the particular role that is 
‗expected‘ and period of time. To an outsider, this may be perceived as an adaptation to 
the local culture, or to categorize the Gypsy as a ‗foreigner,‘ but with specific social 
traits to be ranked within a hierarchy. However, the identity that is presented to the 
‗outside world,‘ is fictive.
 23
 
Ethnic boundary making strategies, as compared to the literature on nationalism, 
accounts for how the state‘s promotion of ethnic categorization at times creates the 
justification for minority discrimination, as members of the majority are ‗representative‘ 
of a particular state. Minorities are confronted with a new hierarchy of exclusion as 
ethnic boundaries become established in everyday understanding and action.
24
 In 
contextualizing Romani exclusion in the overall debate regarding European racism and 
nationalism, it is useful to refer to Balibar‘s argument that each nation ―through its 
institutions, constructs a fictive ethnicity‖ that is different from the ‗other‘ on the basis 
of visible, behavioural or audible characteristics. As fictive ethnicity and patriotism are 
augmented, it serves only to perpetuate racism. Balibar understands racism as ―internal 
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to the current history of nationalisms.‖
25
 As states are progressing toward ‗anti-
citizenship,‘ security measures, constitutional changes, and legislation coordinated 
among nations are similar in immigration and asylum rights. National identity is 
increasingly displaced by fictive ethnicities and racism. Additional security measures 
and constitutional changes coordinated among European nations create ―a new mode of 
discrimination between the national and the alien.‖
26
 The nation‘s exclusion of ‗others‘ 
and individual internalization of the ‗foreigner‘ creates internal and external borders.  
The previous discussion focused on how the literature on nationalism is inadequate to 
explain Roma exclusion. The concept of ‗ethnic community‘ is problematized in the 
case of Roma as the social group does not conform to European ideals of national 
belonging. While the nationalist literature provides an account of how national ideology 
based on culture and ethnic affiliation contribute to societal divisions and internal 
conflict, it does not analyze state ethnic categorization and boundary making. The 
nationalism literature is focused on Western conceptions of collective identity and does 
not include a discussion of identity construction; this is especially limiting in the case of 
Roma identity formation and political participation in Macedonia and Serbia.  
2.3 IDENTITY POLITICS 
The Externalization of Roma Identity 
The literature on nationalism and ethnic boundaries provided a framework for 
understanding how Macedonian and Serbian societies are characterized by a high degree 
of social closure and politicization. Generally, in Eastern Europe individuals are 
identified as belonging to a specific ethnic community with little ambiguity and there is 
strong emotional attachment to an ethnic category. Social groups will attempt to 
preserve cultural authenticity at any cost, even in periods of great social change.  
Identity preservation reduces the options for boundary making strategies and 
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interpretation of ethnic categories.
27
 However, this structure of ethnic boundary making 
in relation to Roma is not deterministic. In certain historical junctures, a strategy may be 
reformed and change is possible. An ‗exogenous shift‘
28
 may occur as new actors 
become involved changing the availability of resources and political alliances. For 
instance, international organizations such as the European Union, Council of Europe and 
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) have been active in 
Eastern European candidate countries on issues regarding inter-ethnic relations.  
Wimmer accounts for political alliance networks as an integral factor in boundary 
adaptation.
29
 However, a critical evaluation of international organization discourse 
demonstrates an external imposition of identity on the Roma community. The EU for 
instance, has been an important actor in authenticating ‗Gypsy‘ and ‗Roma‘ as political 
terms within international organization discourse and documents such as ‗action plans.‘ 
Challenges arising from seemingly ‗objective‘ categories remain submersed, as EU 
institutions and governments search for numerical evidence to validate the construction 
of the ‗Gypsy/Roma‘ category and its political objects. Early EU discussions 
acknowledged that information regarding ‗Gypsies‘ was to be collected, but the 
community was not included as active participants.  Instead, dialogue occurred only 
among EU institutional actors; an interaction that has only recently included the Roma 
community.
30
 As the Roma community does not have significant political power and 
legitimacy, advocating a new ethnic boundary and establishing alliances is challenging. 
Political actors with different interests have to be persuaded of their self perception that 
entails a delicate negotiation process.
31
 Although the state and international institutions 
determine the contours of individual ethnic boundary making, those in a disadvantaged 
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For instance, Valery Novoselsky, Roma activist and organizer of the web based Romano 
Liloro Groups; a forum and information service on Roma issues, has argued that the 
internet encourages ‗cultural communities‘ and ‗transnational ethnic identification 
among the Roma.‘
33
 Novoselsky has argued that the internet can change how Roma 
communicate, disseminate information, build civil society, develop social partnerships 
and political activism. These mechanisms can foster a ‗virtual nation,‘ utilizing the 
internet as a platform. In critically evaluating the role of the internet as an ‗emancipatory 
tool‘ for Romani political mobilization, Atanasoski suggests that the marginalized status 
of Roma communities in Eastern Europe limits the capacity of technology to advance 
Roma rights.  For instance, for many Roma families in non-Western nations, the internet 
is considerably expensive; this is especially the case in Macedonia and Serbia. 
Furthermore, as Roma rights discourse on the internet is generally influenced by 
Western international agencies and NGOs, there is a misrepresentation of the Roma 
issue as an Eastern European problem. For instance, the European Roma Rights Centre 
(ERRC) is often the target of criticism for not publishing sufficient information on the 
Roma rights violations in Western Europe. It is also recognized that the ERRC monitors 




Roma as a ‘Victim-Subject’ within Development Discourse 
The literature on development discourse is especially useful in negating Western 
European constructions of Roma identity and perceptions of the community. 
International organizations such as the EU have authenticated the category ‗Roma,‘ 
creating a vast network of experts, statistics, and documents that validate the 
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community‘s existence. Roma prior to the early 1990s were predominately excluded 
from the development discourse. Developmental policies and programs under the guise 
of ‗political activism,‘ target a once peripheral people, and symbolize ‗reform‘ and 
‗progression‘ in Eastern European countries, to eventually join the European 
community. As noted by Havel, the Gypsies offered ―a litmus test of liberal tolerance 
within ‗new Europe‘ constituting Gypsiness as a marker of racial difference that 
measured the progress of Eastern Europe democracies by their multicultural 
inclusiveness.‖
35
 Thus, any measures to support Roma political activism are connected 
with the idea of ‗Balkan development and minority inclusion‘ and the adoption of 
international human rights norms, as well as the particular transformation of Serbia as a 
‗Balkan monster.‘ Macedonia is comparatively, romanticized as a haven for minorities 
and thus, more amenable to international intervention.  
The role of the ‗victim subject‘ in particular is a dominant concept in the context of 
Western intervention regarding marginal groups in ‗developing nations.‘ International 
institutions and Western European states have reinforced the image of Roma as a victim 
subject,
36
 promoting cultural essentialism in discussions of minority issues that has 
further transferred into a Western European/Balkan divide. As stated by Hansen,  
The Western discursive constructions of the ‗Balkans‘ have taken a spatial identity, the Balkans, and 
constructed it within three different discourses: a Byronian Romanticism that constituted ‗the Balkans‘ as 
different from the West, as an object of admiration that should be transformed, but supported by the West 
in it struggles for independence; a civilizational Enlightenment discourse that constituted ‗the Balkans‘ as 
different from the West but with the capacity for liberal political and economic transformation, a 
transformation for which the West had a moral responsibility as well as financial and geopolitical interest; 
and, finally, a Balkanization discourse that constructed ‗the Balkans‘ as radically different and threatening 
in its capacity to bring chaos and war to the West, as incapable of transformation, and to be isolated and 
deterred rather than supported.
37
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In particular, academic, media and government discourses refer to  Serbian national 
identity as ‗violent,‘ ‗irrational,‘ ‗underdeveloped,‘ ‗barbarian,‘ ‗backward,‘ ‗tribal,‘ 
‗primitive,‘ and ‗savage,‘ as compared to the ‗developed,‘ ‗civilized,‘ ‗rational,‘ and 
‗controlled‘ European identity.
38
 The connection between Balkan culture and violence 
are used as an explanation of the kind of marginalization and impoverishment that Roma 
individuals are confronted with in Eastern European contexts. 
By successfully adopting Western ‗multicultural‘ standards,‘ Eastern European states 
may also ‗progress,‘ in attaining racial equality and eradicate inter-ethnic divisions.
39
 
Within this emancipatory framework, the important marker of ‗colour‘ loses its 
significance. Recognizing ‗difference‘ through the process of ‗integration,‘ thus renders 
‗race‘ an insignificant signifier, as Eastern European states adopt neoliberal values 
sustained by economic reforms. The ‗multicultural‘ society, as an ‗ideal‘ state does not 
always make visible the cultural and physical characteristics that define and empower a 
community. ‗Race consciousness,‘ ethnic identity, heterogeneity and fragmentation 
within the Roma community do not devalue its representation and participation in an 
inclusive society.  
These ideas are an essential foundation for Western development discourse that seeks 
through the extensive network of international organizations, and development agencies 
to propose strategies and programs that will ‗develop‘ Eastern European states to 
discontinue the victimization of Roma communities. The emphasis on the victim subject 
reinforces the impression of Roma in Eastern Europe as perpetually ostracized and 
impoverished; reasserting stereotypes and racist portrayals of Balkan culture that 
privileges the position of Western European nations. International attention on the Roma 
community has had important and beneficial consequence, focusing interest on the lack 
of domestic governmental action on Roma claims-making for equality in education, 
employment, health care and housing. The victim subject has also allowed Roma to 
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discuss issues of importance, that otherwise would have remained invisible in human 
rights discourse.  
However, if a more progressive and representational movement is to develop on Roma 
concerns it is necessary to renegotiate international intervention on Roma affairs. As 
stated by Kapur ―it is important to recognize and centre the peripheral subject and her 
multiple historically, culturally, and socially determined subjectivities instead of falling 
back on universalized assumptions about the individual‘s realities and their subject 
position.‖
40
 In order to empower marginalized people, it is important to recognize 
‗moments of resistance‘ so as not to produce a narrative that simply describes how the 
individual is subjugated. Providing multiple narratives of an individual‘s or movement‘s 
history helps to undermine hegemonic interpretations of culture and race that are 
reiterated in the international and domestic arenas. Representations of Roma as 
thoroughly disempowered and incapable of self-determination does not help to liberate 
the community from repressive domestic power structures.  
Limitations of the Nationalism, Ethnic Boundary, and Development Literature 
To sum up, the nationalism, ethnic boundary and development literature focuses on how 
identity construction impacts processes of internal conflict and exclusion. The 
nationalism literature based on Western European ideas of collective identity and 
national belonging pays little attention to ethnicity and how this determines insider-
outsider status in a society. The literature reflects on the nation building process, but is 
limited by not interrogating state categorization and how this may create the justification 
for minority discrimination. Comparatively, the ethnic boundary model provides a multi-
level analysis of how ‗differences‘ between social groups are constructed, thereby 
critiquing everyday primordialist assumptions of ‗eternal hostility.‘  
In the specific case of the Roma community, it is important to reflect on the 
externalization of identity using the concept of political alliance networks. Strategies of 
boundary adaptation are important to challenge nationalism and exclusion in 
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Macedonian and Serbian societies. External actors, such as the EU have supported 
alternative constructions of the ‗Gypsy‘ identity, but have only recently included the 
Roma community in political discussions. The further contextualization of Roma as a 
‗victim subject‘ within the Western European/Balkan divide illustrates how the literature 
on development and nationalism are integrated. The promotion of cultural essentialism 
and characterization of the Balkan identity as ‗violent,‘ and ‗barbaric,‘ privileges the 
Western position and intervention on minority issues in the Balkans. International 
attention on the Roma community is essential to criticizing limited domestic 
implementation of Roma related policies and programs, but an emancipatory framework 
would challenge universalized assumptions of Balkan culture and the victimization of 
the Roma community. 
It is thus important to introduce the social movement literature that provides a 
framework for understanding how a marginalized community such as the Roma can 
challenge political institutions. Kapur (2002) addresses the importance of recognizing 
‗moments of resistance,‘ and focusing on community emancipation without providing a 
basic narrative of subjugation.  The literature on nationalism, ethnic boundaries, and 
development provided a useful analysis to illustrate minority exclusion, but in order to 
address the topic of minority mobilization it must initially focus on the political 
opportunity structure in a state that facilitates or constrains claims-making.  
2.4 POLITICAL OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURES (POS)  
The POS model is one of the dominant theoretical approaches used to analyze protest 
group mobilization.
41
 As defined by Kitschelt ―political opportunity structures are 
comprised of specific configurations of resources, institutional arrangements and 
historical precedents for social mobilization, which facilitate the development of protest 
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movements in some instances and constrain them in others.‖
42
  The existing social 
movement agenda outlines ―increasing access, shifting political alignments, divided 
elites, influential allies, limited repression and facilitation, low state strength, ineffective 
and illegitimate state repression, and international conditions and allies,‖
43
 as factors 
necessary in analyzing social movements. 
By comparing the political opportunity structures in Macedonia and Serbia one can 
demonstrate how movement strategies are influenced by the choices presented by the 
state structure, and concomitantly how protest activity impact their environments. It is 
important to recognize the interaction between open/closed political structures and 
movement mobilization. Kitschelt attempts to demonstrate that closed political 
structures suppress social movements, open and receptive regimes reformulate protest 
demands in accordance with state policies, and moderately authoritarian structures 
provide a platform for movement demands but do not readily accommodate its ideas to 
reform established policies.
44
 One way that political opportunity structures can restrict or 
enhance collective action is dependent on the ―coercive, normative, remunerative and 
informational resources‖
45
 a movement can collect and utilize in its protest activities. 
Movement appeal to universal norms, the collection of information regarding human 
rights violations, and monetary funds to distribute information increases the chances of 
attracting a wider audience and movement membership.
46
 
Developments of the POS Model 
McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly (2001) introduce the idea of a dynamic mobilization model, 
building upon the existing social movement factors and identifying the mechanisms that 
allow for their interrelation. Opportunities and threats are not perceived as objective 
structural variables, but the focus becomes on how the opportunities and constraints are 
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viewed by collective actors. Mobilization cannot occur unless the protest group 
conceives the opportunity or threat. Thus, while repression poses a constraint on 
collective action, it also depends on how movement actors perceive or define it as a 
threat.
47
 Furthermore, a dynamic mobilization model does not focus on existing 
opportunity structures, but the ―active appropriation of sites for mobilization.‖
48
 Instead 
of forming new organizations; protest groups turn existing structures into sites of 
mobilization. For protest groups that lack resources, this is one way to compensate for 
organizational deficits.  
Goldstone (2004) suggests that while POS may be useful to describe macro-level 
conditions, „external relational fields‟ is a more accurate term to account for 
relationships with other actors and contesting groups; as well as allowing for a more 
detailed analysis of movement dynamics.
49
 The main contribution to POS literature is 
Goldstone‘s adoption of a relational approach when analyzing social movement 
mobilization and success to study the effect of specific elements on a particular 
movement and issue, and the relationship between the various factors. Tarrow and Tilly 
(2007) improve upon the dynamic mobilization model, and adopt a ‗relational approach‘ 
by clarifying concepts and including additional components. Many of the factors 
important to analyzing social movements remain the same. Threats and opportunities are 
viewed as a simultaneous process; constantly changing in response to regime openness, 
shifting political alignments, and the availability of allies. Variable threats and 
opportunities move contesting groups to either rigid or flexible repertories. For example, 
conflict between those in power sometimes leads to an alliance formation with 
challengers (i.e. mainstream parties in Macedonia and Serbia would not form alliances 
with Roma political parties unless additional votes were required for election). This 
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limits those in power as well as the challengers from adopting a more rigid or flexible 
repertoire.
50
   
This thesis argues that the Roma movement may be constrained as cooption and 
dependency on the Macedonian and Serbian political structures has not enabled 
flexibility and innovation in terms of advocacy. A common repertoire connects social 
movement challengers and those in power. Activists once clear on the object of their 
claims, may now be uncertain of some movement goals.
51
 For example, as it exists 
presently in Macedonia and Serbia, Roma civil society is either part of the government 
structure, or dependent on alliances with the government for survival.  Roma civil 
society in the respective states is active, but limited in its criticism of government action 
on Roma inclusion policies. Political response to Roma claims by international 
organizations and governments has led to institutionalization and a loss of momentum 
concerning Roma activism.  
It is important to note the tactics of ‗power holders‘ that may constrain protest activity, 
not enabling a social movement campaign: i) target groups may dispense symbolic 
satisfactions. Appearances of activity and commitment to problems substitute for, or 
supplement, resource allocation and policy innovations which would constitute tangible 
responses to protest activity, ii) target groups may dispense token material satisfactions – 
crises cases, and no general assault on problems, iii) target groups may organize and 
innovate internally in order to blunt the impetus of protest efforts iv) target groups may 
appear to be constrained in their ability to grant protest goals, v) target groups may use 




This thesis will demonstrate that the Roma community is not perceived as a legitimate 
actor by power holders in Macedonia and Serbia. Although some room has been made to 
create Roma-related positions within Macedonian and Serbian political structures, 
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resources concerning Roma inclusion projects are lacking, leading to further constraints 
on activism.  Macedonian and Serbian institutions as the ‗objects‘ of Roma ‗program 
claims‘
53
 have not been a successful endeavor. Other factors limiting Roma activism 
include alliance formation and cooption by mainstream political parties, an uncritical 
civil sector, division among Roma leaders, limited inter-departmental cooperation, and 
the ineffective measures implemented by international organizations to be discussed in 
detail in later chapters. 
Limitations of the POS Model 
One of the main limitations of the POS and Dynamic Mobilization models is a 
predominant focus with institutions and organizations as the main avenues for claims-
making. Stammers and Eschle argue that movements are frequently conflated with, or 
subordinated to organizations, while other aspects of activism are neglected, thus 
reinforcing existing power structures and relations.  Social movement organizations are 
often viewed in an ultra positive light and assumed to be ‗progressive,‘ initiating a ‗new 
politics.‘
 
Organized and informal activism is often portrayed as sharing similar 
ideological commitments and goals. As noted by Stammers and Eschle ―if informal 
grassroots activism and non-institutional articulations of collective identity entirely 
disappear then a social movement no longer exists.‖
54
 
Similarly, Trehan argues that the ‗NGOization of human rights‘ has not led to the 
emergence of an independent voice among Roma communities in Europe.  Roma 
activists are seeking inclusion in a predominately White civil society, in which 
alternative discourses remain insignificant. The ‗Roma movement‘ is highly 
institutionalized as a primarily NGO and elite driven process promoting neoliberal 
values in post-socialist states. Local Romani organizations are marginalized and viewed 
only as ‗implementing partners,‘ as national/international elite interests dominate. 
Private American organizations advocating strong anti-communist humanitarian values 
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frame the Roma rights agenda, particularly in Eastern Europe. Thus, substantial funding 
was allocated to NGOs in Eastern Europe that promoted neoliberal values and 
democratization processes which focused on supporting civil society and human rights.
55
  
Secondly, the POS model does not articulate the important differences between 
movement emergence and success. As argued by Goldstone, the two processes are not 
fostered by the same opportunities and should be analyzed using different factors.
56
 
Goldstone posits that democratization provides the basic framework for the emergence 
of social protest movements, as well as institutionalized political activity. Once 
democratic institutions are in place, protest becomes a normal part of politics. Thus, 
other factors that the POS model lists – ―state strength, allies, repression,‖ no longer 
seem relevant.
57
 Democratization may be conducive to the emergence of social 
movements, but not necessarily institutionalized protest activity. Ballentine and Snyder 
make the persuasive argument that ethnic and nationalist conflict is exacerbated when 
there is greater freedom of expression and debate in emerging democracies. While civil 
society is blossoming and state institutions are not well established, the state and 
political opportunists compete for constituents to acquire power.  Under these 
conditions, an increase in the freedom of expression allows ‗nationalist mythmakers,‘ to 
dominate public debate.
58
 For instance, Milosevic was successful in attracting Serbian 
constituents by monopolizing the media outlets in Belgrade, and relying on historical 
tensions between Albanian and Serbian groups. Thus, Serbian constituents reacted 
favourably to his uncontested propaganda.
59
  
Earlier POS models identified the domestic structural conditions for movement 
mobilization. The work of Kitschelt exemplifies previous studies that focused on the 
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interaction between open/closed political structures and movement actors. McAdam, 
Tarrow, and Tilly refer to a dynamic mobilization model, building upon the existing 
social movement agenda by accounting for the mechanisms that allow for variable 
interrelation, adopting a ‗relational approach.‘ One of the main limitations of the POS 
and dynamic mobilization models, however, is a focus on organizations and institutions 
as the main avenues for claims-making.  It was noted that domestic political structures as 
the target of Roma activism have constrained movement actors and led only to 
‗symbolic success.‘ The domination of NGOs and political elites within the Roma 
movement submerse informal forms of activism that could build movement momentum. 
The subsequent discussion will focus on mobilization at the international level, utilizing 
‗transnational advocacy networks‘ as a concept to analyze if Roma claims-making has 
been successful in the international sphere. 
 
2.5 International Advocacy and Roma Mobilization 
Since the early 1990s, international organizations have shown an increasing interest in 
addressing Roma-related issues in Eastern Europe, thus constructing favourable 
opportunities and facilitating Roma claims-making in international arenas. International 
initiatives have included the ‗Decade of Roma Inclusion (2005-2015),‘ as well as 
various programs and actions by the European Union (EU), Organization for Security 
and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and Council of Europe (CoE). Although Roma-
related issues are prominent on the international agenda, implementation is severely 
lacking in the domestic sphere where the reforms need to occur.  There is indication of 
‗symbolic‘ success; shown for instance, by the institutionalization of Roma-related 
issues. However, the path between international and domestic levels is impeded. 
Although the international opportunity structure is more ‗open,‘ the lack of 
implementation at the domestic level severely impairs the ability for sustainable change.  
Often political imperatives do not enable international organizations to fulfil their 




rather than promote policies that international institutions suggest for expansion and 
growth.
60
Although international agencies seek to provide knowledge and resources for 
development – often many of the resources are misallocated.  Domestic institutions are 
central to policy direction – without political reforms, international influence is 
negligible. International organization staffs are confronted with an awkward 
predicament. Acknowledging the difficulty of implementing political changes, but 
having to act within the bureaucratic structures of international organizations bolsters the 
idea of ‗doing something,‘ despite the limited achievements.
61
  
International Organizations such as the Council of Europe and OSCE are limited in their 
ability to act by EU Member States, but are able through a variety of mechanisms to 
penalize non-implementation of policies. International organizations may monitor and 
disseminate information that would negatively impact the international status of member 
states.
6263
 It is also essential that international organizations be viewed as impartial 
actors for enforcement mechanisms to work effectively.  An international organization‘s 
authority and legitimacy is integral to its influence – thus cannot be taken lightly.  
Although international agencies may be perceived favourably among EU member states, 
if perceived as biased, too coercive, or vindicating of government actions it is likely they 
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Civil society organizations are also critical of international organizations and their focus 
on government institutions as the main conduit to implement Roma-related policy. This 
may be viewed as the most effective means of ensuring the institutionalization of 
minority issues and focusing on long term measures to implement change. Institutional 
democratization is a constructive approach, but is limited as the extent to which reforms 
can be implemented is dependent on the political environment in Macedonia and Serbia. 
The result of political corruption and struggle between various political parties is 
institutional inertia and policy stagnation. The international community has invested 
considerable resources in attempting to build democratic institutions, but have failed in 
their efforts, as political actors specifically in Serbia are not yet ready to reach a 
consensus. In this regard, civil society representatives have advocated further capacity 
building initiatives and monitoring within the NGO community.  
One of the key limitations of project implementation in the post-conflict period has been 
political and government instability, diminishing opportunities for NGO/government 
cooperation. As campaign and re-election periods are lengthy, government institutions 
and personnel are only operational several months later. Institutional inertia and the lack 
of communication disallow any activity on government policies, and specifically, Roma-
related issues. There is a lack of responsibility among government personnel to 
implement previous agreements, thus NGOs struggle to compensate for government 
deficits in implementing programs.
65
 
The work of Kitschelt (1986), McAdam, Tarrow, Tilly (2001), Tarrow and Tilly (2007) 
has been helpful in analyzing how different government structures facilitate or oppress 
social movement actors at the domestic level, but is inadequate to evaluate how the 
connection between the international and domestic levels is impeded. It is essential, 
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therefore, to integrate literature on ‗transnational advocacy networks‘
66
 to develop a 
comprehensive framework for this study. In order to analyze Roma political activism 
one needs to understand it as a domestic and trans-national social movement. To 
comprehensively discuss Roma political action one cannot only think of transnational 
advocacy in regards to domestic opportunity structures. It is also important to focus on 
the characteristics of the international arena that provide favourable opportunities or 
limitations for protest activity. As international organizations are one of the primary 
actors that promote, but also conflict with other social movement players regarding 
Roma advocacy, it becomes necessary to analyze the unique relationship between 
domestic and international actors, as well as institutions. 
2.6 Transnational advocacy networks 
Building upon the social movement literature, Keck and Sikkink (1998) introduce the 
idea of ‗transnational advocacy networks‘ defined by international actors, who share 
common values, discourse, information and services on a specific issue.
67
 The 
predominant issues that characterize advocacy networks are those ―involving bodily 
harm to vulnerable individuals and equality of opportunity – these issues speak to 
aspects of a belief system or life experiences that transcend a specific cultural or 
political context.‖
68
 By constructing new alliances between civil society actors, states 
and international organizations, advocacy networks increase linkages to the international 
system allowing activists to take advantage of international resources to utilize in 
domestic protest activity.
69
 Keck and Sikkink argue that domestic groups may seek 
recourse at the international level to express their concerns when their government 
refuses to recognize their claims. It is important to note that transnational advocacy 
networks are most likely to appear concerning issues where: 
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1) the linkages between domestic groups and governments are restricted or when 
communication paths are ineffective for conflict resolution 
2) activists believe that networking will strengthen social movement campaigns and 
further promote the issue 





An integral part of this strategy is the ―construction of cognitive frames.‖
71
 How a 
movement frames the issue can enhance its appeal with the broader public. In turn, this 
can help to influence and change other actors‘ interpretations of their identities and 
interests. Furthermore, advocacy networks can have influence regarding: 
i) issue creation and agenda setting 
ii) influence on discursive positions of states and international organizations 
iii) influence on institutional procedures72 
 
One of the main aims of building international alliances is to increase activism 
domestically in ‗closed‘ regimes that suppress social movements. It would follow that as 
the communication path between activists and domestic governments is impeded, 
activists in ‗closed‘ regimes, have no alternative, but to make international links. Thus, 
‗closed‘ regimes become more ‗open,‘ by transforming both the domestic and 
international opportunity structures by improving human rights and promoting 
democratization.
73
 Thus, ―international institutions offer international opportunity 
structures, which interact with domestic political opportunity structures to produce 
particular types of environments for transnational collective action.‖
74
  Similarly, Della 
Porta and Tarrow argue that ―externally there has been a shift in the locus of institutional 
power from the national to both the supranational and the regional levels, with the 
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increasing power of international institutions …‖
75
 Informal networks have expanded 
across national boundaries (such as international agreements on human rights, and NGO 
alliances on human rights issues).  These processes have led to the creation of a 
‗complex internationalism,‘ which consists of threats and opportunities to non-state 
actors and weaker states.
76
 
Key factors impacting the success of networks are the opportunities and constraints 
within domestic arenas, specifically their susceptibility to economic and moral 
incentives. For instance, the target country may be more amenable to change in cases 
where monetary support is dependent on human rights improvements. Additionally, 
international obligations may also influence changes in domestic policies, or specific 
historical junctures may induce improvements. Lastly, prospective changes may depend 
on the need to maintain a reputable position within the international community.
77
 
The effectiveness of networks is based on their identity, the values and aims, as well as 
the formalized interactions among the connected organizations and individuals. Thus, 
the ‗network as actor‘ obtains its success from its structure, as ideas are developed, 
discussed, practiced, and negotiated.  Although there may be representatives that act on 
behalf of the network, the communication among members distinguishes the unique 
voice of the network – it is not only the product of various actions by individual 
members. However, this does not presuppose that advocacy networks are democratic 
structures. It is important to recognize the power asymmetries of many network 
communications, which are often based on resources, overwhelmingly located within 
North American and European ‗network nodes.‘ Often stronger members in the network 
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The literature on transnational advocacy networks has contributed extensively to 
understanding the complex relationship between different actors and institutions at the 
international level. Components of the POS model have enabled a discussion of how 
domestic opportunity structures have contributed to the lack of success of Roma political 
activism in Macedonia and Serbia. In order to guide the empirical research, transnational 
advocacy networks as a concept needs to be operationalized by using the literature on 
norm socialization to complete the discussion of how international institutions seek to 
influence the domestic government in accommodating social movement claims.  
2.7 Mechanisms of Transnational Advocacy Networks 
The socialization of international human rights norms into domestic practices 
Social movement actors may also use international norms, defined as ―shared 
expectations held by a community of actors about appropriate behaviour for actors with 
a given identity.‖
79
 The concept of diffusion crucial to the proliferation of norms is 
defined as networking across national boundaries, but also the adoption of 
organizational structures, collective action frames and goals of protest groups from 
collective actors in other states.
80
  International norms as political opportunities and 
resources can support social movement actors in transforming their goals and at times, 
collective beliefs may influence international norms.
81
 Specifically, in the case of 
Romani political activism, international norms were not entirely inclusive of the Roma 
community in Europe. The first task of activists was to build new international norms by 
mobilizing consensus around collective beliefs.  
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The literature on international norms and domestic implementation stipulates three main 
processes by which internationalization occurs:
82
  
1) processes of instrumental adaptation 
2) processes of moral consciousness raising, argumentation, dialogue, and 
persuasion 
3) processes of institutionalization and habitualization 
 
Instrumental adaptation can be described as state concessions to international pressure 
(for example, the signing of international agreements). This process also involves 
bargaining and discussing human rights violations in the international arena.  Domestic 
governments amend their actions according to international norms, engaging in 
rhetorical communication,
83
 but may not necessarily believe in the norms. In the initial 
stages of norm socialization, governments generally, instrumentally adapt in response to 
increasing domestic and international pressures.
84
 
The second steps important to analyzing norm socialization are argumentative and 
persuasive processes. There is an acceptance among actors as to the authority of norms 
in their daily discourse. As domestic and international actors formulate a shared 
understanding of the norm, it can lead to the influencing of political and social 
obligations.  Argumentative and persuasive processes enable a change in perception 
based on acceptance of the norm. A combination of instrumental and argumentative 
processes may influence humanitarian issues in a state and does not allow for a lack of 
commitment in the long term.
 85
 As governments validate instrumental interests, 
challengers can seek legitimization of the claims, provoking a response and detailed 
discussions. However, states may employ ‗rhetorical action‘ to undermine international 
values, reconstruct ideas to fit individual preferences and context, or use alternative 
international norms that support their arguments.  
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While exercising ‗rhetorical action,‘ states must refrain from creating an inconsistent 
image that uses conflicting arguments and actions at different times, thus damaging their 
international standing. Processes of argumentation lead to ‗rhetorical entrapment and 
commitment,‘ that force states to comply with international norms, although initially 
reacting from an individual perspective.
86
 Finally, norm socialization cannot occur until 
the state has institutionalized certain humanitarian practices regardless of individual 
values.
87
 States generally have few motivations to collaborate on issues. As advocacy 
networks challenge and transcend the idea of national sovereignty, in many cases states 
may coordinate to oppose the campaign and activities of networks. Continuous lobbying 
by committed activists is essential to agenda-setting before domestic policies are 
influenced. Individuals within government institutions may also highlight issues, but in 
order for states to implement change, questioned values must either correlate with the 
‗national interest‘ or the target country must view the change as an inexpensive 
alternative.  Networks may also attempt to change state perceptions of the ‗national 
interest,‘ and subsequently, the rational deliberation of specific policies. Furthermore, 
network members may attempt to recruit state representatives who sympathize on certain 
issues, or accrue other benefits from taking action.
88
  
The concepts of rhetorical communication, rhetorical action, rhetorical entrapment and 
commitment are integral to understanding how argumentative processes focus attention 
on a humanitarian issue that subsequently, may lead to the socialization of norms in a 
country. The literature on transnational advocacy networks and norm socialization are 
essential to studying the interaction between domestic power structures, international 
institutions, and social movement actors. Although advocacy networks seek to describe 
how state policies may be influenced, the concept does not comprehensively discuss the 
mechanisms by which this occurs. Similar to the POS model, transnational advocacy 
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networks focus on the role of institutions and organizations without discussing the 
individual cognitive processes by which political actors make decisions.
89
  
This chapter outlined domestic and international theoretical approaches in the study of 
political activism and mobilization. Specifically, the POS model and the concept of 
‗transnational advocacy networks,‘ were highlighted as necessary to guide the empirical 
research. The discussion also demonstrated the limitations of the nationalism, ethnic 
boundary and development literature in relation to the particular case of Roma 
mobilization.  The subsequent methodology chapter will focus on how the research was 
conducted. 
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In order to examine the effectiveness of Roma mobilization in contesting state actions in 
Macedonia and Serbia, and to investigate the divergent treatment of Roma communities 
in the respective states a comparative case study approach was applied.  This chapter 
will also outline the main factors of political activism and discuss the limitations of the 
research strategy. This research project used a variety of data sources in conducting a 
case study: official government documents, NGO and international reports, interviews, 
and direct observations. Various government institutions, non-governmental 
organizations, international organizations, legal aid offices, independent consultants, and 
academics working on policy formulation and implementation concerning Roma 
inclusion were contacted to provide information and relevant documents for this study. 
3.2 Mechanisms and Processes of Political Activism 
This study seeks to deconstruct mobilization by evaluating its particular mechanisms. 
This enables an analysis of how political activism is initiated and thus, how important an 
individual component is to the eventual outcome. More specifically, in order to present a 
comprehensive explanation, it is useful to identify the location of contention. In addition, 
it is important to describe the political context at the specified location, describe the 
inter-relationship between various activist claims, identify the most important results of 
activism, and observe the integral mechanisms that feed into processes of mobilization. 
In analyzing political activism, Tarrow and Tilly outline the following mechanism 
process procedures: 
1) Disaggregating a familiar process, such as mobilization, into its component 
mechanisms, in order to understand what makes it work. 
2) Comparing how such a process works in different settings to understand what 




3) Examining whether particular mechanisms coincide so frequently with similar 




This study will focus on three main mechanisms that combine in various political sites 
and situations to stimulate effective political activism: brokerage, diffusion, and 
coordinated action. Brokerage refers to the ―production of a new connection between 
previously unconnected sites.‖
2
 Diffusion is defined as the “spread of a form of 
contention, an issue, or a way of framing it from one site to another.”
3
 The study will 
demonstrate that Roma activists have not been able to form a connection between 
multiple sites of contention. For instance, this is especially apparent among pro-Romani 
civil society organizations and political parties in Macedonia and Serbia. While activists 
have an institutional base and few financial resources to develop programs for Roma 
inclusion, there is considerable dissension among relevant actors. The lack of 
coordination is also a key limitation among government institutions implementing Roma 
inclusion policies and programs, especially between leaders of various Roma political 
parties. 
Romani activists in civil society organizations and government agencies have similar 
goals of public and political participation, as well as the alleviation of poverty in Roma 
communities. Although activists can coalesce around similar goals, there are many 
challenges with the diffusion of ideas, resources and practices, as there is limited 
coordination and extensive competition among Roma activists and politicians. As will 
be described further in chapters four and five, government authorities are also unlikely 
to facilitate Roma activism through institutional channels. The domestic political 
opportunity structure in Macedonia and Serbia is not conducive to Roma advocacy. 
Thus, diffusion and other mobilization mechanisms are not likely to be effective under 
such conditions.  
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The mechanisms of brokerage and diffusion enable coordinated action defined as “two 
or more actors‟ engagement in mutual signalling and parallel making of claims on the 
same object.”
4
 In the context of this research project, coordinated action would 
generally seek to connect three components: a group of claimants, object (s) of claims, 
and government authorities that may or may not choose to implement changes, having 
extensive impact on the claimants‘ welfare.
5
  
Although Roma activists in government institutions, civil society, and political parties 
seek to develop and implement Roma inclusion policies and programs, the inability to 
present a common platform and cooperate (absence of brokerage and diffusion 
mechanisms) has not led to coordinated action. The Macedonian and Serbian 
government authorities as the target of activist claims are important to take into 
consideration as part of the internal dynamic that presents specific challenges for Roma 
activists in contesting their oppression. As the study will demonstrate in proceeding 
chapters, there is a limited and weak connection between government authorities and 
Roma activists. It is not likely that coordinated action will transpire within the current 
domestic opportunity structure. 
In conducting a comparative analysis of Roma mobilization in Macedonia and Serbia, 
the particular presence or absence of brokerage, diffusion, and coordinated action were 
noted. This accounted for why similar mobilization mechanisms did not always lead to a 
successful outcome in case (A) compared to case (B). For example, in comparing civil 
society organizations in Macedonia and Serbia, it was found that the presence of 
brokerage, diffusion and thus, coordinated action enabled better opportunities for 
political activism in Macedonia. Although parallel mechanisms facilitated the 
emergence of civil society organizations in Serbia, the ramifications of the conflict 
(1990-1999) and repressive tactics of the Milosevic regime did not enable the effective 
participation and influence of civil society organizations in the state.  Thus, the domestic 
political opportunity structure constrained activists‘ actions and remained ‗closed.‘ 
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Alternatively, in evaluating institutional responses in Macedonia and Serbia, it was 
found that while brokerage enabled a connection between government authorities and 
Roma activists, diffusion and coordinated action were absent – leading to similar 
(negative) outcomes for Roma inclusion in the respective states. 
Roma activists have not been effective advocating and coordinating at the domestic 
level. However, there has been extensive activity at the international level. In order to 
examine political activism in the international sphere, it is useful to refer again to the 
concept of ‗transnational advocacy networks.‘ As defined in the previous chapter, 
transitional advocacy networks are most likely to transpire when the linkages between 
domestic groups and governments are restricted or when communication paths are 
ineffective for conflict resolution.
6
 The specific challenges of coordination among Roma 
activists, as well as domestic government oppression has led to the production of new 
connections, and the diffusion of ideas, resources, and practices in the international 
arena. This has led to the participation and influence of the European Union, as well as 
other international organizations. An upward scale shift has occurred, leading to 
coordinated action at a higher level;
7
 that is, among Roma activists and international 
institutions that seek to influence domestic Roma inclusion policy. Emulation occurs 
when structural conditions (internationalization and communication), social mechanisms 
(brokerage), and pathways (diffusion) are conducive to action. As multiple actors adopt 
similar ideas and practices, activist claims and influence intensify.
8
  The specific 
opportunities and challenges of this endeavour will be further discussed in chapter six. 
3.3 Factors of Political Activism 
It is useful to refer to the two initial propositions in this study before discussing the 
explanatory components that describe the ability of Roma to mobilize and advocate for 
their issues: i) Roma mobilization is likely to succeed when the domestic political 
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opportunity structure is favourable ii) A ‗closed‘ domestic political opportunity structure 
shifts the focus of Roma activism to the international level. 
Following Goldstone, this thesis adopts a ‗relational approach‘
9
 analyzing the 
relationship between various factors impacting a particular issue, rather than focusing on 
the macro-level conditions influencing protest activity as included in classic POS 
literature. By using an alternative term ‗external relational fields‘
10
 to account for protest 
group dynamics, Goldstone does not define a clear set of conditions for the emergence, 
sustainability, or results of protest activity. Collective action is rather confronted with its 
own unique set of factors within the ‗external field,‘ consisting of: (1) other movements 
and counter-movements that may compete for attention and resources, or provide 
reinforcement and alliances, or engage in direct competition or conflict with the 
movement; (2) political and economic institutions (and their history) that provide the 
framework in which political actors recruit, act, and seek responses; (3) various levels of 
state authorities and political actors (including political parties and civil and military 
officials) whose responses to the movement and its actions affect its development and 
outcomes; (4) various elites - economic, political, religious, media - whose interests, 
capacities, and actions affect movement development and its outcomes.
11
 In the 
following empirical chapters, ‗external fields‘ are conceptually defined by using the 
terms ‗state repression/facilitation,‘ ‗increased institutional access,‘ ‗influential domestic 
and international allies,‘ and ‗shifting political alignments.‘
12
  
3.3 Research Strategy 
Case Selection Rationale 
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Skopje, Macedonia and the cities of Novi Sad and Belgrade in Serbia were selected as 
fieldwork sites because they highlighted a number of interesting contrasts in terms of 
state responses to Roma political activism. Additionally, Skopje and Belgrade as capital 
cities facilitated access to the main NGOs and government institutions working on Roma 
issues. As the researcher resided in Novi Sad, located in the province of Vojvodina, and 
recognized its distinct history and culture, it was perceived as necessary to describe the 
particular case of Roma in this region. Additionally, many of the prominent academics, 
NGO activists, and government officials working on Roma inclusion were residing in 
Novi Sad – thus, it was important to include their interviews and documents in the study. 
Macedonia is often promoted by Romani and non-Romani politicians and activists as a 
‗multi-ethnic state‘ promoting tolerance toward minority communities. In addition, 
Macedonia, in 1971 was the only Yugoslav nation that officially recognized Roma as an 
ethnic community in its constitution. Serbia, in contrast, has often been portrayed by 
academics, the media and Western governments as nationalistic, promoting inter-ethnic 
conflict.
13
 The Serbian constitution while classifying the Roma as an ‗ethnic group‘ has 
not recognized the community as a national minority. A cross-case comparison allows 
for an examination of Roma political activism in two post-socialist states in the process 
of democratic transition. Thus, Macedonia presents an ideal case assuming that the 
political opportunity structure has been more conducive to promoting Roma inclusion, 
while Serbia presents a case in which the political opportunity structure may not be 
conducive to Roma inclusion.  
3.4 The Case Study Approach 
The research project utilized the case study as a research strategy, defined by Yin as ―an 
empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life 
context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not 
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  The alternative research strategies that could have been utilized are 
ethnography, or a statistical survey. A secondary analysis has not been used as 
conducting comparative research by designing a survey or questionnaire in which the 
meanings are perceived the same way by respondents in each state would be a difficult 
task to accomplish. Surveys would not encapsulate the details necessary for an in-depth 
analysis of the phenomenon studied, for instance in interview techniques utilized.
15
  
Ethnography as a research strategy is a popular field research technique, which uses 
participant observation to develop thick descriptions.
16
 However, these two research 
strategies do not incorporate all of the intensive data collection and analysis procedures 
as outlined by the case study approach. Furthermore, a case study strategy is especially 
relevant as this project gives considerable attention to contextual conditions that are 
important for describing state oppression of Roma and their ability to mobilize.  
Therefore, this research project has been a qualitative study, as one of the goals is 
―directed at providing an in-depth and interpreted understanding of the social world of 
research participants by learning about their social and material circumstances, their 
experiences, perspectives and histories.‖
17
 Regarding theory development, a multiple 
case study design is useful as conclusive findings of the research project may support the 
‗hypothesized contrast,‘
18
 thus moving toward theoretical replication and satisfying 
external validity.  
3.5 Limitations of the Case Study Approach 
Bias 
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The issue of bias in a research study is important to address regardless of the research 
strategy employed. There is the perception that the case study is not a rigorous research 
strategy.  At times, there has been the opinion that the researcher has not conducted a 
systematic analysis, and has allowed personal biases to formulate the final conclusions. 
However, as Yin argues the opportunity for bias to influence the research strategy can 




Concerning this study on Roma, the issue of bias may arise in regards to taking the side 
of the oppressed group or ‗underdog.‘
20
 The initial reason for conducting research on 
this issue stemmed from an emotional response to the marginalized situation of Roma in 
Macedonia and Serbia. One of the main concerns in conducting social scientific research 
is the difficulty of remaining impartial and unemotional. The issue of emotion and 
sentiment is addressed by Gouldner arguing against ―the myth of the sentiment-free 
social scientist.‖
21
 By suggesting that bias is an inherent part of the research process, 
Gouldner‘s argument presents a better understanding of how a researcher can balance 
viewing research emotionally, as well as engaging in an intellectual project that is 
credible in the academic community.
22
 
As an individual that has worked in this field, to undertake the role of researcher was at 
times problematic.  In view of the widespread discrimination and exclusion of the Roma 
community, it was difficult to present a negative image of the group, or reveal some of 
the weaknesses and problems within political parties and civil society organizations as 
Roma seek to mobilize in opposition to the state. It was found that state institutions and 
societal discrimination are only part of the problem that can account for the oppression 
of the Roma people in Macedonia and Serbia. The lack of cohesion among Roma 
activists and politicians also plays a role in limiting activism. 
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Another important aspect is the identity of the researcher in influencing the research 
process. Mies, in reference to feminist activism, writes, 
―feminist women must deliberately and courageously integrate their repressed, unconscious female 
subjectivity, that is, their own experience of oppression and discrimination into the research process. This 
means that committed women social scientists must learn to understand their own ‗double consciousness‘ 
as a methodological and political opportunity and not as an obstacle.‖
23
 
As a researcher who is a ‗visible minority,‘ my identity and prior experiences of racial 
discrimination and exclusion influenced the research process and eventual findings. In 
interviewing government officials, NGO activists, and international organization 
representatives, specific questions regarding individual and institutional discrimination 
were proposed. Furthermore, if the interviewees discussed certain themes related to 
racism and exclusion, the researcher pursued these ideas further. In analyzing the data 
and including interview excerpts, the researcher attempted to provide a comprehensive 
perspective of the challenges confronting Roma activists in Macedonia and Serbia. The 
researcher‘s personal experiences as a ‗visible minority‘ (sometimes perceived as a 
Romani female) residing in Macedonia and Serbia, as well as witnessing the treatment 
of Roma individuals in everyday interactions did influence the inclusion of specific 
material related to racism and discrimination. As previously noted in the introductory 
chapter, racism and discrimination are important factors in accounting for the 
marginalization of Roma communities that impacts essential areas of interest such as 
housing, health care, education and employment. 
Mies criticizes the idea that researchers when analyzing women‘s issues should 
―suppress their emotions, their subjective feelings of involvement and identification with 
other women in order to produce ‗objective‘ data.‖
24
 Furthermore, my identity as a 
visible minority and being of Indian ethnicity rather complemented efforts to gain access 
to the community. Many Roma intellectuals and elites are aware of their cultural, 
religious and linguistic roots in India. Because of a perceived ethnic affiliation with the 
researcher, respondents were at times more forthcoming with information, and at times, 
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displayed greater interest and curiosity in the study. Although perceived ethnic 
affiliation may have encouraged a friendly rapport and facilitated discussion, the 
researcher and respondent remained objective by following the interview agenda, as well 
as focusing on the main aims of the study. In analyzing interview content, the 
researcher‘s access to informants (Roma and non-Roma) from different institutions led 
to a comprehensive evaluation of Roma mobilization, providing a varied and rich source 
of data. 
Generalization 
A secondary concern regarding the case study approach is the difficulty in generalizing. 
As George and Bennett emphasize ―case study methods involved a trade-off among the 
goals of attaining theoretical parsimony, establishing explanatory richness, and keeping 
the number of cases to be studied manageable.‖
25
  Additional cases would increase the 
generalizability of the research project; however, there are limitations to resolving the 
issue in this manner. Primarily, multi-site studies can be quite costly. By focusing on 
numerous sites one may not be able to analyze the cases extensively and in depth.
26
  This 
supports the idea of ‗explanatory richness‘ as a strength of the case study approach.
27
 
 The challenge of generalization can be dealt with by offering a re-conceptualization of 
the term.
28
 Schofield offers an alternative term ‗fittingness,‘
29
 that can be described as 
studying the extent to which the social phenomenon studied is comparable to another 
case one finds interesting. Subsequently, there is a greater focus on increasing 
information about the social phenomenon and context analyzed. Without detailed 
information, it is difficult to apply the findings from one case to understanding another 
site of interest.
30
 Thus, generalizability conceptualized in this manner, may help to 
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deflect criticism of using a case study approach, and demonstrate the strength of this 
strategy in providing strong support for the theoretical propositions developed.  
In discussing the ‗targets of generalization,‘
31
 Schofield argues that qualitative studies 
should attempt to generalize by seeking explanations to the question of: what could be. 
Thus, the researcher can choose a site that represents a ‗theoretical ideal‘ (i.e. 
Macedonia). If there are serious difficulties that arise at the research site, it would be 
reasonable to assume that there would be problems in other situations, thus, the 
researcher would reform or dismiss theoretical propositions that led to the case selection. 
Alternatively, the case could also present an opportunity to gain further understanding 




However, there is a limitation in employing the strategy of selecting a site as the analysis 
of the case may be influenced by the theoretical propositions and expectations. The 
researcher may ignore other interesting puzzles and dimensions that emerge because of 
their commitment to a particular perspective. This poses difficulties concerning internal 
validity, but can be mitigated if the researcher is open to what may actually occur at the 
research site and uses the theory as a support rather than an inflexible rubric. Although a 
case is chosen as a theoretical ideal, it is important to analyze problems that arise. A 
related issue is that prior knowledge of cases allows ―stronger research designs; cases 
can be selected with a view toward whether they are most-likely, least-likely, or crucial 
for a theory, making the process-tracing test of a theory more severe.‖
33
 As it applies to 
this research project, Macedonia exemplifies an ‗ideal case,‘ and Serbia a distinct 
comparison on the relevant factors.  
3.6 Data Collection 
Interviews 
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From January – June 2009, I conducted field research in Skopje, Macedonia, and the 
cities of Belgrade and Novi Sad in Serbia. The empirical investigations of Roma 
political activism presented in this thesis rely on data from secondary literature, surveys, 
international and NGO reports. The majority of the information, however, is obtained 
from semi-structured interviews with forty-two representatives or members of NGOs, 
government institutions, legal aid offices, and international organizations, as well as 
independent consultants and academics working on Roma inclusion. This was also the 
most appropriate method to collect data for this research project, as secondary 
documents do not always adequately explain the effects of state and international 
organization policy toward Roma. After completing transcription of all forty-two 
interviews, the content was categorized by sub-themes relating to the factors of political 
activism. 
Through the interviews, a variety of topics were covered such as the state response to 
Roma advocacy, the impact of Roma political parties, networking among Roma 
activists, NGO-state cooperation, international organizations and influence on domestic 
Roma inclusion policies and programs, international cooperation with NGOs, the 
Decade of Roma Inclusion and its impact, challenges for Roma political activism, as 
well as the steps required to promote further integration of the Roma community.  
In Macedonia and Serbia, interviews were conducted in person in the offices of the 
participants. The following organizations relevant to Roma and minority inclusion 
policy at the domestic and international levels were contacted in the respective states: 
RNVO 2002 (NGO), NGO Sumnal, Association of Roma Students (NGO), Roma 
Resource Center Ecumenical Humanitarian Organization (NGO), Novi Sad 
Humanitarian Center (NGO), Union of Roma Students (NGO), League for Roma 
Decade (NGO), Minority Rights Center (NGO), Ministry of Labour and Social Policy, 
Ministry of Minority Affairs and Languages, Department of Justice, Office for the 
National Strategy on Roma and Implementation of the Roma Decade, Secretariat for 
National Minorities in the Executive Council of Vojvodina, Office of the President 




Minority in Serbia, think tank Studio Room, European Commission, Open Society 
Institute (OSI), Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Roma Education Fund (REF), 
World Bank, CARE International, and University of Novi Sad.  
The researcher would have liked to interview Roma politicians in Macedonia and 
Serbia; unfortunately, there was a lack of credible candidates in Macedonia. In meeting 
some of the Roma politicians from the dominant Roma political parties, the researcher 
decided not to arrange interviews, as in the opinion of the researcher, the individuals 
would not have provided accurate or substantive information on the research themes. 
Furthermore, NGO activists and international organization representatives informed the 
researcher that a few of the Roma politicians in Macedonia were either absent (had left 
the country to escape punitive corruption charges), or were extremely biased and had 
limited knowledge of political issues. The following tables are the list of interviewees 
contacted by the researcher from January – June 2009 in Macedonia and Serbia. The 
institutional affiliation and position of the respondent are also included. 
Interviews in Skopje, Macedonia (January – March, 2009) 
Interviewee/Gender Date of Interview Position/Institution 
Neseme (F) January 19, 2009 Executive Director, 
Multicultural Society 
Neda Milevska (F) January 23, 2009 Consultant, think tank 
STUDIOROOM 
Ramiza Sakip (F) January 23, 2009 Coordinator, RNVO 2002 
Slavica Indzevska (F) January 26, 2009 Director, Roma Education 
Fund 
Mereba Kamberi (F) January 28, 2009 Director, National 
Coordination Office for the 
Implementation of Decade 
Action Plans and National 
Strategy for Roma Inclusion 





Sabena Mustafa (F) February 3, 2009 Program Assistant, National 
Coordination Office for the 
Implementation of Decade 
Action Plans and National 
Strategy for Roma Inclusion 
Ljatif Demir (M) 
 
February 5, 2009 
 
Government Advisor to 
Minister without Portfolio and 
National Action Plans, 
Coordination Office for the 
Implementation of the 
National Strategy for Roma 
and Decade 
 
Eben Friedman (M)  February 6, 2009 
 
 
Independent Consultant , 
Roma Education Fund 
Alexandra Bojadzieva (F) February 9, 2009 Manager, Roma Democratic 
Development Association 
Ibrahim Ibrahimi (M) February 9, 2009 
 
former Deputy Minister of 
Justice 
Elvis Memeti (M)  February 10, 2009 
 
Junior Associate, National 
Coordination Office for the 
Implementation of the Decade 
Action Plans and National 
Strategy for Roma Inclusion 
Nevenka Krusarovska (F) February 16, 2009 
 
Ombudman‘s Office 
Orhan Usein (M) February 18, 2009 
 
Assistant to Director of Roma 
Education Fund 
Senad Mustafov (M) February 18, 2009 
 




Denis Durmis (M) 
 
 
February 19, 2009 
 
Junior Associate, National 
Coordination Office for the 
Implementation of the Decade 
Action Plans and National 




Fatma Bjram (F) February 21, 2009 
 
Executive Director, NGO 
Sumnal 
Ramche (M)  February 24, 2009 Senior Community Service 
Officer, UNHCR 
Alma Mustafovska (F) February 25, 2009 
 
Lawyer, CEEOL 
Redzpali Cupi (M) February 26, 2009 
 
Director, Department of 
Minority Languages and 
Culture 
Elvis Ali (M)  
 
February 27, 2009 
 
Task Manager, Public 
Administration, European 
Agency for Reconstruction 
Victor Friedman (M) March 10, 2009 Professor of Linguistics, 
University of Chicago 
Domenico Albonetti (M) March 13, 2009 Political Adviser, OSCE 
Spillover Monitor Mission to 
Skopje 
 
Interviews in Belgrade and Novi Sad, Serbia (April – June, 2009) 
Interviewee (Gender) Date of Interview Position/Institution 
Dusko Jovanovic (M) April 28, 2009 
 
Director, Roma Inclusion 
Office 
Jelena Savic (F) 
 
May 5, 2009 Junior Assistant, Education 
Program, Open Society 
Institute 
 
Sonja Barbul (F) 
 
May 5, 2009 
Roma Assistant, United 
Nations High Commissioner 
for Refugees (UNHCR) 
Jelena Jovanvic (F)  
 
May 6, 2009 
 
Coordinator, Provincial 
Secretariat for Regulations, 
Administration and National 
Minorities 








Andrea Colak (F) 
 
May 7, 2009 
 
Executive Director, Minority 
Rights Center 
Matthew Newton (M) May 7, 2009 Director Roma Assistance 
Program, Organization for 
Security and Cooperation in 
Europe (OSCE) 
Petar Nikolic (M) May 12, 2009 
 
 
Roma Activist and Television 
Host 
Svenka Savic (F) 
 
May 17, 2009 
 
Director Women‘s Studies and 
Research, University of Novi 
Sad 
Jasna Kronja (F) May 18, 2009 Department Head, CARE 
Serbia Office 
Milena Cuk (F) 
 
May 18, 2009 Program Coordinator, Novi 
Sad Humanitarian Center 
Nenad Vladisavljavic (M) May 21, 2009 
 
Roma Students Association 
Srdjan Sajn (M) 
 
May 29, 2009 Leader of the Roma Party 
Dusko Radosavljevic (M) June 2, 2009 
 
Former Advisor to the 
President of the Assembly of 
AP Vojvodina and Professor of 
Law, University of Novi Sad 
Osman Balic (M) June 3, 2009 Director, YUROM Centar 
Nadja Kocic (F) 
 
June 5, 2009 Country Facilitator Serbia and 
Montenegro, Roma Education 
Fund 
Ljuan Koka (M) 
 
June 5, 2009 Head of Department, 
Secretariat for Implementation 
of the National Strategy, 
Ministry of Human and 
Minority Rights 
Vitomir Mihajlovic (M) June 6, 2009 
 
Member of Parliament 
Democratic Party (DS) and 




Council for Roma 
Jadranka Stojanovic (F) 
 
 
June 8, 2009 Program Coordinator, Fund for 
an Open Society 
 
 
Regarding state repression/facilitation, increased institutional access, and shifting 
political alignments the following documentation was relevant: academic studies of the 
same cases, election and survey data, government and international organization reports. 
Academic sources, government and international organization reports provided historical 
background and current information on the government structure. Election and survey 
data supported an understanding of the political dynamics in each state (political parties 
and factions that influence openness). It was also important to conduct semi-structured 
interviews with government authorities in Macedonia and Serbia to analyze how ‗open‘ 
the government structure is to policy demands by minority groups. Additionally, 
interviews would help to evaluate the intermediation between interest groups and the 
executive branch. 
To evaluate the strength of influential domestic and international allies  it was useful to 
collect documents such as agendas, announcements, conference and commissioned 
papers, proposals, progress reports, academic studies, government reports, international 
organization policy papers, and NGO human rights reports. Semi-structured interviews 
were conducted with NGO and individual activists, international organization and 
government representatives. The information obtained from the interviews supported an 
understanding of state/NGO/activist relations. Key actors involved in Roma activism 
revealed the challenges and opportunities that are encountered with state authorities.  
There are strengths and weaknesses to conducting semi-structured interviews. A key 
characteristic of a semi structured interview is its combination of ―structure with 
flexibility.‖
34
 There should be enough flexibility to ensure that the responses of the 
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interviewee can be fully penetrated and that the interviewer can formulate questions of 
interest that arise spontaneously. The interactive aspect of interviews is perhaps, one of 




The limitations of the interviewer concerning this project may be an imposition of the 
interviewer‘s framework of understanding the issue. It can be difficult not to interrupt 
the flow of conversation with one‘s own thoughts on the issue, respond to questions by 
the interviewee, or guide the interview with preconceived questions.
36
 It was also 
important to build trust in order for the respondent to feel comfortable in answering 
questions. This is especially the case when conducting a study on Roma inclusion; as 
some respondents had negative experiences with academics, and government officials 
who manipulated the information to present highly discriminatory reports on Roma 
communities. Interviews were primarily with Roma and non-Roma working in 
government institutions, international organizations and NGOs. Some respondents were 
cautious initially, questioning how the information provided would be used in the 
context of the study. Respondents were notified at the beginning of the interview that 
their names could remain anonymous, information would be kept confidential and 
transcriptions upon completion would be available for review. As the researcher had 
previously worked on Roma issues and was acquainted with Roma activists working in 
Macedonia and Serbia, issues of trust and credibility were facilitated by mentioning their 
names.  
Because the interviewing process is a highly intellectual exercise, as well as emotionally 
draining, the researcher limited the quantity of interviews conducted per week, in order 
not to become oversaturated with information and exhausted.
37
 This lengthened the 
period of field research, but also allowed for further access to government officials and 
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NGO personnel, as well as facilitating informal conversations with activists working on 
Roma issues. Generally, for all interviews contact was initiated primarily through the 
snow-ball method, as key informants would be able to relay information about other 
experts/activists in the area of Roma issues. A limitation of this method is the potential 
for bias, as interviewees may not provides names of individuals with whom they have 
personal conflict, or differing political affiliations. However, the majority of Roma 
politicians, activists, NGO personnel, and international organization employees working 
on Roma policies and programs were well acquainted, and this greatly facilitated making 
contact and arranging meetings.  
It was also important, although not directly related to the topic, to visit and reside in 
Roma communities. While in Skopje, Macedonia the researcher volunteered briefly in 
NGO Sumnal situated within the Roma settlement of Topaana on the outskirts of the 
city. This enabled a more comprehensive understanding of how Roma inclusion policy 
and international funds are implemented in the context of providing tutoring, and 
English language classes for Roma children. Although the thesis does not analyze 
aspects of Romani culture (traditions, socialization, gender roles etc.), it was an 
enriching and humbling experience to reside in Topaana for two weeks to understand the 
effects of marginalization, exclusion, and socio-economic inequalities impacting the 
community. The researcher also had the opportunity to accompany ‗street level‘ activists 
working with Romani beggar children. This further demonstrated the limited effects of 
international and domestic policy, such as the ‗Decade of Roma Inclusion (2005-2015)‘ 
on the lives of the most vulnerable groups within the Roma community. The researcher 
did not have the opportunity to visit or reside in Roma communities in Serbia, as a 
familiar acquaintance is generally necessary to gain access to the community. 
Other limitations of interviews included the time consuming task of constructing an 
interview agenda and transcription. Although the majority of Roma activists and 
academics are fluent in English, language posed a problem as the researcher does not 
have competence in the Macedonian, Serbian or Romani dialects and had to rely on 




relied on a translator for seven interviews. In Serbia, a total of ten interviews included 
the presence of an interpreter.  Having an interpreter present may have influenced the 
respondent‘s answers or relayed inaccurate information as it is not always possible to 
translate some Macedonian and Serbian terms into English. It was also challenging to set 
up interviews with participants, as differing schedules did not always allow for the 
respondent, translator and interviewer to meet. Another important concern was 
conducting interviews primarily with NGO personnel, international organization and 
government officials that may have resulted in biased conclusions, as the concerns and 
perceptions of activists are secondary.  
Direct Observation 
By conducting field work in Macedonia and Serbia, the contextual conditions in 
international organizations, government offices and NGOs could be observed, thereby 
supporting an analysis of Roma political activism in the respective states, as well as 
revealing novel dimensions to be studied. The researcher was able to participate in 
conferences and meetings regarding Roma inclusion, and could directly observe policy 
makers and activists engaging on relevant issues. This also enabled a more 
comprehensive understanding of the opportunities and challenges for Roma political 
activism at the domestic and international levels. The researcher was able to attend the 
Open Society Institute/World Bank Conference on Roma Inclusion and Health in 
Macedonia (Januray 2009), as well as a meeting of Roma politicians in the Organization 
for Security and Cooperation in Europe (June 2009) and the UNHCR/World Bank 
Conference on progress made during the Decade of Roma Inclusion in Serbia (June 
2009). Furthermore, the researcher had the opportunity to attend various seminars and 
presentations relating to NGO programs and EU policies on Roma inclusion at the 
Central European University (CEU) summer course on ‗Social Integration and the 
Romany Minority in Europe Today: Linking Policy and Research to Work Against 
Poverty Discrimination, and Ethnic Conflict‘ (June – July 2010), as well as the 




2010). Documents and academic papers distributed at the various conferences and 
meetings also contributed to providing information for the thesis. 
Finally, there are a few general difficulties that were encountered while conducting field 
work in Macedonia and Serbia. Both countries are post-Socialist and post-conflict areas 
of study, which was problematic for collecting information, as records may have been 
lost, incomplete and not up to date. Furthermore, the field research period was 
lengthened from four to six months, as the researcher did not expect that respondents, 
particularly in the case of Serbia, would take longer to respond to the initial invitation 
for an interview.  
Data Reduction and Analysis 
In analyzing the data, the study applied an inductive approach. Although the researcher 
focused on one aspect of the research process at a time, there was constant movement 
between the various steps outlined below. Hence, the theoretical framework, empirical 
evidence, and research questions were in simultaneous dialogue; eventually converging 
to establish a cohesive structure to present the findings. The following steps were 
important to the analysis and reduction of data: 
 
analyzing within-case data, searching 
for cross case patterns, and shaping propositions.
38
 
Subsequent to data collection in Macedonia and Serbia, the researcher transcribed forty-
two interviews, and wrote detailed case notes for each site. This was an essential process 
to provide further insight into the various components of Roma mobilization, as well as 
providing greater clarity and organization of the data. The researcher became very 
familiar with each case study and its particularities, prior to making general claims. This 
process also facilitated cross case comparison.  
In recognizing comparable themes between the case studies, the researcher developed 
several categories (i.e. NGO/political party conflict, Decade of Roma Inclusion) to 
further establish similarities and differences between the cases. Although at initial 
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glance, the dynamics of Roma mobilization in Macedonia and Serbia seemed quite 
similar - the categorization of data allowed for the recognition of distinctive subtleties. 
This process allowed for the generation of new categories and concepts not previously 
anticipated.  This technique of cross-case comparison also supported the development of 
robust propositions and conclusions that were closely connected with the empirical 
research. Furthermore, cross case comparison enabled the realization of new findings in 
the data.
39
 As relationships between the various components of Roma mobilization 
emerged, the researcher compared the tentative theoretical framework with the emerging 
case data. This was a highly iterative process that built upon new findings and developed 
a strong theoretical base that reflected the empirical research.   
In order to evaluate the quality of the research design, one has to take into account 
construct, internal, and external validity, as well as reliability.
40
  It is important that the 
study used multiple sources of data, as mentioned previously, to meet the test of 
construct validity. By ―establishing a chain of evidence‖ the researcher improves the 
reliability and construct validity of the information collected. In order to do this, the 
report cited the relevant data collected (i.e. interviews, documentation). Second, the data 
collected revealed the context and primary evidence of information included in the case 
study.
41
 Alternatively, ‗triangulation‘ referring to ―the process of multiple mapping, 
whereby a particular observation or finding is subject to scrutiny from more than one 
source‖
42
 was used as a research strategy; especially as some interview material and 
documents collected during field research, while contributing to the originality of the 
study, have previously not been subject to academic or public review. 
A primary concern of this research project is internal validity. The issue of external 
validity has been discussed extensively concerning the generalization of a study. 
Concerning internal validity, the propositions initially stated in the introduction of the 
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methodology chapter refer to a causal relationship regarding the political opportunity 
structure in Macedonia and Serbia that may have an impact on the ability of Roma to 
mobilize and advocate for their issues. The researcher took into account that inferences 
based on interviews and documentation were rigorously analyzed by taking into account 
alternative possibilities and explanations.
43
 It is also important to mention that after 
extensive analysis only certain transcriptions and quotes were used, as only the most 
relevant and representative content regarding the research topic was included.  
Ethical Implications 
Many of the academic studies, international and NGO reports are written by non-Roma 
individuals.  The ‗epistemic violence‘
44
 that constitutes the ‗other‘ by the West, as well 
as the intellectual‘s role in knowledge production about Roma, assists in marginalizing 
the illiterate, the majority of Roma that exist beyond the ‗civilization‘ of the West and its 
elites. At best the academic community is only an ‗informant‘ for those concerned with 
the voice of the ‗other.‘ It is important to question, as Spivak provocatively states ―how 
can we touch the consciousness of the people, even as we investigate their politics? With 
what voice-consciousness can the subaltern speak?‖
45
 
In any written text, such as this thesis, the analysis is elaborated in place of the ‗subject,‘ 
– the ‗Roma community,‘ is only a brief reminder to describe the multitude of 
experiences, rich oral history, and consciousness that are not written into a text intended 
for an academic audience.  A more difficult task still, one must be careful not to 
transform the ‗subject‘ into an object for investigation. Furthermore, any narrative of the 
‗subaltern subject‘ is a substitute for those that cannot speak within the confines of 
dominant group discourse. And, thus it is important to be reflective when constructing a 
narrative - as not only representing ‗them,‘ but, also our selves.
46
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Furthermore, any research on ethnic minorities has to account for the politically 
sensitive nature of the topic. This is especially the case regarding the Roma community. 
As mentioned in the introductory chapter, the Roma identity is often conceptualized as 
‗monolithic,‘ negatively portrayed as a subservient underclass. It is important that 
various stereotypes of the Roma as poor, uneducated and criminal are not perpetuated 
within this study. Thus, while the thesis criticizes some elements of Romani political 
organization, it does not imply this is true for ‗all Roma,‘ nor does it suggest specific 
behaviours of Roma activists.  It is the aim of the study to provide an objective 
perspective of the successes and failures of Roma mobilization and 
national/international policy on Roma inclusion. It is also important to note that while 
the study describes the social exclusion of some Roma – it does not reflect on the entire 
population. It is recognized that many Roma are integrated within mainstream 
Macedonian and Serbian societies. Socio-economic inequalities are only highlighted as 
it is this particular segment of the population that are targets of national and international 
policies on Roma inclusion. 
This chapter has demonstrated that the case study approach is a rigorous research 
strategy regarding this research project. Data analysis and collection techniques outlined 
enabled the researcher to conduct a comprehensive and in-depth analysis, while taking 
into consideration criteria for evaluating the research design. In conducting the research, 
challenges were mitigated by having prior knowledge of the research strategy and 
finding innovative ways in formulating and revising the theoretical framework. The 
following chapters (chapters 4 and 5) will examine the domestic opportunity structure 
and Roma political activism in Macedonia and Serbia. Chapter 6 will focus on 
international advocacy and Roma mobilization. The final chapter of the thesis (chapter 
7) will include a comparative analysis of the case studies and examine Roma 








Domestic Opportunities and Constraints: The Case of Macedonia and 
Roma Political Activism 
4.1 Introduction 
The main aim of this chapter is to describe the domestic factors that may facilitate or 
impede Romani activism in Macedonia. The domestic political opportunity structure 
(POS) is a useful framework to analyze components impacting mobilization; these 
include, state repression and/or facilitation, increasing institutional access, influential 
domestic and international allies, and shifting political alignments. The preliminary 
section provides a brief synopsis of how the nation building process in the former 
Yugoslavia impacted contemporary inter-ethnic relations in the state and was not 
conducive to minority integration. Despite ratification of the Ohrid Framework 
agreement and promulgation of Macedonia as a ‗multicultural community,‘ the Roma 
community remains in a disadvantaged position. This section also describes the political 
conflict and lack of consensus among decision makers seriously debilitating 
opportunities for legislative reform and policy making, thus creating closed political 
channels for Roma claims-making. Although Macedonia has ratified numerous 
international agreements on human rights, minimal progress has been achieved in 
addressing state and societal discrimination concerning Roma. Secondly, the chapter 
focuses on various institutional responses to deal with issues of Roma inclusion. 
Additionally, the various strategies of domestic actors are outlined and evaluated; 
specifically focusing on the implementation of national strategy and action plans, inter-




issues. Finally, the chapter discusses the extent to which the current process of 
decentralization may facilitate Roma activism at the local level. 
4.2 Macedonia: Inclusive Society or Repressive State? 
Nation Building and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia  
Prior to discussing the opportunities and challenges facing Roma advocacy actors in 
Macedonia, it is important to briefly describe the socio-political environment that 
impacts minority related concerns in the state. Contemporary conflicts regarding inter-
ethnic relations in the former Yugoslavia are an outcome of the nation building process. 
At the beginning of the twentieth century, with the Ottoman Empire diminishing in 
power, Bulgaria, Serbia, Greece and Turkey disputed Macedonia. According to the 
‗principle of nationalities,‘ territorial sovereignty was substantiated by the ethnicity 
(cultural nationality) of the population. Thus, the four contesting states attempted to 
define the population in a way to produce ‗their‘ ethnic majorities. As stated by Kertzer 
and Arel, ―cultural identities in Macedonia were complex, with much of the population 
multilingual, religion (Orthodoxy, Catholicism, Islam) cross cutting languages, three 
Patriarchates (Serbian, Bulgarian, Greek) contending for the loyalty of Orthodox 
believers, and much of the population having a weak national consciousness, in the 
modern sense of the word.‖
1
 All four competing states contested the existence of a 
Macedonian ethnic identity even though historical sources attest that an increasing 
number of people defined themselves as such at the time.
2
 
The Macedonian nation did not exist previous to 1944 in Yugoslavia, but upon 
recognition was made equal to the other republics. The creation of a Macedonian nation 
was dictated under the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (CPY) under the leadership of 
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 The nation building discourse in Yugoslavia made distinctions between various 
national communities. There were nations (Slovenes, Croats, Muslims, Serbs, 
Montenegrins, and Macedonians), nationalities (Albanians, Hungarians, and Italians), 
and smaller ethnic communities (Roma, Austrians, Czechs and Slovaks).
4
 The concept 
of ‗minority‘ did not exist in the Yugoslav communist vocabulary, but the 
aforementioned hierarchical ordering did signify the inclusive/exclusive character of 
Yugoslav identity. This reflected the acknowledgment of a common Slavonic identity, 
and the idea that the constitutive ‗nations‘ as compared to ‗nationalities‘ and ‗ethnic 
communities‘ did not ‗belong‘ elsewhere in the world.
5
  
To include the non-Slavic population in Yugoslavia, ethnic identity could not serve as 
the main referent point in defining national identity. Instead, ―brotherhood and unity‖ 
and Marxist conceptions of class reinforced the idea of a unified past and future. Despite 
the rhetoric of a collective identity based on opposition to liberal conceptions of 
citizenship, national identity was not suppressed during the Yugoslav socialist period. 
Thus, ―Yugoslav discourses on the national question acknowledged difference between 




Yugoslavia can be described as an ‗institutionalized multinational state‘
7
 as compared to 
a multiethnic or multicultural state. Yugoslavia contained separate nations that sought 
political autonomy in order to develop their ‗own‘ national culture and identity. The 
unique hierarchical structure based on ethno-nationality institutionalized relations 
among different nations in the Yugoslav state. Despite the state‘s attempts to suppress 
national sentiment by creating political/territorial boundaries in the form of republics, 
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supporting the notion of ‗states‘ among the different ethnic groups fermented the 
geographical boundaries and ethnic affiliation of the nations within Yugoslavia.
8
 
 The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) with a population of 2.2 
million people is comprised of six officially recognized ‗nationalities‘ (Albanian, 
Turkish, Vlach, Serbian, Bosniac, and Roma).
9
 Macedonia is a parliamentary 
democracy; with numerous political parties suggesting the state is a functioning 
democracy with transparent and competitive elections. The political and security 
situation in Macedonia is relatively stable; in August 2001, the Ohrid Framework 
agreement made important constitutional and legislative reforms to improve minority 
civil rights in Macedonia.
10
 A further description of the political environment will 
illustrate the factors that present challenges for Roma claims-making in Macedonia. 
2008-2009 Elections 
The 2008 election outcome resulted in a governing coalition led by the Internal 
Macedonian Revolutionary Organization – Democratic Party of Macedonian National 
Unity (VMRO-DPMNE), and the Democratic Union for Integration (DUI), the ethnic 
Albanian party which received the most popular support. Opposition parties the Social 
Democratic Union of Macedonia (SDSM) and the Democratic Party of Albanians (DPA) 
initially opposed and protested the VMRO-DUI led Parliament based on SDSM 
accusations of false arrests during the election campaign, and DPA platform to recognize 
Kosovo. Early presidential and municipal elections were held in March and April 2009 
leading to the victory of VMRO-DPMNE, a coalition of Macedonian, Albanian and 
smaller minority based parties.  Elections in 2009 were peaceful; political parties and 
candidates avoided the violence that disrupted the 2008 election process.
11
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According to the 2009 OSCE-ODIHR Election report, Macedonia met most 
international standards for a democratic election process that was professional and 
transparent. Municipal and presidential campaigns were targeted toward specific ethnic 
communities, and voting preferences concomitantly were influenced by the ethnic 
background of the candidate. However, significant impediments to the election process 
were noted such as voter intimidation. Civil service employees were fearful their jobs 
would be threatened if they did not vote for the ruling party. Some citizens were 
intimidated into believing their pensions or social welfare benefits would be rescinded if 
they did not vote for a specific political party.
12
 
Prior to the 2009 elections, the main contributing factors to dissolution were high 
political tensions and inadequate communication between parties which seriously 
debilitated parliamentary work, leaving important ministerial positions vacant. It is 
hopeful that political tension between coalition members and with the opposition will 
not lead to government inaction concerning the implementation of legislation. 
Undemocratic actions by members of parliament in the past have led to the president‘s 
refusal to promulgate legislation. These concerns raise serious doubt as to the future 
functioning of government institutions.
13
  
Ohrid Framework Agreement and Minority Rights 
The Ohrid Framework Agreement, with the support of the international community was 
signed in 2001 as a resolution of the conflict between Albanians and ethnic 
Macedonians. Inter-ethnic tensions have been assuaged, but confusion still exists as to 
the reasons and consequences of the conflict. As a result of the Ohrid Agreement, 
important amendments were made to the Constitution of Macedonia. This instigated 
public administration reforms, such as the Decentralization Act and allowed for 
territorial divisions within the state. The Ohrid Agreement stipulates that certain rights 
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are guaranteed (i.e. proportional representation, use of language) where members of 
minority groups in municipalities comprise more than 20% of the population. In August 
2007, a law specifying the use of non-majority languages at the state/local level and in 
parliament was passed. However, the 20% threshold concerning the use of languages 
favors larger ethnic communities and does not serve the needs of smaller groups that 
may be territorially dispersed, such as the Roma. The law has allowed for the use of 
minority languages of smaller ethnic communities in the educational system, but 
financial limitations remain regarding faculties for teaching. Although Albanians are a 
sizeable minority in Macedonia, the needs of other ethnic communities are often 
neglected. Ethnic tension in the country may increase as minority groups attempt to meet 
the 20% threshold through the provision of territorial division.
14
 The only municipality 
where Roma comprise more than 20% of the population is Shuto Orizari.
15
 Municipal 
committees concerning community relations have been set up at the local level (19 out 
of 20 municipalities) in response to a law adopted on the advancement and protection of 
smaller ethnic communities, but are limited by inadequate resources and an incoherent 
legal framework. In addition, a Secretariat for implementation of the Ohrid Framework 
Agreement has been established, but remains understaffed.
16
 
Macedonia as ‘Multicultural Community’ 
It has been asserted that Macedonians have a long tradition of relative interethnic 
tolerance, and have peacefully coexisted with the Roma for centuries.
17
  The 
Macedonian government has continued to foster the idea of a tolerant and multiethnic 
nation – but the portrayal of the Roma community in Macedonia differs considerably 
from reality. Open and direct discrimination is not apparent, but rather a ‗sophisticated, 
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 exists among state/societal actors. Plaut states ―domestically, the 
attitude of politicians, academics and public figures towards Roma in Macedonia can 
most easily be labeled as a lack of interest or, more accurately, institutionalized 
marginalization.‖
19
 The myth of a ‗multi-ethnic, tolerant‘ Macedonia has gained 
acceptance within the Southeast European region and has been promoted by Roma/non-
Roma politicians and civil society.
20
 Although Roma do not face overt discrimination 
(i.e. skinhead attacks, hate speech) found in countries such as Slovakia, Czech Republic, 
and Hungary, hidden and sophisticated forms of institutionalized discrimination may be 
more dangerous in terms of minority integration.
21
  Discrimination exists within all 
facets of society and state structures including the educational, judicial, employment and 
housing systems.   
In 1971, Macedonia was the only Yugoslav nation that officially recognized the Roma 
as an ethnic community in the constitution, and legislation is explicit in meeting 
international human rights standards, and protection of minorities.
22
 As Roma became a 
significant minority in Macedonia, the group benefited from political reforms that 
advocated minority representation. While not equal to other minority groups, Roma did 
gain minimal cultural and symbolic freedom such as TV and radio communication in 
Romani, as well as a national flag.
23
 In 1996-97, optional language instruction was 
introduced in elementary schools. Furthermore, there are several cultural and artistic 
societies representing this group.
24
 However, minimal progress can be noted concerning 
the promotion and enforcement of human rights. In reality, the Macedonian government 
has demonstrated a lack of interest and concern regarding the Roma community.   
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4.3 General Situation of Roma in Macedonia 
 The Roma community is the most marginalized population in Macedonia (official 
population 52 000, unofficial population 60 000 – 260 000 based on the 2002 census). 
The national report on the situation of Roma in Macedonia shows that the largest 
number of Roma live in urban settlements (95%), concentrated in ghettoes or suburban 
areas. Basic infrastructure conditions have not been provided (no electricity, water, there 
is often lack of sewage facilities, asphalt roads, street lights, lack of regular garbage 
collection, as well as basic urban infrastructure). Living conditions are very poor; 
frequently housing does meet adequate standards. Populated settlements are often 
without clear ownership status
 
and outside urban planning arrangements, thus basic 
infrastructure and state services are difficult to access.  According to some assessments, 




Roma are at a further disadvantage, as often individuals lack the appropriate level of 
education to be competitive in the labor market. Official data show that in the year 2000 
from the total number of unemployed registered in the Employment Agency of the 
Republic of Macedonia 4% were Roma, of these half have incomplete elementary 
education. In comparing the total labor force according to ethnic categories, it is evident 
that the Roma have the highest percentage of unemployment, over 70%. Roma NGOs 
claim that in reality, the percentage is in fact even higher (95%) and differs significantly 
from the official statistics.
26
 State reports suggest that the main problem of Roma 
employability  
―lies in their difficult re-entrance on the labor market.  In principle the Roma live „from one day to the 
next‟ with the earned money, without paying contribution that would include them in the legal trends of 
the state and would guarantee them certain rights. This picture is supplemented also with the social 
„safety net‟ that covers the minimum needs of those receiving it, stimulating the operation of the grey 
economy. This way the beneficiaries of assistance acquire the social benefits dependency psychology, 
making more difficult their entry on the regulated labor market.‖ Furthermore, the state report on 
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employment states ―the reason for the unemployment is partially found in the Roma themselves who do 
not know how to inform themselves about possible employment at the competent official institutions.”
27
  
 It is important to note however, according to data collected in 2004 by the Social, 
Political, and Legal Research Institute in Macedonia that 50% of Roma recognize  
discrimination as a major debilitating factor of employability.
28
  It is also clear that the 
state report supports the discourse that the majority of Roma is dependent and takes 
advantage of the social welfare system, perpetuating the stereotype of Roma as a lazy, 
social underclass. It is also uncertain how the Roma community should ―inform 
themselves about possible employment …‖
29
 when the Macedonian state has 
consistently demonstrated a lack of political will and concern for the community. 
Additionally, a focus group survey demonstrated that Roma are generally disappointed 
by Romani politicians in government as employment in state administrative bodies is 
subject to party influence and politics. Roma with completed secondary education, able 
to work in some positions in the state administration, are still on the waiting list of 
unemployed. This consequently, according to the focus group has discouraging effects 




According to the national statistics office, less than 600 out of the 7868 Romani children 
who are enrolled in elementary school completed their primary education. Although 
each Macedonian citizen is obliged to complete primary education, the results show 
inconsistency with the legislation. In 2003, the European Centre for Minority Issues 
(ECMI) conducted focus groups to assess and evaluate the low level of enrolment of 
Roma children in Macedonian educational institutions. The findings suggest there are 
several reasons contributing to the low level of educational attainment such as family 
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structure/environment, living conditions, language barriers, and 
discrimination/segregation. In regards to family structure/environment, there is often 
inadequate education awareness among the Romani population. Many parents are unable 
to assist and support their children with homework as they lack the appropriate 
educational background.  Additionally, although elementary school education is free in 




An additional difficulty for many Roma children is the language of instruction in 
educational facilities, as 99% of the Roma population in Skopje speaks Romani. Thus, 
progress in school is seriously debilitated as children do not have an adequate 
knowledge of Macedonian and frequently drop out in later years. It is also important to 
note the extensive discrimination and segregation of Romani students. Often, teachers 
neglect Romani children, thus the quality of education in comparison to other students is 
substandard. It has also been recognized that Romani children are discriminated in the 
evaluation process. There have been cases where Roma children with special needs were 





In contradiction to the belief that the health conditions of Roma are influenced by their 
culture, customs, and lifestyle, – factors such as the reduction of government support, 
decreased unemployment benefits and emigration offer a more plausible account for the 
poor health within Roma communities. During the transition period, many Roma 
families sought asylum in Western European nations, but have now returned through a 
process of mandatory repatriation. Consequently, many Roma were no longer registered 
with the unemployment bureau, and as a result could not apply for health insurance. The 
health of Roma children is similarly affected, as parents are unable to cope with socio-
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economic difficulties. Furthermore, as Roma children are excluded from educational 
institutions, systematic monitoring of their health status (vaccination, systematic medical 
checkups) is lacking, leading to further health problems. Poor health conditions are 
further exacerbated as living conditions are often substandard within Roma 
communities. In the past ten years, Macedonia has not adopted adequate measures to 
address the health of the Roma population.
33
  Despite various international 
commitments, specifically, the ‗Decade of Roma Inclusion (2005-2015)‘ that addresses 
four priority areas – health, housing, employment, education, Macedonia has achieved 
minimal progress in improving the situation of Roma communities.  
Roma Human Rights Awareness 
As noted in the European Commission progress report on Macedonia, there has been 
ineffective control of police units, particularly the Alpha Units, which have used 
excessive and undue force in relation to the Roma community. The report suggests that 
the prosecutor‘s office and Ministry of Interior should make further investigations 
concerning cases of ill treatment that meet national and international standards. External 
procedures to investigate police corruption have not been established.
34
Economic and 
social inequality of minorities limits their ability to receive assistance and access to 
justice concerning rights violations (i.e. property rights, court decisions). A survey 
conducted in the summer of 2005 by the European Center for Minority Issues (ECMI) 
among Roma communities in ten Macedonian cities revealed that Roma have limited 
awareness of their human rights. The survey‘s findings also demonstrate that Roma 
infrequently refer to state institutions for protection of their rights due to a lack of trust. 
The low education level of survey respondents is also an important factor in accounting 
for their limited awareness. However, the study also indicated that two thirds of the 
respondents are interested and would benefit from state education regarding human 
rights awareness. The study demonstrated that presently, the state system is not 
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sufficient to promote education of rights.
35
 Specifically, significant resources are 
required for those who are the targets of indirect discrimination and do not have access 
to information regarding rights violations. Supporting evidence in the case of 




4.4 Increasing Institutional Access? Various Mechanisms for Roma 
Inclusion 
Observance of international human rights legislation 
The republic of Macedonia has ratified numerous international agreements and 
conventions concerning the protection of all citizens, including Roma. The main 
international documents that have significance concerning the National Strategy on 
Roma are the Copenhagen Criteria (1993), main principles adopted by the EU in 
Tampere (1999), and the Social Inclusion Draft. The Copenhagen Criteria sets 
guidelines for EU candidate status including institutional stability that guarantees 
democracy, rule of law, human rights, protection of minorities and commitment to the 
political and economic principles of the EU. It is recommended that candidate states 
include Roma in the area of minority rights.  The main focus of the 1999 Tampere 
principles is on eliminating discrimination and racism towards Roma, and enabling 
equal opportunity and access in the areas of education, employment, housing, health, 
and gender relations. The Social Inclusion Draft is a novel document that imposes an 
obligation on states to include social inclusion and poverty reduction aims concerning 
certain communities in official state policies. The document highlights the interrelation 
between economic, employment and social policies to resolve problems of integration.
37
 
Relevant international and national documents ratified by the Republic of Macedonia 
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signify the importance of minority related issues, but there is limited implementation to 
improve the status of ethnic communities, especially in the case of Roma. 
Participation and Integration 
In accordance with the Ohrid Framework Agreement, the Republic of Macedonia is 
responsible for the ―better quality participation and integration of national minorities, 
especially in confidence building measures, development of a decentralized government, 
non-discrimination and equal representation in all areas of social life.‖
38
 In reality, 
opportunities for minority group participation in the political sphere remain limited. 
Minority communities until recently did not have representatives within centralized 
government structures to participate in the decision making process and represent the 
community. Thus, any minority related concerns were presented and discussed by 
representatives that did not have knowledge or interest in the minority community in 
question. This resulted in the under development of some communities and regions in 
Macedonia.  The recent Decentralization Act allows for greater citizen participation in 
local government structures, but has not been implemented. The state is not promoting 
this as a mechanism to address and solve problems within minority 
communities.
39
Furthermore, the creation of minority related positions and individual 
nominations to those positions are a matter of negotiation between political parties. The 
process does not have the support of different ethnic communities and lacks 
transparency. Ethnic communities do not have access to representatives, or knowledge 
of department/ministry functions and responsibilities.
40
 
In accordance with the Ohrid Agreement, the Macedonian state initiated civil service 
training for ethnic communities to be equally represented in state structures. In the 
period 2002-2007, public employment data shows that the participation of Albanians 
increased (from 11-12% to 17-18%) and participation of the Turkish community has 
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  According to the 2002 Census, Roma constitute 2.66% of the 
population.  As of 2007, only 0.6% of Roma were public employees
42
 and very few 
high-level positions have been created within government structures.
43
 There has been 
uneven representation of ethnic communities in municipal and central level government 
structures, with the Roma community being severely underrepresented. Former Deputy 
Minister of Justice, Ibrahim Ibrahimi accounts for a number of factors that may 
debilitate the representation of Roma within the public service: the influence of political 
parties in determining the employment of public officials, the low level of education 




In general, there needs to be considerable public administration reform. Decisions to 
recruit and promote individuals lack transparency and accountability. Qualifications and 
experience are not taken into account, thus recruitment procedures are not based on 
objective, merit-based criteria. These practices are in contravention to civil service 
legislation and have de-motivating effects on state employees. In addition, the state has 
not provided for adequate civil service training and funding is still dependent on donor 
contributions. Overall, the internal management structure and administrative capacities 
are insufficient concerning financial and human resources, policy development, co-
ordination and planning. These difficulties have detrimental effects on governance: in 
particular, a number of key positions in the Secretariat for European Affairs, Ministry of 
Justice, and the Ministry of Local Self-Government remain vacant. Additional measures 
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 In 2009, five positions were held by individuals of Roma ethnicity: Minister without Portfolio Nezdet 
Mustafa (National Coordinator of the Decade of Roma Inclusion and the National Strategy for Roma; 
Ibrahim Ibraimi (Union of Roma in Macedonia) Deputy Minister of Justice; Amdi Bajram (President of 
Union of Roma in Macedonia and Member of Parliament. Shaban Saliu (leader of Democratic Forces of 
Roma) Director of the Agency for Protection and Rescue; Bajram Berat (President of Party for Integration 
of Roma) Advisor in Ministry of Internal Affairs 
44
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It is in this political context that the government is currently developing Roma inclusion 
policy and programs. Although national and international legislation promote minority 
rights, and positions have been created within political structures regarding Roma issues, 
the implementation of policy remains stagnant. The next section discusses the national 
strategy and action plans, inter-departmental communication, Roma political parties and 
Roma civil society, as well as the process of decentralization to describe the lack of 
progress on Roma issues. Further discussion of these factors allows for an analysis of the 
interrelation between Roma actors and government institutions to demonstrate how 
Roma activism has been constrained. Cooption and dependency on the Macedonian 
political structure has not enabled flexibility and innovation in terms of advocacy. The 
process of decentralization, in this regard, may serve as a mechanism in the future to 
promote activism at the local level. 
Implementation of the National Strategy and Action Plans 
In 2005, the national strategy and action plans on Roma inclusion were adopted by the 
Macedonian government as a result of the Decade of Roma Inclusion; an international 
initiative to influence signatory countries to develop and implement policies and 
programmes concerning the Roma population. The national strategy and action plans 
provide a detailed account of activities the Macedonian government will implement 
concerning Roma in the areas of housing, employment, health and education.
46
 
However, actual implementation of activities is weak and minimal financial means have 
been provided by the government. In total, 370 000 € were provided to the Transport, 
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Responsible for the coordination and implementation of the national strategy and action 
plans are the Ministry for Social and Labour Policy and offices of the Minister without 
Portfolio. Inter-departmental cooperation is weak and implementation of activities often 
remains stagnant. Many ministry documents concerning Roma-related activities have 
been circulated previously as part of past initiatives and very few records have been kept 
of activities.
48
 In general, many conference papers and international documents signify 
the importance and concern for Roma inclusion. There has been much funding allocated 
for 'paper work' concerning the Roma issue, but in terms of actual implementation – 
only sporadic projects have been initiated by national governments, with little or no 
funding for implementation of detailed policies and activities within 
national/international strategies and action plans.  
Project – Oriented Approach 
One of the fundamental problems concerning how the Roma issue is addressed is the 
project-oriented approach of many government departments, international and civil 
society organizations.
49
 Project oriented activities are generally short term and only have 
impact on a small segment of the population.   A long term, programme structured 
approach that incorporated Action Plan activities within all government departments 
would allow for better implementation and have wider impact on the general Roma 
community. For example, the Macedonian health department has a comprehensive 
programme for socially marginalized people. However, the action plan on health for 
Roma communities was not considered while formulating the programme. Additionally, 
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more funds may be allocated to Roma-related issues if all action plans were incorporated 
into current governmental programmes.
50
 
The project-oriented approach to addressing Roma concerns is partly a result of 
government agencies adopting the practices of international and non-government 
organizations. Many departmental staff have previous work experience in international 
and civil society organizations concerning Roma issues. The method by which the 
national strategy and action plans are implemented may be reflective of this fact. 
Furthermore, international organizations are still funding Roma inclusion programs 
within the government. Although international institutions such as the World Bank and 
Open Society Institute have been essential to the creation of government departments 
and staff positions concerning Roma-related issues, the project oriented approach of 
implementing activities may suppress macro level development of successful initiatives. 
Inter-departmental Cooperation  
As mentioned previously, the Roma Decade and national strategy are the two main 
approaches the Macedonian government is using to develop Roma-related projects and 
activities. Thus, these initiatives are the basis for analyzing inter-agency cooperation 
concerning Roma-related issues. Responsibility for coordination of the Roma Decade is 
in the offices of the Minister without Portfolio. The Unit for Implementation of the 
National Strategy is in the Ministry of Labour and Social Policy.  There is, however, 
limited communication and severe animosity between the offices of the Minister without 
Portfolio and the Unit for Implementation of the National Strategy, creating many 
difficulties in implementing Roma inclusion policies. An additional problem is the 
Macedonian government's decision to specify unclear ministerial/departmental roles and 
tasks for strategy implementation. The offices of the Minister without Portfolio and the 
Unit for Implementation of the National Strategy do not comprehend the decision of the 
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Another challenge of inter-departmental cooperation is the shifting of Roma-related 
issues to Roma staff employed within the offices of the Minister without Portfolio, the 
Unit for Implementation of the National Strategy and the Department of Minority 
Languages and Culture.  Although implementation of the Decade action plans and 
national strategy should be divided between all government ministries – the 
aforementioned departments and staff members are viewed as responsible for the overall 
implementation of Roma-related policy. This then leads to a limited/segregated approach 
to Roma inclusion policy in which only Roma are viewed as being responsible for Roma 
issues – and not mainstream government personnel. Thus, ethnic Macedonian staff shift 
implementation of Roma programs onto any ministry/department where Roma staff are 
employed or to the Roma individual who is working in their department. Additionally, 
although the Decade action plans and national strategy cover four core areas (i.e. 
employment, health, education, and housing) each ministry does not have a department 
or focal point responsible for Roma issues.
52
 
The dysfunctional inter-departmental communication is also a result of the 
discriminatory attitudes of ethnic Macedonian government personnel. It is 
incomprehensible to some state employees that there are professional, qualified Roma 
individuals who work on Roma inclusion policy and programs. There is also the 
perception that Roma are not part of the overall government structure, working toward 
common policies and programmes in Macedonia. Mainstream government staff view 
Roma employees as only working on behalf of the Roma population and find it difficult 
to understand that Roma can be employed in non-Roma related positions and 
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 As one staff member in the office of the Minister without Portfolio stated 
―one cannot expect to have cooperation where by being Roma and entering the building 
everyday people give you strange looks. In such a context you cannot expect to set up 
foundations for meaningful collaboration among different institutions.‖
54
 Furthermore, 
he noted  
―governmental institutions are not used to hiring experts to do work around Roma. They 
are a little bit rigid when it comes to the approval of certain documents, structural 
reforms or anything that it takes to target the specific needs of the Roma community. The 
people in the government do not understand that Roma can work for the benefit of the 
whole society and not only for the benefit of the Roma community.‖
55
  
Alternatively the former Deputy Minister of Justice noted  
―I can see how people find it unusual that Roma can be in such high positions, in 
executive government. When I was working with the Ministry of Labour and Social 
Policy in the past -- we had to prove that we can be fully committed and do the work 
professionally. So, there is no direct discrimination in government institutions, but there 
are more doubts that Roma are capable to perform their duties in a professional manner 
and this is something we should change in the future.‖
56
  
This also presents problems for the implementation of the national strategy and Decade 
action plans. With mainstream personnel not included in developing Roma inclusion 
policy, Roma working in government institutions can only communicate with other 
Roma government personnel. The same issues are discussed among those who are quite 
familiar with Roma-related concerns, as many current Romani government staff 
members are former civil society employees. Furthermore, any additional trainings, 
related conferences and seminars are only attended by Roma government personnel. 
Roma do not have the opportunity to convey issues to higher levels of government and 
                                                          
53
 Several interviewees of Roma ethnicity working in government institutions related similar narratives of 
discrimination  
54 Interview with Ljatif Demir, Government Advisor to Minister without Portfolio and National 
Coordination Office for the Implementation of the National Strategy for Roma and Decade Action Plans 













An additional issue that needs to be addressed is the impact of Roma political parties on 
the implementation of Decade action plans and national strategy. Members of Roma 
political parties occupying government positions each have a different interpretation of 
the documents, adding to the difficulty of developing a coherent and collaborative 
approach to implementation of the strategy and action plans in government institutions. 
Additionally, political party leaders sometimes put pressure on government personnel to 
achieve the goals of the political party as opposed to the goals specified in the national 
strategy and action plans. Inter-departmental cooperation is also hindered as conflict 
exists between the Deputy Minister of Justice and the Minister without Portfolio.
58
  The 
government of Macedonia has been slow in formulating and implementing Roma-related 
policies and programmes. It is unfortunate that political party affiliations and personal 
conflict are dividing Roma leadership in the country when two Ministers of Roma 
ethnicity are occupying such high level positions. The role of Roma political parties in 
advancing the claims of the Roma community deserves further discussion in the next 
section. 
4.5 Influential Allies for Roma Activism? The role of political parties 
and civil society organizations 
Roma Political Parties 
Early presidential elections in March 2009 led to the election of the Internal Macedonian 
Revolutionary Organization – Democratic Party for Macedonia National Unity (VMRO-
DPMNE), a coalition of Macedonian, Albanian and smaller minority based parties.
59
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Presently, there are six Roma political parties
60
 that have formed a coalition ―For a 
Better Macedonia‖ led by VMRO-DPMNE. However, political and power struggles 
between Macedonia and Albanian parties often leads to the marginalization of minority 
groups limiting their participation in developing state policies. This has led to the 
unequal representation of ethnic communities in government structures. In previous 
years, the Romani vote was divided as Roma political parties formed coalitions with 
different mainstream Macedonian parties. Although this is an opportune time to lobby 
the Macedonian government to implement the National Strategy and Decade action 
plans, personal conflict and the inability to develop a common platform are dividing 
Roma leadership. This has weakened the credibility and political stance of Roma 
leaders, presenting the image of fragmented Roma activism and leadership in front of 
ethnic Macedonian government leaders and staff.
61
 It has been stated that Roma political 
parties are merely 'pulled by the nose' and acting upon the advice of the prime minister. 
At times, conflicts among the Roma political parties are also resolved by the Prime 
Minister.
 62
 As Roma related concerns are not a priority for the Macedonian government, 
this has contributed to the lack of progress and action on the national strategy and 
Decade activities.  
Generally, within Roma political parties there is a lack of intellectual, organizational and 
financial capacity. Regarding the internal management structure of Roma political 
parties, inner conflict among leaders is one of the major challenges with personal 
ambition and interest taking precedence. There is limited membership and funding to 
support branch offices and facilities.
63
  Among other challenges is the lack of political 
education among Roma political leaders who are not able to represent their communities 
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effectively as they do not communicate often with their constituency and have minimal 
knowledge of community issues.
64
 Politicians only relate to the community in pre-
election campaigns promising basic needs for an impoverished community. The Roma 
community, in turn, has minimal choices regarding which political party to vote for. 
There is also a lack of long run strategic thinking and planning that is not connected with 
capacities, and when activities do occur, they are spontaneously constructed and 
implemented.
65
 Added to these limitations is the reluctance to let the younger generation 
of well educated Roma access the decision making process within political parties.  The 




Because of these challenges and limited membership, Roma political parties are forced 
to form coalitions with larger, mainstream political parties. In the process of negotiating 
with mainstream political parties, Roma political leaders are pursuing their personal 
interests ahead of community interests. Roma political parties do not have their own 
'agenda' to negotiate and are not lobbying for any specific programmes or policies. Thus, 
government institutions set-up to benefit the Roma community are not being used 
effectively under present Roma leadership.
67
 It is especially difficult to develop and 
implement project activities when different political actors have not resolved issues 
among themselves. This is foremost in the election period, when political conflict among 
leaders is especially detrimental to Roma-related projects, with work sometimes stalling 
for five or six months. Political conflict at the national level also impacts local politics 
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and implementation of projects at the municipal level – with the election of municipal 
councilors connected with national elections.
68
 
Upon Macedonian independence in 1991, the Roma as a marginalized community and 
‗nationality‘ was given political recognition in the constitution. Although the 
Macedonian constitution is explicit in granting equal status to Roma and other ethnic 
communities, it is definitive in referring to ethnic Macedonians as the ‗primary owners 
of the state.‘ International recognition of an independent Macedonia was not easily 
attained, and hostile neighboring states claiming the territory as their own has led to 
persistent arguments as to the self-determination and culturally dominant position of 
ethnic Macedonians.
69
 Nationalist sentiments have further exacerbated ethnic cleavages 
within the state and with the disintegration of Yugoslavia; Macedonia effectively has an 
‗ethnic party system.‘ It should be mentioned, however, that Macedonia was the first 
post-Yugoslav state to grant Romani political representation (i.e. Roma political parties 
and a Romani member of parliament). In 1991, Roma political parties rather than 
seeking further political rights emphasized the improvement of living standards for 
Roma communities. In this way, mainstream Macedonian parties have often thought of 
Roma political parties as easy allies. Furthermore, subsequent to the 2001 conflict, the 
Albanian community benefitted from reforms implemented under the Ohrid Framework 
Agreement. Although Roma could also refer to the Framework Agreement to advocate 




The Roma community in post-socialist Macedonia lacks a unified political platform and 
‗public face,‘ as ineffective political leaders have not used the opportunity of 
constitutional recognition to promote Roma issues. In this sense, a significant proportion 
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of the Roma community is alienated from the political sphere which is based on an 
‗ethnic party system‘ demanding assertion of a strong public identity. In an ethnically 
divisive state, it is also widely perceived that only an ethnically based political party can 
represent and advocate for a specific ethnic community. As representation in the public 
sphere is essential for political inclusion in Macedonia, it is important to note that in 
Macedonia, as well as in Serbia, Roma individuals have a strong sense of identity and 
affiliation with the category ‗Roma‘ that is perpetuated at the micro (familial and 
community) level, as compared to the macro state level. Romani participation in the 
political sphere is generally within NGOs that work with Roma communities or at the 
international level, circumventing the state. Roma political activists generally refer to the 
international Romani movement or civil society as promoting a collective Roma 
identity, and not domestic Macedonian institutions. Generally, the Roma community 
does not believe Roma political parties are effectively representing or addressing their 
needs. Thus, from the public‘s perspective Roma have a ‗weak identity‘ and domestic 
political representation.
71
   
The participation of Roma political parties in parliament has not been effective in 
advancing Roma claims.  In terms of bargaining with mainstream parties, Roma political 
parties can show they have a voting/constituency base which can be used during the 
election period to gain concessions from Macedonian mainstream political parties 
regarding Roma inclusion policy and implementation. According to Friedman, often the 
Roma community is the decisive factor in national and local elections between VMRO-
DPMNE and its main rival Social Democratic Union of Macedonia (SDSM). 
Representatives of both parties have attested to the importance of Roma political 
support, as demonstrated by campaigns in Roma settlements.
72
 However, as stated 
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previously Roma political parties do not have the capacity to effectively lobby and 
represent the interests of the Roma community.
73
  
As mentioned previously, the Macedonian government while perceiving the Albanian 
community as a threat with potential to destabilize the state, has generally viewed the 
Roma as ‗loyal citizens.‘ The Macedonian-Albanian divide is one of the central political 
issues in the state. Political conflict among the two largest political parties in Macedonia 
(VMRO-DPMNE and SDSM) has led to the participation of ethnic Albanian parties in 
government since multi-party elections commenced in 1990. Thus, any regard for the 
Roma community, as argued by Friedman, was in reality the need for a potential ally 
against other ethnic Macedonian political parties and the ethnic Albanian diaspora.
74
 
Since the late 1970s, as Albanian nationalism grew, Muslim Roma were encouraged to 
identify with the Albanian community, reportedly sometimes being offered bribes during 
census declarations. There have also been efforts to co-opt the Roma community by 
Albanian political parties to the chagrin of Macedonian politicians. Despite common 




 The Albanian political parties have opposed their status as a ‗minority,‘ subordinate to 
the ‗Macedonian‘ majority in the new constitution. This act re-defined Albanians as the 
hostile ‗other,‘ and was viewed as opposition to Macedonians asserting their territorial 
rights, and constructing a new identity.
76
Any discussion of Albanians having equal 
status to Macedonians is viewed as denying Macedonians national sovereignty and their 
identity. It is the socialist discourse of differentiating between ‗nations,‘ ‗nationalities,‘ 
and ‗ethnic communities,‘ that has influenced contemporary debates concerning 
majority-minority status in Macedonia. Inclusion in the Macedonian state is based on 
ethnic affiliation despite rhetoric that argues for the equal status of all citizens.
77
 In 
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contrast to the Albanian population, Roma in the former Yugoslavia held a subordinate 
status as an ‗ethnic community.‘ As Albanians and Macedonians are attempting to 
renegotiate their identities, and struggle for political power, Roma as one of the few 
minority groups in the state are viewed as an irrelevant contender for inclusion. While 
Albanians are seen as outsiders – the group is still viewed as politically relevant. The 
Macedonian-Albanian divide in contemporary Macedonia has been a great disadvantage 
to the Roma population.  
Collective action and protest among the Albanian population have caused unrest in the 
state especially since 1991.  It should be noted that the Albanian community has been 
more effective in advocating for their claims partly as a result of generous funding from 
the Albanian diaspora in neighboring states, but also as the community has greater 
organizational capacity and aptitude for politics.  As stated by Friedman, the Roma 
community in Macedonia has organized fewer than ten demonstrations, generally in 
relation to election preparations, improving living conditions, police brutality or the 
plight of refugees from Kosovo.  While specific issues are important to emphasize, the 
overall goal of securing political rights and inclusion within Macedonian society should 
continuously be on the agenda of activists and politicians. The few political rallies that 
have been organized have not instigated a response from Macedonian authorities in the 
form of repression or concessions.
78
 The next section considers the role of Roma NGOs 
in political advocacy. 
Romani Civil Society 
The establishment of Roma civil society and humanitarian organizations in Macedonia 
was initially a response to the refugee migration from Kosovo. Subsequent to this 
period, many NGOs continued their work as humanitarian organizations serving the 
basic needs of the Roma community in the form of small-scale projects. Due to the 
conflict in Kosovo there were many international organizations in the Southeast 
European region, and substantial funding available for Roma humanitarian 
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 With the simultaneous processes of subsiding conflict in the SEE region, 
democratization and EU accession status, Macedonia exists in a ‗vacuum‘ where the 
international community is retracting funds concerning humanitarian and Roma-related 
issues. 
The retraction of funding by international organizations has created increased conflict 
and jealousy between Roma political representatives and Roma civil society. 
Comparatively, the Roma civil sector has been advantageous in building contacts with 
international organizations and receiving training on lobbying, project development and 
implementation. The attractiveness of NGOs, as one of the main avenues to advocate for 
Roma claims, was also due to the inability of Roma politicians to join mainstream 
political parties. The electoral terms of Roma politicians has been unstable and 
vulnerable, and as ethnic nationalism in Eastern Europe ferments, Roma candidates are 
not viewed as assets to mainstream political parties. Thus, politicians and activists 
viewed the sphere of civil society in more favorable terms and as an arena to influence 
state policy on Roma-related issues.
80
 
Roma political representatives believe that NGOs are corrupt, receiving international 
funds without serving the needs of the Roma community.
81
 In contrast, NGOs argue that 
Roma political parties are only interested in personal interest and ambition.
82
 In 
response, some Roma political representatives have actively tried to suppress the Roma 
NGO sector from obtaining international funds, and tried to take ownership of Roma 
organizations and activities. This has created a tense situation; the government needs the 
                                                          
79
 Interview with Sabena Mustafa, Program Assistant, National Coordination Office for the 
Implementation of Decade Action Plans and National Strategy for Roma Inclusion Skopje, Macedonia, 
February 3, 2009 
80
 Trehan, Nidhi. ―The Romani Subaltern within Neoliberal European Civil Society: NGOization of 
Human Rights and Silent Voices,‖ in Romani Politics in Contemporary Europe: Poverty, Ethnic 
Mobilization, and the Neo-liberal Order. eds. Nidhi Trehan and Nando Sigona. (Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2010) p. 59 
81
 Interview with Eben Friedman, Independent Consultant for the Roma Education Fund, Skopje, 






input of the Roma civil sector in order to gain access and information concerning the 
Roma community, but at times, the Roma civil sector is not supportive.
83
  
An NGO activist noted, “in my view the NGO sector is far more developed … the 
political parties they think they are developed. So, I don't think there is good 
cooperation.  Additionally, I think that's not the problem of only Roma political parties, 
its how the political situation in Macedonia is. Basically, people involved in politics are 
there for their interest. They don't work much on community interests, global interests. 
They are just trying to get a job for themselves and for their families. And, they also 
don't understand policy, the National Strategy, and the Decade of Roma Inclusion. They 
think the Decade is a pot of money, that the NGO sector is spending and they don't have 
anything. For years Roma politicians were trying to get leadership in the Decade. I 
think the NGO sector is always declaring the same thing. We would like to work with all 
the politicians -- not one in particular. We are not affiliating with one political party. 
But, from the political parties you hear so many even, contradictory things such as, the 
current Minister without Portfolio speaking in the parliament before election to his post: 
„I'm publically declaring war with the NGOs.‟ And, the Roma political parties are not 
open, we want this and that... you're never sure.‖
84
 
The development of Roma activism has been inhibited by the withdrawal of 
international funding, conflict between major actors, but also the inclusion of recent 
Roma university graduates and civil society representatives in Roma political parties and 
government structures. This is a problematic development and may lead to the lack of 
constructive criticism regarding Roma-related policies.  The government has been slow 
in implementing the national strategy and action plans, but there will be no critical civil 
sector to effectively lobby and instigate change. In addition, Roma activists hired within 
government institutions often become distant from community issues.  As stated by a 
Roma government representative  
―it is important for young people to go back into communities and listen to people, and 
look at their real needs and problems. This is one of the problems that we had in the past 
-- people once they get employed, once they get positions they don't go back into 
communities. They try to resolve issues by sitting in their office.‖
85
 Further compounding 
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difficulties is the inability of young Roma graduates to find employment, thus as stated 
by the former respondent ―the intervention we made in the past decade or so with 
increasing the number of educated Roma and having a base of qualified professionals, 
we are kind of lagging behind -- but not only lagging, we're turning the whole process 
back. And, that's to say because those Roma who graduate from universities there is no 
employment for them ... and you can see some of them working in the black market 
economy, exactly in the same way as some of the Roma who have no education at all. 
And, some of the government people it's easy for them to say it doesn't really matter, 
education doesn't really matter for Roma, because both of them, both the illiterate and 
the educated will end up selling things on the black market.
86
 Despite investing in the 
young Roma and the efforts we make, some people will say that they're not visible, and 
that's true they're not visible.‖
87
 
An additional problem is the lack of cohesion and networking among existing Roma 
NGOs. The lack of international funding has increased competition among Roma NGOs, 
but more importantly, the inability to coordinate and agree on a common platform has 
debilitated Roma activism. However, successful examples of NGO networking and 
coordination do exist such as RNVO 2002. The network is a composition of two lobby 
groups including representatives from state institutions. The purpose of the group is to 
advocate on behalf of the Roma community concerning issues of legislative reform, 
citizenship, housing, discrimination, education, and health.
88
  
When Romani activism started building momentum in Macedonia and in the region, 
many of the new NGOs to demonstrate they are ‗fighting for the Roma community,‘ 
called themselves Roma NGOs.  In order to address Roma issues and attract attention to 
the movement it was beneficial to add Roma as a precursor. However, this can be 
debilitating to Roma activism as in this way, NGOs are not targeting a specific expertise, 
but rather focus on a broad range of issues (health, employment, education, housing) 
attempting to do ‗everything.‘  Often times international and government institutions 
have noted the lack of professionalism, and competency among Roma NGOs. Thus, 
including ‗Roma‘ in the organization‘s name can promote a negative image. As noted by 
a think tank executive in Macedonia in relation to advocacy work and capacity building, 
Roma NGOs should  










―start becoming an equal partner, an equal fighter in the arena. Otherwise, it will 
always be under certain circumstances okay, its Roma, they are always less educated, or 
they are always less capable so let's give them sort of quota, so they can rest assured 




In 2005, the national government enacted a strategy and established an office for 
cooperation with the civil society sector.  NGO activists believe the strategy was 
developed only to appease EU conditions for membership. As stated by a think tank 
representative  
―our general government attitude is that we don't want the membership in terms of 
wanting to improve ... we do not understand the membership as having to improve the 
lives of our citizens, but it‟s rather a task that Brussels gave us, so it‟s like a checklist. 
So, it doesn't really matter if the cooperation between the government and NGO 
improved. But to the government, we have the Strategy, we have the office and, it has 
produced no results as far as I know...‖
90
  
Furthermore, many NGOs in Macedonia have not received any funding from the Office 
for Cooperation with the civil sector. As of 2009, the office had only developed the 
paper work for funding applications and criteria for the distribution of funds. Initially, 
the Macedonian government had proposed 2 million € for NGO activities; it was then 
deduced to 250,000 €. NGO activists also mentioned that as funding is dependent on 
political party affiliation, it is often difficult to maintain a critical perspective on 
government actions. Thus, many organizations do not apply for monetary resources and 
rely on international aid.
91
 
In general, there has been some progress concerning implementation of the Government 
Strategy and action plan for cooperation with civil society organizations. Grants 
available for NGOs are limited, but the selection criteria and public calls for proposals 
have allowed for greater transparency in this area. In addition, new sources of funding 
have become available as current legislation allows for business and private 
contributions through income tax, but tax relief benefits for civil society organizations 
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have not been forthcoming. Civil society organizations in Macedonia remain dependent 
on international funds, limiting their ability to provide services. In general, the 
government has not solicited civil society involvement in policy and legislative 
development.
92
 The current process of decentralization may create opportunities for 
greater NGO involvement in government policy development. 
As SEE countries are still struggling to find their own sense as states, it is challenging to 
conceptualize how the Roma issue is a part of this process to redefine state identity. The 
Roma community is severely marginalized – challenges are in capacity building, 
negotiating with mainstream political parties, and coordinating actions among activists. 
Roma activism is still in the initial phase – developing as a relevant important 
social/political actor. In order to be politically active and influential the community 
needs a solid foundation, as stated by an OSI representative ―the Roma community as a 
base for either NGO activism, or political representation and participation is completely 
unprepared for that ...‖
93
 It is also problematic that NGOs implement activities in 
‗chunk mode,‘ implementing small scale projects. Roma communities ‗develop the 
vision that tomorrow will be better, and NGOs are going to make life better.‘
94
 However, 
as funding decreases in the SEE region, NGOs are not in a position to make long term 
improvements in Roma communities. As NGOs are increasingly working with the 
government, they are highly dependent on the bargains Roma politicians made with the 
government. Thus, there is no one to ‗really define boldly what we want to do with the 
Roma community.‘
95
 NGOs have existed in an ambiguous space, ‗of being a partner, but 
a partner with no funds,‘ and could not ‗persuade the government to open up.‘
96
 Thus, 
NGOs are in a ‗dangerous position ... coming very close to the government and Roma 
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political parties,‘ and losing their critical perspective.
97
 Another NGO activist 
recognized that ―some organizations are very much connected with particular 
politicians – it seems as though the NGO is politically active. The connection is very 
close and sometimes it‟s questionable -- it creates doubt.”
98
 This in essence for many 
activists and international organization representatives was mentioned as the ‗biggest 
challenge‘ for Roma inclusion in Macedonia. 
Decentralization 
As noted previously the institutionalization of Roma activism at the national level has 
not been conducive to promoting Roma-related issues. The current process of 
decentralization may induce greater levels of activism at the local level. Although this 
may occur in cooperation with local organizations and political structures, it can create 
opportunities for grassroots activism that promotes community consciousness and the 
implementation of programs that effectively serve the needs of the community. The 
process of decentralization initiated in 2005 is unfolding slowly – additional time and 
finances will be required until local structures are able to manage independently and 
effectively. In the last two years, the central government has devolved responsibilities in 
the areas of social services, education and urban planning. This has led to the approval 
of Roma-related local action plans in few municipalities (Kumanovo, Bitola, Stip, and 
Vilis). However, monitoring and implementation of local action plans is impeded as 
limited funding is provided by the central government, but does not necessitate a 
complete withdrawal of support for programmes by local governments. As noted by a 
NGO activist,  
―the decentralization process is very difficult in Macedonia. Local self government is in 
total chaos because they don't receive money, but do receive more responsibilities. They 
can't handle it -- they don't have the capacity from previous periods, so, they cannot 
manage themselves. And, local authorities rarely think of Roma.‖
99
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The European Reconstruction Fund (at the time of writing) was in discussion with the 
government regarding the portion of funds that can be transferred for the municipality to 
implement its responsibilities effectively.
100
 In general, municipal taxes have increased 
but revenues remain insufficient to administer new tasks and in some cases 
municipalities have considerable debts leading to legal proceedings concerning their 
accounts. Within local administrations, human and financial resources are inadequate to 
manage state-owned resources. There is also a lack of transparency and accountability in 
local administrations and limited civil service training.  Past efforts to function 
effectively were further hindered by the resignation of the Minister for Local Self-
government; the post remained vacant for 7 months.
101
  
Other activities that have been implemented concerning the integration of Roma related 
issues within the community are the establishment of Roma information centers within 
NGOs.
102
  This signals progress in terms of community development and interest in 
Roma-related issues, but has some limitations as the purpose of creating Roma 
information centers is not to provide greater support to civil society in communities, but 
to ensure funding and continuous communication with municipal governments so that 
Roma issues are not marginalized. Roma information offices could be established as 
autonomous units within local government structures to ensure a distance from local 
politics, while having an input in the decision making process. Although a new ‗political 
space‘ has opened in creating positions for local Roma councilors within information 
centers at the municipal level, many of the challenges that exist at the central level of 
government regarding monitoring and implementation of actions plans, NGO/political 
party conflict, and the precedence of personal ambition threaten effective engagement 
with the Roma community in Macedonia. The position of Roma councilor within 
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municipalities should be an independent post without taking into account the interests of 
political parties and coalition members.
103
 
In the particular case of Shuto Orizari local governance structures and informal activism 
could have a positive impact on the Roma community. Shuto Orizari is the only 
municipality in the world predominately populated by Roma, with a Romani mayor and 
councilors. The redrawing of territorial boundaries in 2002 allowed for the re-
establishment of factories and loss of investment to other municipalities.  The 
community has no resources to obtain funding and cannot generate tax revenues as many 
of the inhabitants are social welfare recipients. As mentioned previously, the provision 
of funding to local governments is progressing slowly, thus local governance structures 
in Shuto Orizari are not functioning effectively.
104
 As noted by a Roma activist and 
government representative  
―if we compare the municipality of Shuto Orizari with smaller municipalities in 
Macedonia, and compare the institutions which are present within one municipality, 
than you would see that Shuto Orizari doesn't have some of the most important 
institutions, the core institutions which develop any group people, any population, any 
community, any nation. One cannot expect any progress here. The big question for the 
Macedonian government and Roma political parties is how do you develop a nation 
which is dependent on social welfare? And, how do you work with people who can only 
think of their social welfare and whether it‟s going to come on time or not?‖
105
  
 In 2009, the municipality did not approve the budget due to political difficulties and has 
incurred a deficit.
106
 These limitations should not inhibit plans for future development 
and investment in the area. Effective political leadership and community level decision 
making could lead to a vibrant, cultural municipality. 
Conclusion 
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The nation building process in the former Yugoslavia although promoting the idea of 
‗brotherhood and unity‘ legitimated national and political identities based on ethnicity, 
and established a hierarchical ordering of the various communities within the state – 
positioning Roma at the bottom.  This has impacted contemporary inter-ethnic relations 
in Macedonia; despite state ratification of numerous international agreements on 
minority rights, as well as recognition of Roma as an ‗ethnic community‘ in the 
constitution, the community remains in a disadvantaged position, often the target of 
discriminatory practices. The Roma predominately perceived as ‗loyal citizens,‘ are 
excluded as relevant contenders in political negotiations, as frequent contestation and 
effective lobbying by the large Albanian community provide a constant threat to the 
Macedonian state.  The lack of effective leadership, political acumen, financial and 
organizational capacities within Roma political parties has lead to a weak public image 
and political platform. The division among VMRO-DPMNE and SDSM, the dominant 
political parties in Macedonia requires coalition building with smaller minority parties. 
With marginal votes determining election outcomes; both parties have commented on 
the importance of Roma political support. However, Roma political parties have failed 
to capitalize on their bargaining potential – important concessions are not realized, such 
as further implementation of the national strategy and action plans.  
In addition to ineffective political leadership, often internal conflict within Roma civil 
society organizations has not led to the successful promotion of Roma issues. 
Increasingly, the international community has limited funding to the SEE region, and 
this has presented further difficulties for Roma NGOs that do not have domestic support 
from Roma politicians or Macedonian institutions. Among other challenges is the 
employment of Roma NGO representatives within government institutions, which may 
lead to limited criticism of government policies and activities. The Ohrid Framework 
Agreement has stipulated the equal representation of ethnic communities in government 
institutions, but Roma remain severely under-represented. As minority communities did 
not have effective representation in centralized decision making structures, many regions 




decentralization may allow for greater involvement and participation of minority 
representatives in local government structures, as well as greater opportunities for 
advocacy and addressing the needs of the Roma community. 
Macedonia as a participating state in the Decade of Roma Inclusion has created the 
relevant documents necessary to provide policy direction and implement activities on 
Roma inclusion. Limited funding and lack of political interest in Macedonia, however, 
has not led to significant progress on improving the situation of Roma communities. 
Further challenges are the lack of cooperation between the main agencies and political 
leaders responsible for implementation of Roma inclusion policies, in addition to 
adoption of a ‗project oriented‘ approach that has short term impact; consequently, 
limiting the macro level development of initiatives on Roma issues. Furthermore, Roma 
political parties often lack a collaborative approach in interpretation of the national 
strategy and action plans. Discrimination among government personnel also debilitates 
opportunities for cooperation, as Roma issues are not viewed as integral to the overall 
goal of representing and addressing Macedonian concerns. Implementation of Roma 
issues are generally relegated to employees of Roma ethnicity, thus issues concerning 
the community do not enter higher level agendas and decision making processes. Thus, 
in analyzing the factors of political activism (state repression/facilitation, increasing 
institutional access, influential domestic and international allies, and shifting political 




















Domestic Opportunities and Constraints: The Case of Serbia and 
Roma Political Activism 
 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter seeks to analyze the domestic factors that may support or debilitate Roma 
advocacy in Serbia. The domestic political opportunity structure (POS) is a useful 
framework to analyze components impacting mobilization; these include, state 
repression and/or facilitation, increasing institutional access, influential domestic and 
international allies, and shifting political alignments. The first section argues that the 
strength and form of national feeling in a state can be used as an indicator of increasing 
state repression towards minority groups and as such, it constitutes a major destabilizing 
factor for minority groups‘ ability to integrate.  This section also summarizes the conflict 




negotiating within a system of closed political channels that does not allow for policy 
reform or development in the state. The discussion proceeds to outline the situation of 
the Roma community, describing the prevalence of societal discrimination and violence. 
Secondly, the chapter seeks to describe the various institutional mechanisms that 
seemingly provide ‗increasing access‘ regarding Roma inclusion as a response to 
international commitments.  Influential domestic and international allies within the 
domestic arena pose opportunities as well as challenges for civil society organizations 
and Roma political parties that seek to influence Roma inclusion policy.  
Finally, it will be illuminating to analyze Roma inclusion policies within Vojvodina and 
Kosovo subsequent to the Milosevic period that consequently had a lasting impact on 
ethnic relations in the state. The former is an ethnically divisive territory under the 
auspices of the international community, Serbian, and Kosovo governments, thus 
minority inclusion is dependent on domestic and international allies; while shifting 
political alignments create a complex scenario for the RAE minority. In comparison, the 
province of Vojvodina has traditionally been viewed as a multi-ethnic society, receptive 
to minority participation and interests, but has been negatively influenced by ethnic and 
political conflict in the region.  
5.2 State Repression: Explaining Nationalism in the Former Yugoslavia  
As previously noted, the foundations of nationalism and ethnic conflict in the former 
Yugoslavia are very much a result of the hierarchical ordering of ethnic groups within an 
institutionalized multinational state system designed to accommodate differences. While 
Serbians constituted forty percent of the population, Yugoslavia did not include a 
significant majority that was able to dominate ‗naturally.‘ The preservation of 
Yugoslavia was dependent on the cooperation of Serbians and Croatians, the two 
national groups with the largest populations in a constant struggle to maintain their 
‗boundaries.‘ This understanding formed the basis for Yugoslavia as a nation state.
1
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In this political environment, nationalism was the vehicle for creating new power 
sharing arrangements in reconstructing the nation and perceived as a necessary evil to 
ensure security among newly forming states. The foundation of Yugoslavia was based 
on an uneasy cooperation between two opposing national ideologies and was therefore 
unable to cope with claims of territorial sovereignty.
2
 The conflict in the former 
Yugoslavia can be defined by political fragmentation along ethnic lines and 
consequently the outbreak of war to redraw national boundaries. The origins of the 
conflict in the mid-1980s were the outcome of a nationalist upsurge led by Serbia‘s 
Communist Party. The movement sought to provide further cohesiveness of the 
federation under leadership of the Communist Party, but nationalist fervour led to ideas 
of a ‗Greater Serbia.‘
3
  
Ethnic conflict in the former Yugoslavia was intensified as the Serbian nation was 
reconstructed by nationalist intelligentsia, political leaders, and the Orthodox Church by 
appealing to the idea of a special and distinct national identity. Serbian identity was 
juxtaposed with ‗other‘ Yugoslav nationalities that were constructed as a ‗threat‘ and an 
‗enemy.‘ Serbian nationalist ideology was also based on the notion of Serbian solidarity 
– that all Serbs reside in one state. The security of Serbian people could only be 
accomplished by excluding all other ethnic groups from this state.
4
 Thus, ―to be a Serb 
… and not be nationally obsessed means to be accused of betraying your nation, and 
labelled as a ‗bad‘ Serb. Distinctions between ‗bad‘ and ‗good‘ Serbs have become very 
important to the national mythology …‖
5
 The re-vitalization of historical grievances in 
opposition to other ethnic groups was able to fuel the nationalist goals of political 
leaders and impassion the populace. Propaganda  in the form of conspiracy theories; 
Serbia as an ‗exploited nation,‘ ‗hatred‘ of Serbs and their genocide, the imagined 
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Yugoslav nation that betrayed Serbian people, led to the inevitable conclusion of a 
secure nation that unified all Serbs.
6
  
The resulting violence that ensued in Kosovo toward the Roma minority, forcing the 
population to seek refuge in Macedonia, Germany and other Western European nations 
is further testament to the effect of Serbian national identity on majority/minority 
relations. During the conflict, the Roma minority was caught between the two rival 
majority groups vying for control of the province. According to Mann, numerous social 
groups became involved – not just leaders and masses, but also radical and moderate 
movements and core constituencies.  All were involved in a descent from a multinational 
Yugoslav Federation to murderous ethnic cleansing by organic nationalists. This 
comprised five main steps: the breakup of the Yugoslav Federation, its replacement by 
organic leaning nation-states, the outbreak of violent incidents between these states and 
their ethnic minorities; the escalation of such incidents into war between ethnically 
based states and statelets and escalation of war into murderous ethnic cleansing.
7
 
Radicalized nationalism was thus able to spread quite widely among the rival 
communities, but it was stirred, manipulated, and coerced by elites, armed militants, and 
core constituencies of radical nationalism. War then made ethnic identity compulsory, 
triumphant over all other identities.
8
  
Barany has asserted that Macedonians have a long tradition of interethnic tolerance, and 
have peacefully coexisted with the Roma for centuries whereas Gypsies were settled in 
Bohemia only in the communist era.
9
 The Macedonian identity and conception of 
nationhood is not as strong as in the Serbian case, especially after the dissolution of 
Yugoslavia. In contrast, the population in Serbia was aware of a common ‗Serbian‘ 
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identity, although part of a greater Yugoslav state.
10
 From an early period there have 
been strong nationalistic tendencies and awareness of a common ethno-national bond or 
greater Serbian nation. Thus, it can be assumed that there is greater discrimination 
toward the Roma minority as they are viewed as ‗outsiders,‘ unable to integrate 
successfully and not capable of adopting the Serbian national identity.  Additionally, one 
may surmise that Roma in Macedonia have had better opportunities to protest against 
discriminatory state practices and advance their claims for equality, as compared to their 
situation in Serbia.  Although the prevalence of nationalism and political turbulence in 
Serbia has not been conducive to promoting Roma issues, Roma claims-making has led 
to minimal achievements in both Macedonian and Serbian states. 
 ‘Multiculturalism’ and the new Serbian state 
The constitution in Serbia further entrenches ethnocentrism, although political leaders 
attempt to convey the impression of a multicultural society. There are divisions among 
political parties in Serbia concerning EU accession, but for supporters of EU integration, 
discussions of multiculturalism are essential to promoting national myths and narratives 
that present the idea of an inclusive society. There has been a lack of political will in 
Serbia to develop the idea of civic participation, and the political and societal realities in 
both Macedonia and Serbia have falsified the myth of multi-ethnic states.
11
  
The constitution and political party platforms explicitly state the idea that Serbia is the 
state of the Serbian people. As stated by a former presidential advisor in Vojvodina  
―the problem is that the mainstream Serbian population doesn‟t feel that Serbia is a 
multi-ethnic community. That‟s felt objectively and subjectively. They don't recognize 
inter-ethnic problems. For example, Serbians would probably be insulted if you called 
them racist or discriminatory because for them you're either Serb or nothing. They don't 
recognize Roma people as a separate community, autonomous community within 
themselves. They believe that there are no other people in Serbia except Serbs obviously.  
I can clearly state with certainty that nobody will die for Roma rights in Serbian 
                                                          
10
Mann, M. op.cit, p. 362. 
11
 Gavrilovic, Z. ―Analysis of the Political Position of the Roma in Serbia,‖ in Toward the Political 
Inclusion of Roma, Report funded by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) 









An additional problematic are the contradictory laws in Serbia, which according to Bašić  
 
enable an “inarticulate and sterile multicultural policy in contemporary Serbia. During 
the preparation of the Law on the Protection of National Minorities itself, it was 
emphasized that its implementation depends on the solutions provided for in other laws 
– on local government, official use of language, elections, education, culture, 
information and others. However, only in rare instances did laws in the Republic of 





Political Turbulence in Serbia 
The 1990s marked the most tumultuous period for Serbia with the final phase of 
Yugoslavia‘s disintegration commencing. This process resulted in wars between former 
Yugoslav states, international sanctions, the NATO bombing, and authoritarian rule 
under Slobodan Milosevic, perpetuated into isolationism and opposition to European 
integration. Subsequent to political reforms in 2000, external relations with the EU 
improved and Serbia has attained EU accession status.
14
  
In the 1990s, political struggles centered on the divide between nationalist and pro-
European supporters. Nationalism tended to fuel an anti-Western opposition and with 
the transition to a multi-party system, the nationalist wing attained a significant 
advantage in elections. Political reforms in 2000 did not remove Milosevic supporters 
entirely within government structures and in 2003 the Prime Minister of Serbia Zoran 
Djindjic, was assassinated; partly as a result of his actions in the extradition of Milosevic 
to the Hague Tribunal in 2001. This was a momentous loss for the country as Djindjic 
was a powerful actor in the process of democratization. Consequently, these events 
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The election of the Democratic Opposition of Serbia (DOS) in 2000 facilitated drastic 
political reforms, indicating a change from the old regime. The DOS had many 
challenges, as the previous administration of Slobodan Milosevic resulted in a 
disenchanted electorate that had no faith in public institutions, the media, the judiciary, 
law enforcement, and election procedures. A fragile economy, high unemployment rate, 
and the significant inflow of refugees extenuated difficulties. In addition, the disputed 
status of Kosovo and the possible secession of Montenegro created a volatile political 
climate rife with conflict and nationalist fervour.
16
  
Although the 2000 elections led to the overwhelming victory of the DOS, stability was 
temporary. The 18 party DOS coalition was rife with political and personal conflicts, as 
well as ideological differences. The most significant cleavage was between the 
Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS), led by the President Vojislav Kostunica, and the 
Democratic Party (DS) led by the Prime Minister Zoran Djindjic. In 2001, DSS 
withdrew support and this led to the expulsion of its members from parliament. As a 
consequence, parliament reached an impasse which delayed the adoption of legislation. 
DSS members returned only temporarily to enable election amendments; not minimizing 
conflict between DSS and DS.
17
 
 In 2002, several factors changed the political environment in Serbia. Agreements were 
concluded regarding the common state of Serbia and Montenegro. Conflicts continued 
between DOS coalition partners; it became unclear if the government still had a 
parliamentary majority, once again leading to an impasse and delaying legislative 
reforms. This was an especially challenging period as further indictments by the 
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International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia detained senior staff of army 
and police forces. As a result of continued feuding among political parties and a vote of 
no-confidence, the National Assembly was dissolved in November 2003.
18
 
Parliamentary Elections in December 2003 did not mark an improvement in political 
relations and no consensus was reached among political parties. Although Zoran 
Zivkovic continued the political reforms initiated by Prime Minister Zoran Djindjic; 
political stalemate was aggravated by the non-election of a President since 2002 leading 
to an increasingly volatile political climate.
19
 The December 2003 elections marked the 
end of the fragile DOS Coalition and the promise for reforming an autocratic, quasi-
mafia state to a functioning democracy.   
As the parliamentary elections in January 2007 did not indicate a clear parliamentary 
majority, a government coalition consisting of the DS, G17+, Democratic Party of 
Serbia (DSS) and New Serbia (NS) was formed with Kostunica as Prime Minister. A 
coalition agreement was signed among the political parties indicating cooperation on 
priority issues such as the status of Kosovo as a Serbian province, EU candidacy, and 
cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal of the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). 
Partnership among the coalition members increasingly grew tense with the upcoming 
2007 presidential elections, stemming from differences concerning the priority issues – 
this perpetuated a very negative political climate and campaign. January 2008 marked 
the first presidential election since the approval of the new Constitution of Serbia, and 
perhaps the most important elections since the end of the Milosevic regime.
20
 Once 
again, the May 2008 parliamentary elections in Serbia followed the demise of the 
coalition government under the leadership of Kostunica – mainly due to the contentious 
topics of the Serbian reaction to the declaration of independence by Kosovo in February 
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2008, and cooperation with the European Union.
21
 Perhaps most alarming for minority 
groups is the increasing support for the Serbian Radical Party that promotes a strong 
nationalist agenda. The country continues to be plagued by corruption, organized crime, 
ethnic conflict in the region, weak coalition governments and government institutions, 
and a political culture of intolerance and undemocratic values.
22
 
5.3 Situation of Roma in Serbia  
Serbia has the largest population of Roma in the former Yugoslavia, predominately 
residing in the cities of Nis and Belgrade; estimations of the population are as high as 
600,000.
23
 Prior to the disintegration of Yugoslavia in 1989-1991, it was the first 
country under the leadership of Tito to recognize Roma as a national minority. The 1993 
Constitution classified the community as an ‗ethnic group;‘ Roma leaders advocated for 
national minority status in 1998, however, Macedonia and Montenegro are the only 
successor Yugoslav states to recognize the community.
24
 The situation of Roma in 
Serbia, as in other SEE countries, is precarious. As noted by the United Nations 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights ―despite the State party‘s efforts to 
improve the economic and social situation of Roma through National Plans of Action for 
the implementation of the Decade of Roma Inclusion (2005-2015) in both Republics, 
widespread discrimination of Roma persists with regard to employment, social security, 
housing, health care and education.‖
25
 A 2002 report assessing the social, ethnic and 
racial distance toward the Roma community demonstrates a high degree of societal 
discrimination on part of Serbians, as well as Albanian and Hungarian minorities. 
Depending on the region in Serbia, approximately 50% of the populace would not accept 
                                                          
21 See OSCE-ODIHR, Parliamentary Election Report Serbia, 2007 and OSCE-ODIHR, Presidential 
Election Reports Serbia, 2008 .osce.org/odihr-elections/14610.html 
22
 Kesic, O. op.cit, p. 118 
23
 See European Roma and Travellers Forum (ERTF) Website, Council of Europe, Statistics, available: 
coe.int/T/DG3/RomaTravellers 
24
 Reinhartz, D. ―The Yugoslav Roma under Slobodan Milosevic and After,‖ in Serbia since 1989: 
Politics and Society Under Milosevic and After. eds. S. Ramet and V. Pavlakovic (Washington: University 
of Washington Press, 1995) pp. 383-384 
25
 See the Concluding Observations of the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 




Roma as an employer or neighbour. Regarding marriage and partnership, approximately 
70-90% would not accept Roma within their families.
26
  
Inter-Ethnic Violence and Racially Motivated Attacks 
The perception that Roma are prone to crime is a widely shared belief in Serbian society. 
The most frequent violation of Roma rights is in the form of ethnicity based 
discrimination either by private individuals, as well as documented cases of police 
torture. Often Roma individuals cannot rely on police protection in assault cases. 
Furthermore, investigations of police brutality are rarely initiated, and in the few cases 
of a guilty verdict, sentences are quite lenient. The frequent infringement of human 
rights by law enforcements officers are viewed as ‗irregularities.
27
‘  
Many human rights organizations have noted the high incidence of hate crimes and 
racially motivated assaults against Roma in many Serbian cities. Physical assaults take 
the form of beatings in public, and setting fire to homes in Roma settlements. At times, 
victims have suffered from life threatening injuries.  Many Roma individuals have also 
complained of verbal assaults and harassment.
 28
 Although anti-discrimination 
legislation in Serbia is explicit in addressing hate crimes, the major challenge in 
confronting racism is the lack of political will and limited penalties or non-persecution 
of offenders.  At times, the police are responsible for racial profiling and physical assault 
on Roma individuals. Judicial decisions and lenient sentences for perpetrators reflect 
discriminatory attitudes and disinclination of applying anti-discrimination measures and 




                                                          
26
 Dordevic, Dragoljub. ―Social, Ethnic and Religious Distance Towards Roma of Serbia (Empirical 
Report for 1999-2002),‖ University of Nis, Serbia, pp. 257-266 
27
 Interview with Andrea Colak, Executive Director, Minority Rights Center, Belgrade, Serbia, May 7, 
2009 
28
 See ―Rights Organizations Urge Prevention and Prosecution of Racist Attacks in Serbia,‖ June 17, 2010  
available: errc.org 
29





In Serbia, adoption of the 2005 Action Plan on Roma inclusion resulted in considerable 
progress in the area of education. However, there is a lack of initiative by the Ministry of 
Education; most projects are the actions of the National Roma Minority Council, NGOs 
and international organizations. Although some key improvements such as the 
employment of Roma assistants, adult education programs, and affirmative action for 
enrolment in high school and universities were achieved – major challenges remain such 
as segregation and bureaucratic obstacles. As many Roma families do not have the 
appropriate property, birth certificates and health documentation, a considerable number 
of Roma children do not enrol in educational facilities. Segregation is a major obstacle 
that has not been addressed. Research by the Minority Rights Centre in Belgrade 
demonstrates that in elementary school often there are classes with Roma children only, 
as ethnic Serbian parents refuse to send their children to the same school.  
Approximately 50-80% of Romani children are sent to ‗special schools‘ seriously 
debilitating future opportunities to enrol in higher education. Similar to the case of 
Macedonia, many Roma live in isolated settlements, thus Romani children do not always 
have the opportunity to learn other languages. Roma children are often the targets of 




According to the 2009 Decade Watch Report, housing in Roma communities is the area 
where the least progress has been made. In many SEE countries, Roma are confronted 
with similar challenges in regards to substandard housing conditions. Similar to the case 
in Macedonia, Roma often live on settlements without basic services and infrastructure, 
residing near hazardous areas that pose a health risk to residents. Many Roma 
communities living on informal settlements are often susceptible to forced evictions; in 
many cases legalisation is very difficult or impossible. According to the report, 
Macedonia and Serbia had the highest number of evictions regarding the Roma 
community. Consequently, the settlements are destroyed and inhabitants are moved to 
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inadequate housing or provided with no alternative facilities. Often evictions are 
conducted without prior consultation with the inhabitants, in sometimes, severe weather 
conditions. As no long term solutions are developed, many Roma live in a perpetual 
condition of insecurity. It is evident that racism and discrimination pose challenges to 
Roma finding adequate living accommodations. This is made apparent by state 






Roma have the highest unemployment rate in Serbia – the 2002 census noted that only 
27.2% of Roma are economically active. Furthermore, Roma are severely 
underrepresented in state and local administrations. In addition, there has been no state 
funding for  Roma entreneurship initiatives; any small measures implemented have been 
the result of international efforts which are inadequate to combat Roma unemployment 
and poverty. For example, there have been efforts to employ Roma in various public 
works programmes; generally inadequate measures, as Roma cannot actively participate, 
lacking formal education, skills and appropriate documentation. When Roma do 
participate in the labour market, they are employed in often hazardous work conditions. 
Discrimination by employers also hinders the employability of Roma - as a 
consequence, many take low paid jobs in the informal sector. As the majority of the 
population is markedly young (below the age of 15) this also greatly accentuates the 
socio-economic differences between the Roma and ethnic Serbian population. The 
majority of Roma families rely on limited sources of income (agriculture, construction, 
recycling, social welfare, and remittances from abroad). Due to the transition process, 
limited state funding, the economic recession, and high number of internally displaced 
persons (IDPs), it is unlikely there will be an improvement in the socio-economic status 
of Roma in Serbia. The Roma Employment Action Plan adopted within the framework 
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of the Roma Decade is not implemented in a comprehensive manner, and has no clear 
budget for financing activities.
32
  
5.4 Increasing Access? The Institutional Response to Roma Inclusion 
Observance of International Human Rights Legislation 
Similar to Macedonia, Serbia has ratified numerous international agreements and 
conventions concerning human rights. The Copenhagen Criteria (1993), main principles 
adopted by the EU in Tampere (1999), and the Social Inclusion Draft have relevance 
concerning the development of the Strategy for Improvement of the Status of Roma in 
Serbia, but the document also highlights various other international commitments that 
have influenced the development of national legislation, and especially apply to the 
situation of Roma communities. Some of these include the UN Convention on the Rights 
of the Child (Articles 28 and 29), the OSCE, EU, CoE Framework Convention on 
Protection of National Minorities, European Social Charter,  the Council of the 
European Union (the Directive Implementing the Principle of Equal Treatment between 
Persons Irrespective of Racial or Ethnic Origin, Status of Roma in Candidate Countries: 
Basic Document, Guiding Principles for Improvement of the Status of Roma) and the 
United Nations (International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights), 
which includes recommendations in regards to new economic empowerment, can be 
applied to the Roma community in the Republic of Serbia.
33
  As mentioned by many 
international and NGO representatives, both Macedonia and Serbia have effective 
national legislation regarding the social and political inclusion of Roma.  However, 
inadequate funding and limited political will have debilitated efforts to comprehensively 
address the situation of Roma communities. 
 
In Serbia the central government institutions that formulate and implement Roma 
inclusion policy and programmes are the National Council for Roma (Republic Council 
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for National Minorities), Office for the Roma Decade League, Agency for Human and 
Minority Rights, Secretariat for the Roma National Strategy located in the Ministry of 
Human and Minority Rights. In 2009, there were two high profile political positions 
within the government occupied by individuals of Roma ethnicity: the Deputy Minister 
of Human and Minority Rights, Petar Antic, and Vitomir Mihaljovic (MP) in the 
Democratic Party, also President of the National Council for Roma. 
In January 2005, as a participating state in the ‗Decade of Roma Inclusion,‘ the 
Government of Serbia adopted National Action Plans for the improvement of the Roma 
community in the areas of housing, health, education and employment. As of yet 
minimal achievements have been realized and no sustainable system of funding has been 
provided by the government for the implementation of national and local action plans. In 
2008, the Provincial Secretariat for Regulations, Administration and National Minorities 
in Vojvodina, Serbia conducted a field assessment in Roma communities pertaining to 
awareness of state initiatives and the Decade of Roma Inclusion. The results of the 
surveys demonstrate that the Roma community had inadequate information regarding 
policies and projects to improve the situation of the Roma population. The report 
questioned 450 respondents; 76 (18%) had knowledge of the Decade, while 369 (82%) 
had no information concerning the Decade of Roma Inclusion. Even more surprising, the 
few respondents that had knowledge of the Decade were not aware of its program 
mandate, such as the participation of SEE countries and action plans. In regards to 
knowledge of state programs, specifically self-employment, 103 (24%) have some 
information and 342 (76%) have no information.
34
  
The statistics demonstrate a lack of interest in disseminating knowledge of international 
and domestic initiatives to the Roma community, as well as rhetorical commitments 
made by the Serbian government without implementation. As stated by the Department 
Head of the Roma Inclusion Office in Vojvodina  
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―the Decade is not visible in Roma municipalities. They‟ve spent the previous three or 
four years just with empty words – just saying something, and making action plans – but, 
nothing has really been done. The concept of the Decade is really well conceived, but 
the implementation has not been very successful and most Roma people have not had the 
chance to encounter it, or actually see some consequences or results.‖
35
 As noted by a 
NGO activist in Vojvodina, 
 ―the World Bank and other international institutions they see the Roma as a factor of 
political instability for foreign investments. It‟s not that they love us -- or something like 
that. So they agree that they will start this Decade but all the burden of the 
implementation of the Decade will be on the countries.  So that is not a new financial 
mechanism for this country.  There are some good initiatives, but for some things you 
really need serious financial resources. Also, there is a lack of political will because 
they are only looking at Kosovo so, the Roma are a secondary issue. We are not on the 
top of the agenda.‖
36
  
The National Council of Roma 
The National Council for Roma created in 2005 has the authority and responsibility for 
the overall formulation and implementation of Roma-related policy and programmes in 
government ministries. The National Council and the President of the Council are 
elected by members of the minority community.  The Office for the Coordination of the 
Roma Decade is presided over by the Vice President of Serbia; there are twenty-two 
members (eleven ministers and eleven representatives of the Roma community). The 




NGO representatives have criticized the National Council of Roma, stating the difficulty 
of working with the staff. This is quite consequential to developing actions on Roma-
related issues as the office is one of the main institutions that decides on project funding 
and appraisal of the Roma community‘s needs.
38
 Following the reforms in October 2000 
a ‗declaration on a new democratic system of advancing the position of national 
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minorities‘ was adopted focusing on two main components: the recognition of national 
minorities/communities and the Law on the Protection of Rights and Freedoms of 
National Minorities, passed in 2002. The 2002 Act initiated the process of 
institutionalizing Roma political activism. As a result, National Roma Councils were 
formed in municipalities with large Roma populations. Additionally, the Office for 
Implementing the National Strategy, the Provincial Council for Roma Integration and 
the Office for Roma Inclusion in Vojvodina were created in 2002.
39
 
Adoption of the new Consititution of the Republic of Serbia in 2006 guaranteed national 
minority rights in the areas of: affirmative action, and local governance on issues of 
culture, education, information, and language. Government documents focus on the need 
to promote anti-discrimination through affirmative action measures. The National 
Council of Roma and the Agency for Human and Minority Rights emphasize Roma 
integration in muncipalities as a priority. The Secretariat for Implementation of the 
National Strategy would be the organization responsible for supporting municipalities in 
formulating and implementing local action plans.
40
 Many SEE countries during the 
Decade of Roma Inclusion, as in the case of Macedonia, have created a Secretariat for 
Implementation of the National Strategy within the Ministry of Employment and Social 
Policy.  Although institutional response has not been very effective in Serbia, it is 
important to note that by creating an office within the Ministry of Human and Minority 
Rights, it has enabled more effective communication with other government departments 
in priority areas such as education, housing, health care, and employment.
41
  
In analyzing the legitimacy of the Roma National Council in Serbia, Basic found that 
membership tended to be highly exclusive; with many members inter-linked through 
various interest groups and political connections.
42
 According to Article 24 of the Law 
on the Rights and Freedoms of National Minorities, political parties are able to directly 
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influence the election of members to the National Councils. Thus, a limited number of 
individuals with specific views are controlling the cultural and political development of 
Roma activism.
43
 Basic states  
―in essence, this is an authoritarian model of rule that tends toward the centralization, 
unification and control over human and institutional resources. Its establishment 
confirms the rule by which minority leaders often pay lip service to the need for 
autonomy and decentralization which, however, they are not prepared to recognize 
within their own communities.‖
44
 
Further difficulties arise due to the vague and undefined functions of national minority 
councils that allow for the monopolization of issues in the area of minority self-
government.  National minority representatives are predominately responsible for 
funding distribution. Although limited funds are available, there is a lack of information 
as to how available funding is dispersed for administration and programs. Remarking 
upon the general incoherence and non-transparency of Serbian policy and programs 
regarding minority affairs, Basic states 
“I don‟t want to get into the details of this messy situation, which seems to have come 
about not purposely but through the neglect of institutions charged with dealing with 
national minority rights, but it should be clearly underlined that the existing 
administrative system treats national minority issues as a marginal social and political 
problem. An absence of strategy regarding the integration of minorities and the view of 
multiculturality as found and not too desirable state has resulted in a situation in which 
issues of organizing the state administration on the protection of national minority 
rights has been left to ad hoc decision-making, to incompetent people who are ready to 




The Roma community is based on patriarchal and traditional forms of organization; to a 
certain extent this mode of leadership and communication has been reified within 
government institutions. Traditional Roma communities are dependent upon a few 
‗leaders‘ and ‗mediators‘ that represent the population in communicating with 
government authorities. While it is convenient for international organizations and 
government institutions to refer to one representative voicing the needs of the 
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community, often it is detrimental to democratic representation, and community 
members are unable to articulate their concerns and issues as the ‗mediator‘ is able to 
gain power through the monopolization of money and information. Generally, 
patriarchal forms of organization are indicative of Serbian society, but perhaps issues of 




Serbia has created the relevant departments to coordinate and implement Roma-related 
policies and programs, but it has not led to increased access for Roma activists, nor have 
the results of these initiatives been successful.  As noted in the case of Macedonia, short-
term strategies do not effectively address issues within the Roma community. As stated 
alternatively by a representative of CARE international,  
―one of the things that have burdened our projects considerably is the fact they are 
implemented throughout a period that has been very politically unstable diminishing our 
chances to have good cooperation with the national government.  We had five election 
cycles in twenty five years. And the political struggle between the political parties is 
huge. The mandates of the previous governments are never implemented. There are 
several months of preparation for a new campaign, and the campaign itself, and then 
you have the election process and I don't know how many months after that before the 
government‟s national or local agencies are established. So, it‟s at least a six month 
cycle that you can't work with anybody -- there is nobody that you can talk to, nobody 
will take any responsibility. There is no way you can talk to people and lobby enough for 
them to realize that they should take a certain level of responsibility and work together 
with us on the improvement of the situation of Roma. So whatever we did up to now is 
more like a struggle.‖
47
 
 It is thus important to create a system and strategy that has longevity. One of the main 
challenges within the SEE region, as in Macedonia is the lack of implementation at the 
local level. Although many international initiatives, national strategies and action plans 
exist, it is at the local level where change is necessary and can have the most effective 
impact on the Roma community. One NGO representative noted a situation in which the 
Ministry of Education provided all elementary schools recommendations concerning 
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Roma students. At the municipal level of government the letters were never distributed 
to teachers and principals, as discrimination is pervasive and many local government 
representatives do not view the issue as important.
 48
   
Influential Allies for Roma Activism? The role of civil society 
organizations and political parties 
Roma Civil Society 
As conflict subsides in the SEE region, international organizations are decreasing 
funding for Roma-related issues. The Serbian government, similar to the case in 
Macedonia, implemented short term projects and measures during the election period, 
but no significant policy and program reforms were initiated to have an impact within 
the Roma community. As mentioned by the former presidential advisor in Vojvodina,  
―during elections the government does a few good propaganda movements toward Roma 
people – they give them a few packages, find employment for some of their activists. 
Then wait another 3-4 years for the next elections. Except for a few lonely cases – there 
aren‟t any bigger actions regarding the issue.‖
49
 
State funding is generally limited with resources divided between few NGOs that have 
personal connections to the ruling party.  The funding process is not transparent; there 
are no ‗open tenders‘ for project proposals and in some cases, quasi or fake NGOs 
simply profit from the funding.
50
  Furthermore, as the majority of NGOs are funded by 
international donors, there is a lack of accountability to the community in question. 
NGOs are incapable of implementing wide scale social policy reform or utilising the 
plethora of institutional resources available to the state, and as such can legitimate 
limited voluntary activities. Civil society organizations, unlike state agencies are not 
accountable or responsible to a constituency, and instead promote an agenda created by 
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the international community. In addition, board members of international organizations 
to which NGOs report meet infrequently and generally reside outside the target 
community, thereby silencing Roma concerns and needs.
51
 
As noted in Macedonia, civil society representatives are increasingly employed within 
state departments or informally involved with the government. Similarly, in Serbia, it 
has been a challenging task to maintain a critical stance concerning Roma-related policy 
and programmes if civil society representatives are connected to state authorities.  Many 
Roma students are also at risk of not completing their university education, as 
international organizations and NGOs need to fill vacant positions with Roma 
individuals from the younger generation who have a good knowledge of English and the 
skills required to perform organizational tasks. Roma intellectuals are provided with 
considerable financial incentives, and sometimes choose to expend their resources and 
energy as activists. Consequently, several students either graduate after many years or 
not at all. Thus, the Roma intellectual elite, although obtaining skills in project 
development and management, will not have the credentials to gain employment in other 
fields as contracts with international organizations and NGOs are generally short term. A 
further problematic is those individuals that do manage to finish university education 
sometimes do not want to be recognized as Roma or become activists. At times, 
educated professionals may even adopt a different ethnic identity.
52
  
With the increasing presence of international organizations, such as the Open Society 
Institute (OSI), funding for Roma education included programs for Roma youth - to 
facilitate opportunities to represent their community at the EU level, as well as the 
national/local level. Thus, a new group of young, well-educated leaders are 
progressively taking key positions in the government and NGOs, actively making up the 
new ‗Roma elite.‘ These activists and politicians would be the key communicators for 
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present and future relations between Roma and Gadje (non-Roma) societies. Research 
demonstrates that while many Romani leaders remain in close contact with their families 
and ‗mahallas,‘
53
 frequently, individuals‘ sever contact with their communities. Often 
members of the ‗Roma elite‘ have more familiarity within their network, in comparison 
to community ties. Moreover, in distinguishing themselves from the Roma community, 
many young leaders purported a greater affiliation with Gadje culture and traditions. It is 
also interesting that the majority of youth in leadership positions generally come from 
families that were politically and socially active during the Communist period. It is very 
infrequent that the ‗Roma elite‘ are representatives of ‗lower‘ social strata in their ethnic 
group. It is of consequence that impoverished Roma communities as the target of NGO 




Marx differentiates among ‗presenters,‘ and ‗re-presenters,‘ among the younger 
generation of Roma leadership.  The ‗presenter‘ epitomizes many contemporary Roma 
activists who are socialized within the mahallas – can ‗present‘ community issues within 
government institutions and decision making bodies, but are unable to communicate 
information or implement changes within the community. This consequently accounts 
for the failure of NGO and internationally funded projects. The ‗re-presenter‘ is able to 
obtain information about the community, and has the ability, trust and legitimacy to 
provide advice, leading the community to unpopular outcomes. However, this is a 
complex process as often Roma communities differ in terms of values and culture from 
the majority society. Thus, information (especially impacting life-style) should be re-
contextualized or translated before possible implementation. Thus, the ability of de-
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Synkova similarly argues that the NGO sector in post-communist Eastern Europe 
became a ‗mobility channel‘ for the small elite group of Roma that had experience 
interacting with non-Roma.
56
 Thus, non-educated, impoverished Roma are targeted as 
‗clients‘ of humanitarian organizations, and also legitimate the organizations‘ existence 
that promotes an ideology of ‗Roma helping Roma.‘ Although the clients‘ mobility can 
be assisted by NGOs, there are many cases of Roma and non-Romani paternalism; the 
monopolization of information and communication with authorities. Synkova‘s case 
study illuminated some interesting findings on NGO legitimacy and Roma participation. 
In contradistinction to the idea that Romani organizations are not transparent, 
unprofessional, corrupt and run as a ‗family business,‘ Synkova argues that Roma self-
employment in a NGO is an attractive option, provided that generally, finding 




Furthermore, Synkova views the participation of external actors such as EU funding 
bodies as both significant and detrimental to NGO development. Thus, international 
involvement re-contextualizes the aim of ‗helping other Roma‘ as a ‗project,‘ that 
requires professional writing, managing finances and personnel management. The NGO 
previously run as a ‗family business,‘ is institutionalized requiring significant reforms in 
the hierarchical structure, and decision-making processes. In addition, the input of many 
former employees is no longer perceived as valuable – ‗experienced professionals,‘ are 
required to fill defined positions with multiple responsibilities. The organization‘s 
culture based on mutual cooperation and loose job descriptions is now a formal 
environment. As international funds are increasingly channelled through government 
institutions, this also promotes the bureaucratization of NGOs and dependence on state 
bodies. These changes also indicate a transition from ‗activism and advocacy,‘ to 
‗providing services,‘ as well as the employment of individuals that are effective 
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mediators between the state and NGO sector. As Romani organizations‘ increasingly 
require professional staff, the training capacity of NGOs is also diminished, as 
‗uneducated Roma‘ can no longer function in an environment that is based on the 
documentation of results and output. Non-Romani organizations are also able to criticize 
Roma organizations on the basis of their ‗amateur status,‘ clearly demarking their 
position as a ‗qualified, professional, service oriented,‘ agency. As noted by Synkova, 
there are few Roma individuals able to maintain their position in NGOs that value the 





Similarly, Trehan has argued that substantial funding provided by Western donors in the 
1990s, created what many Roma activists and intellectuals refer to as a ‗gypsy industry.‘ 
This led to increasing conflict between Roma and non-Roma personnel, native and 
foreign employees concerning pay equity. There could also be negative ramifications in 
the long term as NGO service provision is no longer community based and focused on 
technocratic ability, rather than altruistic concerns. A further challenge is the exclusion 
of Roma employees from NGO work, as international organizations prefer western 
educated professionals that are familiar with bureaucratic language and culture. 
Although civil society organizations promote principles of anti-discrimination and 




Representatives of international organizations and NGOs have mentioned that although 
approximately 1000 Roma organizations exist within Serbia, very few effectively serve 
the needs of the community.
60
 Similar criticisms of civil society cooperation in 
Macedonia resound in Serbia:  although Roma NGOs are essential to maintaining 
communication with the general Roma population, it is widely perceived that NGOs lack 
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organizational skills, lobbying and advocacy abilities, professional capacities, as well as 
the motivation to complete project tasks.
61
 The following statement of a CARE 
representative summarizes the view of many international NGOs and institutions 
concerning Romani organizations:  
―Roma NGOs in Serbia are rather undeveloped. Out of the hundreds of registered Roma 
NGOs, it‟s really a very small number of those who you can call a NGO. And even those 
have problems with their organizational structure and capacity to run a business. And, 
the motivation for registering so many NGOs I would say was how to get hold of 
different funding. Even the partners that we have been working with for quite some time 
have certain -- very significant weaknesses they cannot overcome. And, we would like to 
establish a partnership with a group of people, or organization that is not Roma. But, 
including Roma as representatives are necessary for acting as mediators between the 
project and the Roma population. They are absolutely essential. But, they need to be 
part of better established organizations that can channel their capacities in a more 
professional way. The cooperation is better because the organization has a certain 
culture, structure, procedures, and rules of behaviour. If you don't have that -- then 
you're struggling around things that should have been solved within the partner 
organization – it should not be a job CARE has to deal with.‖62 
In the late 1990s, many civil society organizations in Serbia, as in Macedonia, were 
distributing humanitarian aid. Some international organization and NGO representatives 
believe that servicing the Roma community now requires different skills that the 
majority of Roma NGO personnel do not possess. As mentioned by some informants, 
funding distribution has also increased competition between Roma NGOs, which as in 
the case of Macedonia, has led to some challenges in building a cohesive movement. 
This also poses difficulties for international organization representatives, as explanations 
are generally required for funding one organization and not another creating some 
unpleasant experiences.
63
 The majority of funding is generally distributed to non-
Romani led organizations, as donors conceive difficult relations with Roma NGOs noted 
for their ‗lack of professionalism and expertise.‘ This perception, consequently, 
reaffirms wider societal norms denoting the inferior status of the Roma community, as 
well as limiting their influence and participation in decision making bodies. Moreover, 
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the internal political conflicts and lack of professionalism within non-Romani advocacy 
organizations is not scrutinized.
64
 
Serbian civil society organizations in the late 1990s were successful in mobilizing public 
opinion in opposition to Milosevic, but it has been challenging to regroup and find 
support for other human rights issues. A study conducted in 2003-2004 regarding public 
opinion of NGOs in Serbia showed negative results. One focus group participant stated 
―the very notion of something being ‗non-governmental‘ has negative connotations in 
the country – something fighting against the authorities.‖
65
 The majority of respondents 
were also sceptical that NGOs could achieve any results; believing civil society 
organizations to be closed, untrustworthy and selfish, ignoring the marginalized groups 
they purported to support. The politicization of civil society and influence of political 
parties was stated as the main reason for negative public perceptions. In regards to the 
legitimacy of Roma advocacy organizations, one participant noted  
―only a small number of those people for which the project really is needed are using it 
… the biggest part of the project goes to the NGOs themselves, the President of the NGO 
and the closest ones around him. Let me give you an example: the NGO for Roma rights. 
How are they going to solve the problems the Roma face when the President of the NGO 




While the study indicated general apathy toward NGO work and staff, there is scope for 
improvement as many respondents indicated a willingness to join the voluntary sector if 
NGOs provided better information about their projects, and were more open to 




Roma Political Parties 
                                                          
64
 Trehan, N. op.cit., p. 140 
65
 Grodeland, A. ―Public Perceptions of non-governmental organizations in Serbia, Bosnia & 
Herzegovina, and Macedonia.‖ Communist and Post Communist Studies 39 (2006): 226-232. 
66
 Interviewee in Grodeland, A. op. cit., p. 235. 
67




Previous arguments described Serbian mainstream politics as increasingly nationalistic; 
as the former advisor to the president of Vojvodina noted to not be a nationalist is to be 
considered a ‗traitor‘ of the Serbian people. In this political environment it is 
challenging for minority parties, and specifically Roma political parties to gain 
concessions or advocate effectively on behalf of the community. Generally, Roma and 
other minority political parties in Serbia form coalitions with the Democratic Party (DS) 
which has a history of co-opting minority parties. Political parties at the republic level, 
including nationalist radical parties, do not openly discriminate against the Roma 
community.  Very often mainstream Serbian political parties will include Roma 
politicians on membership lists who eventually become MPs, if only to generate 
additional votes. Often, Serbian political parties that are not nationalistic and attempting 
to form coalitions with Roma political parties are undermined by the actions of 
nationalist parties.
68
   
From 1990 - 2008, 29 Roma political parties have been registered in the Republic and 
Federal Registers at the Ministry for State Administration and Local Government. The 
two main Roma political parties in Serbia, the Association of Roma led by Rajko Djuric 
and the Roma Party led by Sergin Shaiyan in 2007, managed to win seats in the Serbian 
Parliament.
69
 According to the new draft law, 500 signatures of employed, adult citizens 
are required for the founding of a national minority political party, which is one-tenth of 
the percentage required for mainstream parties.
70
 The new election law introduced in 
2008 destroyed smaller minority parties by creating unrealistic requirements, such as 
collecting 10,000 signatures in two weeks time in order to be included on the election 
list. In addition, funding is restricted to political parties with representatives in 
government. Roma political parties having not participated in earlier elections did not 
have funding available until January 2007, when the two Roma representatives gained 
seats. For smaller political parties, funding is only available 12 hours before the election 
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begins, ensuring election defeat. In this case, minority political parties do not have the 
opportunity to stand for election, unless the party is self-funded. The two dominant 
political parties in Serbia, the Democratic Party and the Radical Party, both practice 
undemocratic election procedures by distributing food and hygiene packages in Roma 
settlements few days prior to the elections in order to gain votes. Vitomir Mihajlovic 
(MP) representative of the Roma Social Democratic Party was forced to concede his 
votes to the Democratic Party under threat of such practices.
71
 
In the 2008 elections, both the Roma Party and the Association of Roma did not form a 
coalition, hoping to garner enough votes individually; consequently, this was not the 
case and as a result, no Roma political party representative was in parliament. Although 
Roma political parties did not gain seats in the 2008 elections, the Democratic and 
Radical Parties include two MPs of Roma ethnicity, Vitomir Mihaljovic and Sergin 
Shaiyan.
72
 There are also a few individuals of Roma ethnicity as members of the 
Democratic and Radical parties who do not wish to acknowledge their ethnic identity, 
perhaps fearing disrepute among the electorate. However, as representatives of the 
mainstream political parties, there is limited influence that can be exerted regarding 
Roma issues. If Roma politicians agreed on a common platform and formed coalitions 
among Roma political parties, perhaps further action and progress could be achieved 
concerning Roma-related issues.
73
   
Similar challenges exist in Serbia and Macedonia concerning the organization and 
leadership potential of Roma political parties. Frequently, there is disunity among 
political party members as a consequence of personal rivalries and ambition. There is a 
lack of professional and educational skills that would contribute to articulating interests, 
coalition building and networking. There is an absence of a strong funding base to 
support the election campaign and technical competencies.  In general, in Serbia as in 
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Macedonia there is a lack of political knowledge and experience within Roma political 
parties.
74
 Generally, Roma politicians are ineffective in representing the concerns of the 
community. For instance, on April 3, 2009, 47 Roma families were forcibly evicted in 
Belgrade from ‗Block 67‘ by Serbian authorities. 128 individuals were left homeless 
without the provision of alternative accommodation, in contradiciton to Serbia‘s 
international obligations.
75
 As noted by a UNHCR representative, the limited 
involvement of Roma political parties concerning the forced evictions demonstrates their 
lack of organization and ‗political acting.‘ The representative further criticized Roma 
political parties stating   
―it was not important for them to attract attention and be firm in their demands. Instead, 
they were telling me that it wasn‟t the right moment and it wasn‟t something to be done 
now becasue the country is in transition and there are big problems – the Roma 
National Council even had a very limited reaction.‖
76
  
Many government representatives and politicians have utilized the economic crisis in 
2009 as an argument for the limited progress on Roma inclusion initaitives.
77
 
Former advisor to the President of Vojvodina commented that a major challenge for the 
Roma community is finding adequate representation for their issues. He states  
―to be honest people in Serbia are full of prejudices and stereotypes, and are quite 
xenophobic. When some representatives of ethnic groups show up on the political scene 
with a low personal agenda, it is a „shadow‟ upon the entire ethnic group.  It makes a 
really bad picture, conflict within the ethnic community and representatives of the 
community, when addressing representatives of government.‖
78
 
The majority of Roma leaders in Serbia are of the opinion that the political and party 
system are still influenced by the values of the Milosevic period. Nationalism, 
intolerance and discrimination are still present within mainstream parties, and a severe 
                                                          
74
 Interview with Nadja Kocic, Country Facilitator Serbia and Montenegro, Roma Education Fund, 
Belgrade, Serbia, June 5, 2009 
75
 Troszczynska, W. ―Government Should Ensure Adequate Housing for Families Left Without Homes.‖ 
Human Rights Watch April 8, 2009 available: hrw.org 
76




 Interview with Dusko Radosavljevic, Former Advisor to the President of the Assembly of AP 




increase in extreme right organizations with limited state interference has created a 
hostile environment for minorities, especially Roma. The following are statements of 
Roma leaders conveying these sentiments: 
“I realized that very little can be done in Serbia, because after Slobodan Milošević‟s 
plebiscitary dictatorship we now have a multi-party dictatorship… The problem is that 
the Milošević regime destroyed all the democratic institutions in Serbia… Then came the 
wars, which are by themselves destructive, both for the states against which we fought 
and for Serbia itself… We did that (exerted pressure for an insistence on Roma rights as 
a precondition to EU accession) earlier in the cases of Romania and Slovakia, and I am 
afraid that Serbia will also experience that, including lawsuits in the court in Strasbourg 
for drastic human rights violations. Romas are, first of all, citizens of this state and the 
state must care for their rights. If that is left to the people, it is nothing but an excuse. 
We have many political parties in Serbia, of which half are fascistically oriented.”
79
 
“There is no serious civic party today. Let someone try to convince me that DS is not a 
national party, that DSS is not, that SRS is not, that the Hungarian Alliance of 
Vojvodina is not a national party. We should recognize that DS is a national party 
hiding behind a democratic program.”
80
 
At a meeting of Roma politicians, facilitated by the OSCE, the discussion on the 
political integration of Roma led to many interesting thoughts on leadership and the 
potential for political action in the future. Many discussants reported that in regards to 
the Roma community, access to information is very problematic. Thus, state and 
international programs seeking to provide aid, should take into consideration that after 
centuries of exclusion and discrimination, the Roma are quite skeptical and suspicious of 
‗outsiders‘ requesting information to ‗help them.‘ Rather, the acquisition of information 
is often and perceptively viewed as a mechanism of control. The Department Head for 
the National Strategy Office also mentioned that ‗ethnic group‘ in the political sense 
should not be used in reference to Roma, as there are many implications to this 
categorization.  The consequence of a ‗general position‘ is conformity – this may lead to 
a self-destructive motivation.  The politicization of the Roma community in general was 
questioned – as it is often mentioned that the limited political participation of Roma may 
lead to criminal activity – further stigmatizing the group as a deviant underclass. It is 
important to clarify, as noted by the Roma politicians that the issue of Roma inclusion 
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The politicization of the Roma community revolves around the issue of meeting 
existential needs. Thus, Roma political parties are viewed as a mechanism by which 
these needs are actualized. It was recognized among the Roma politicians in attendance, 
that while their political parties had ‗good programs‘ the implementation of those 
programs was limited. It was also acknowledged that the ‗public image‘ of Romani 
politicians could be improved, as traditional mechanisms of communication were not 
conducive to contemporary public relations. In addition, discussants commented on the 
lack of trust among Roma leaders, and their limited political experience. It was the 
consensus of the group that it was necessary to unite Roma in order to attain effective 
political participation. There was a collective agreement that the work of Romani 
political parties could be improved. It was also noted that while difficulties and problems 
with Roma leadership and organization are discussed orally, limited documents exist to 
analyze the areas for improvement or to build political consensus and movement 
momentum. It was recognized among some discussants that Roma had limited historical 
experience of political participation – thus, it was suggested that Roma were too 
‗passive,‘ - Roma have ‗accepted the role of helplessness.‘  It was also interesting that 
the discussants acknowledged the assistance of the international community as essential 




In terms of how Roma politicians perceived their relations with mainstream political 
parties in Serbia, often politicians stated ‗they felt used as electoral votes,‘ and many 
understood their political participation as essential only in the pre-election period to 
garner additional votes among the Roma community. Generally, the consensus was that 
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In regards to Romani political culture, discussants argued the possibility of imagining 
Roma activism without a leader. The majority of Roma politicians perceived leadership 
as a ‗messiah‘ way of doing politics; leading the Roma community to recognize issues. A 
minority of the participants argued that the Roma were tired of the traditional role of 
leaders within settlements and villages. It was recognized among the discussants that 
members of the general Roma community were not included – thus collective interests 
were not represented. Some politicians suggested establishing a new, democratic body 
that did not have a leader – initiating a movement emphasizing the equality of all 
members. It was also highlighted that members of the new forum should not have 
political affiliation. Thus, the specification of an agenda and election to important bodies 
should be a transparent process. Roma from various socio-economic backgrounds and 
locations should be represented. Additionally, the discussant mentioned the challenges of 





Some members alternatively stated that without leadership, the Roma community cannot 
move forward. The community should be represented, as the general Roma community 
is not ‗politically mature.‘ Another suggestion put forth the idea of a council for inter-
ethnic relations. Some members vociferously argued that without a forum it would not 
be possible for Roma members to organize, and the Decade action plans would remain 
minimally implemented. It was acknowledged by a few discussants, that without the 
participation of state representatives the actions of the forum would be futile. In terms of 
the organization of Roma political parties, many of the discussants recognized they were 




The leader of the Roma Party in Serbia, mentioned that the aim of Romani political 
parties in general should not be to remain an ethnically based party – but in a period of 
transition to participate as ‗political elites.‘ Furthermore, he stated the distinction among 








Roma leaders as ‗left‘ or ‗right‘ wing should be diminished as it promotes disunity. The 
politician criticized those advocating for the Roma community as members of the 
Democratic Party. This argument was further contextualized within the general ethnic 
political party system in Serbia that promotes an undemocratic political culture.  Several 
discussants argued that mainstream political parties do not fulfill their promises. Thus, it 
was fundamental to commit to a political goal having longevity; that exceeded any one 
mandate of a political party. A discussant similarly emphasized the need for an 




5.6 The Special Case of Vojvodina in Serbia 
Government representatives and Roma politicians since WWII have often described 
Vojvodina as a tolerant, inter-ethnic community where the position of Roma residents, 
in terms of state policies and societal acceptance, has been much better as compared to 
other areas of Serbia. Many Roma activists describe this perception of inter-ethnic 
relations as a ‗myth.‘ Conveying their sentiments, Roma Student Association president 
in Vojvodina noted  
―the provincial government is not giving more space for Roma inclusion or putting in 
more effort than the Serbian government. Vojvodina in general has a policy to be much 
better than Serbia as Vojvodina - to show that we are more „European.‟
87
  
Under the oppressive rule of Milosevic, Vojvodina, formerly enjoying political and 
economic autonomy – and organizing its own institutions since 1974 (the presidency, 
executive council, parliament, and supreme court), found its powers retracted, changing 
the political environment and ethnic relations in the province. Serbian nationalist fervour 
spurred under the leadership of Milosevic, ethnic conflict in the region, economic crisis, 
and the migration of Serbian refugees from Croatia, contributed to animosity and fear 
among minority communities in Vojvodina in the 1990s. Serbian refugees affected by 
the wars in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia predominately settled in Vojvodina, and 








were perceived as one of the main agents eroding social cohesion in the province, as the 
regime intentionally or unintentionally generally settled refugees in areas with ethnically 
mixed communities. The Hungarian community in Vojvodina, historically recognized as 
a minority, generally not conceived as an ‗enemy nationality,‘ and with considerable 
political influence in the country, at this time, experienced extensive subjugation – 
further contributing to ethnic tensions.
 
 As noted by Kerenji ―the regime of Slobodan 
Milosevic left a disastrous legacy in the area of ethnic relations. It will take long for trust 
and tolerance among different ethnic groups in Vojvodina to recuperate.‖
88
 It is within 
this difficult transition period and political context that Roma inclusion policies are 
presently implemented. 
The Office of Roma Inclusion in Novi Sad, Serbia is the main government institution in 
Vojvodina that implements Roma-related policies and programs. Vojvodina has been 
recognized as the first region in Serbia observing the need for a separate government 
body dealing with Roma issues, and as a result the Roma Inclusion Office was created. 
Although an Office of Roma Inclusion exists at the provincial level in Novi Sad, due to 
state centralization, the province has minimal authority on addressing or implementing 
measures regarding minority issues. In the period 2000-2004, a number of decisions 
were made in regards to minority inclusion in Vojvodina based on laws concerning the 
protection of ethnic minorities, and as a result national minority boards were formed in 
this period. The Roma National Board primarily focuses its actions in Vojvodina and 
was the first provincial government in Serbia to transfer ‗founding rights‘ of the national 
boards to the minority communities.
89
 
While the Secretariat for the Implementation of the Roma Decade exists at the national 
level, Belgrade has yet to establish a Roma Inclusion office, or department that 
implements services specifically for the Roma community. Many international 
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organizations and civil society organizations have commended the government of 
Vojvodina in taking an active role regarding Roma issues therefore promoting effective 
cooperation.  There are arguments, however, that convey some of the limitations within 
the Office for Roma inclusion. In Serbia, activists have noted the monopolization of 
Roma issues once positions have been created within government institutions. In 
particular, the Office for Roma Inclusion has been associated with the Democratic Party 
which inadvertently is accredited with the implementation of all Roma-related programs 
and activities that have been the work of activists and individuals in the area. Another 
problem is how the Roma issue is influenced by specific party ideology.
90
 Most 
importantly, although some Roma-related issues in Vojvodina have been institutionalized 
to a greater extent in comparison to other areas of Serbia, the situation of the Roma 
community has not improved.
91
 
The Office for Roma Inclusion since its inception has become the main information 
centre concerning Roma-related issues. As international organizations require 
institutional cooperation for NGO projects, many NGO project proposals have to be 
accepted by the department head before funding is received. Roma related issues are 
decidedly ‗important‘ based on the views of one individual. Another issue is the re-
instatement of patriarchal organizations common within Roma communities in 
government structures. This has led to the exclusion of different perspectives and de-
prioritization of concerns such as those related to Romani women.
92
   
There are many challenges concerning institutional coordination between the republic 
and provincial levels, as well as their relations with Roma/non-Roma NGOs.  
Communication is especially weak between local government representatives, NGOs, 
and Roma local councillors hired in communities at the municipal level.  It has also been 
stated that Roma organizations do not exist on the level of local government, instead 
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NGOs wanting to profit from Roma inclusion funds advocate on behalf of the 
community. Severe prejudice and discrimination among municipal authorities and 
within the community is especially detrimental to implementing Roma inclusion 
policies/programs, as direct cooperation is essential at the local level.
93
 In general, it has 
been noted that one of the main challenges for Roma activism to succeed is for local 
governments to accept and recognize that the situation of Roma is their ‗problem.‘ 
Although strategies and documents exist at the national level, major reforms in housing, 




5.7 Shifting Political Alignments: The Political Mobilization of Roma, 
Ashkali, and Egyptian (RAE) Minorities in the Republic of Kosovo 
The status of Kosovo remains disputed under the provisional governance of UNMIK, 
Kosovo and Serbian governments. It is important to address the situation of the RAE 
minority in this territory due to its close proximity with Macedonia and Serbia proper, 
which consequently impacts Roma migratory concerns and inclusion within the 
respective states.
95
 Ethnic conflict and minority participation as a key component of 
stabilization in the Balkans has remained an important issue on domestic and 
international agendas. The international community, however, has effectively ignored 
the situation of RAE, and the group remains marginal to the political and ethnic conflict 
between Albanian and Serbian groups.  Subsequent to the end of NATO intervention in 
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the former Yugoslavia in 1999, and the reintegration of Albanians in the Kosovo 
province, approximately 100,000 RAE were evicted from their residence. The ERRC 
has documented numerous human rights violations of the RAE community; 
predominately by Albanians attempting to expel other minorities from the region.  
Albanians have targeted the RAE community due to assumed compliance with 
Milosevic and Serbian forces in 1999, although the RAE community has asserted their 
actions were coerced and non-complicit. This has not led to reconciliation among ethnic 
communities, and in many cases, the international community has played a mere 





International Disregard for the RAE Community 
Despite efforts of RAE to mobilize and seek participation in Kosovo‘s political 
structures, the international community has not been supportive. UNMIK, international 
NGOs and other donor states in shaping the governance structures and administrative 
bodies in the new nation were in a position to facilitate the development of an inclusive, 
multi-ethnic society that would encourage the representation and political participation 
of minorities. The actions of the international community in Kosovo, however, 
demonstrate the lack of political will and bias in effectively advocating on behalf of the 
RAE community.  As stated by a Roma activist in reference to the issue of political 
representation and international involvement  
―the process has made me think that you can never trust anyone, and never rely on 
UNMIK and others to represent Romani issues and to assist us. They care only about 
their organization‟s agenda and their own jobs. I never expect a real commitment from 
them to resolve our problems.‖
97
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The RAE community has not been included in final status negotiations; their political 
participation effectively prevented by the Kosovo Albanian leadership. The international 
community, despite provisions within the UN Declaration on the Rights of Persons 
Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities (UNHCHR) has 
not advocated equally for all minority groups in Kosovo.  International organizations 
while initiating the reconciliation process between Serbians and Albanians have not 
attempted to include the RAE community. Some activists believe this has debilitated 
efforts among the RAE population to unify and present a common political platform 
despite similar challenges to integrate in Kosovo, as Ashkali and Egyptian communities 
differentiate from Roma fearing Albanian retaliation.
 98
 
Since 2000, according to Roma activists in the region, the international community has 
supported one Roma representative in the Kosovo parliament without democratic 
nomination. The United Roma Party of Kosovo (PREBK) is widely perceived as 
nepotistic, and has not advocated equal representation of the community in public 
institutions or advisory bodies.
99
 The international community has not included Roma 
activists in decision making processes, as stated by a youth activist 
 ―the problem is that international organizations use Romani leaders to keep Roma 
quiet. They don‟t like the Roma who speak out. Now in Kosovo we have a generation of 
RAE activists who can work for the RAE communities. You need to have young Roma 




Various actions by the international community have led Roma activists in Kosovo to 
believe their human rights are not promoted and at times, have debilitated efforts to 
integrate. For instance, regarding the case of refugee returnees, Roma activists were 
dissuaded by international NGOs stipulating it was not in their operational capacity or 
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mandate. While international organizations do portend an inclusive image in requesting 
the participation of Roma representatives in public meetings, the international 
community was often criticized for not sharing information, seriously hindering Romani 
NGO efforts to effectively implement their activities.
101
  
Actions by the international community in Kosovo have led to a lack of trust in their 
intentions and commitment to support the Roma community.
102
 In essence, many Roma 
activists have criticized the ‗human rights package,‘ believing Roma are manipulated 
and used as ‗tools‘ to meet international obligations, receiving differential treatment 
compared to the Serbian and Albanian populations. At times the imposition of a ‗human 
rights approach‘ has exacerbated tensions within ethnic communities, reinforcing the 
construction of boundaries – especially among the RAE, as the formation of Ashkali and 
Egyptian organizations received substantial financial support. Roma activists view the 
Socialist period in Kosovo as a time when differences were not accentuated – the 
political ideology at the time advocated a different system of values. Activists now view 
the community‘s situation as more difficult since state independence. The human rights 
discourse, is thought to be an imposition by international workers to legitimate their 
power. Activists in Kosovo sometimes feel as though they are not able to operate 




It is not only government documents and project proposals that present an elusive ‗Roma 
activism,‘ international organizations have also used conferences as an arena in which 
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activists can network, and government officials can present falsified narratives regarding 
Roma-related policies and programs. Conferences provide politicians and activists the 
‗space‘ to define what activism is within the contours of international organization 
language and behavioural code. The professionalism with which international 
organizations representatives and domestic government officials present reports, 
publications, and findings are ‗evidence‘ to create the illusion that the Roma movement 
is gaining momentum. Action plans and policy papers further attest to how the 
international community has supported a thriving civil society and acted as effective 
mediators between domestic governments and the Roma community.  With the 
exception of filling vacant positions with members of a small intellectual elite; in fact, 
there has been little improvement in the lives of Romani people. 
It has also been acknowledged by Roma activists, that with numerous international 
institutions involved there is often disorganization and ineffective policy 
implementation. The difficulty of incoherent policy positions are exacerbated as often 
international personnel are contracted for a short duration, which also negatively impacts 
the work of local NGOs. This also contributes to the lack of investment within local 
communities; instead, foreign money is dispersed among professionals and returned to 
donor countries. Roma communities have also had to contend with the idea that the 
international community has provided considerable funding to improve their situation, 
despite miserable living conditions; thus, accentuating jealousy and ethnic tensions in 
Kosovo. Although it is acknowledged that Roma leadership has not always led to the 
transparent and effective use of funds, activists believe it is necessary to employ Roma 




A major initiative promoting a unified political identity and position is the Kosovo 
Roma and Ashkali Forum encouraging participation and discussion among RAE leaders, 
activists and organizations. The Forum promotes dialogue and reconciliation with other 
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minority communities in Kosovo and seeks to facilitate the social, political and 
economic inclusion of RAE. The Forum fulfills an important role; lobbying policy 
makers to improve minority inclusion practices thereby contributing to a multi-ethnic 
and democratic state.
105
 In regards to the situation of the Roma community in Kosovo, 
the ODIHR-CPRSI in 2006, attempted to facilitate discussions among the Kosovo 
Romani population, and the representatives of the ERTF. As noted by Gheorghe, 
discussions were not very progressive, as the majority of Roma in Eastern Europe are 
concerned with their primary needs and are not seeking cooperation with the most 
marginalized Roma groups. Concerning transnational coalition building among Roma 




Nationalism and political turbulence in Serbia has generally created difficulties for 
policy reform and implementation, especially regarding minority inclusion for a 
historically marginalized community such as the Roma. The regime of Slobodan 
Milosevic, ethnic conflict in the region, and international sanctions in the 1990s have 
fuelled nationalism and anti-EU, anti-Western opposition. Serbia‘s participation in the 
Decade of Roma Inclusion has not led to significant improvements concerning the socio-
economic situation of the Roma or addressed the increasingly alarming racial violence 
toward the community.  
Despite the creation of various state bodies related to Roma inclusion, 
institutionalization has led to minimal achievements. This is a result of limited political 
will and systemic discrimination within the Serbian government, but also the political 
concessions made by Roma leaders for personal gain to the detriment of the wider Roma 
community. Symbolic tokens of participation within government institutions, such as the 
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nomination of few Roma individuals to high political posts have led to minimal 
achievements for Roma inclusion. As noted by NGO representatives and Roma activists, 
patriarchal forms of organization, exclusive membership, and political bias have 
effectively led to a monopolization of Roma concerns that has not lent legitimacy to 
organizations such as the National Roma Councils in Serbia.  
Similar to the government organizations supporting Roma inclusion policies, the 
perception of Roma civil society is often negative. The limited domestic funding of 
NGO projects is not transparent and generally based on connections to the ruling party; 
while international funding does not promote accountability to the local Roma 
community as emphasis is often on the implementation of an external agenda. It is often 
the case that younger Roma intellectuals and activists are employed within government 
institutions or international organizations, which may present challenges in the future, as 
a critical perspective may be largely absent. The lack of ‗professionalism and expertise‘ 
of Roma NGOs is often mentioned as a criticism by international donors. This 
consequently leads to a reaffirmation of negative perceptions toward the Roma 
community, while largely ignoring the internal conflicts among non-Romani personnel 
in international organizations. Furthermore, it is important to note that nepotism, lack of 
accountability and the influence of political parties are often mentioned as factors 
contributing to the general negative public perception of Serbian civil society.  
The co-option of Roma political parties by the Democratic Party of Serbia has led to few 
achievements. As noted by Roma politicians and activists, political parties in Serbia are 
increasingly nationalistic, despite advocating for democratic reforms. Voting 
manipulation within Roma communities and undemocratic election procedures ensure 
minority parties cannot be represented effectively in domestic politics. Furthermore, the 
lack of coalition building, networking and professionalism within Roma political parties 
seriously hinders the effective representation of Roma. 
Vojvodina, historically as a province with congenial inter-ethnic relations, was 




no longer exercises autonomy on minority affairs, the Roma Inclusion office in Novi 
Sad is challenged to implement activities without state authorization. Additional 
limitations are the monopolization of Roma concerns within one institution and 
affiliation with a specific political party ideology. Kosovo, similarly to Vojvodina, is a 
multi-ethnic community that experienced a negative change in inter-ethnic relations. As 
the status of Kosovo remains disputed, the present governing structure under the 
leadership of UNMIK, Serbian, and Kosovo governments does not support the political 
participation of the RAE minority. Often the multiple actors in the region advocate an 
incoherent and disorganized policy prescription that has created general apathy among 
the RAE community. The ‗human rights approach‘ advocated by international 
organizations has not led to reconciliation among minority communities, creating only 
distrust and disunity. Thus, in analyzing the factors of political activism (state 
repression/facilitation, increasing institutional access, influential domestic and 
international allies, and shifting political alignments) it is evident that the political 





Transnational Advocacy and Roma Mobilization 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter seeks to analyze the internationalization of Roma advocacy. Specifically, 
the discussion will address how international institutions and social movement actors 
seek to influence and change Roma inclusion policy in Macedonia and Serbia. The first 
section will outline the main EU initiatives on Roma issues to provide an overview of 




outline the various EU instruments utilized to influence state compliance on Roma 
inclusion, such as structural fund implementation, the ‗Decade of Roma Inclusion,‘ and 
conditionality measures. The role of the Council of Europe (CoE) and Organization for 
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) will be outlined as two of the main 
international institutions in Europe regarding Roma inclusion. Secondly, the chapter 
aims to analyze the interaction between international organizations and civil society to 
evaluate the effectiveness of ‗transnational advocacy networks.‘ Finally, it is important 
to discuss domestic responses in Macedonia and Serbia to international/civil society 
influences considering the processes of instrumental adaptation, argumentation and 
institutionalization within the norm socialization literature.  
 There are three main questions this chapter seeks to address:  
 How has the internationalization of Roma advocacy affected movement activity? 
 What instruments are available to international institutions to guarantee state 
compliance on international obligations and are they effective? 
 How do international institutions and social movement actors (transnational 
advocacy networks) seek to influence and change Roma-related policy in 
Macedonia and Serbia?  
 
6.2 International Neglect on Romani Issues 
International organizations have historically neglected to discuss the Roma community 
as a humanitarian concern. The UN Commission on Human Rights ―in its fifty-six years 
of existence reduces to just the adoption of one Roma-specific and one Roma-
mentioning resolution, and to some interest from three Special Rapporteurs and the 
WCAR.‖
1
 Additionally, Special Rapporteur Weissbrodt noted ―there has been no 
systematic UN effort to understand the situation of the Romani minority in Europe, and 
there has not been a thorough study addressing the ways in which Roma suffer 
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discrimination and of methods to improve their situation.‖
2
 In a 2000 UN study on 
minorities, fleeting references were noted regarding the situation of Roma, but 
responsibility was passed onto the OSCE and CoE to undertake measures addressing 
discrimination and equality of Roma in Europe.
3
  In contrast, early EU discussions in the 
1970s acknowledged that information was to be collected about ‗Gypsies,‘ but did not 
include the community as active participants. The objectification of the community was 
realized in various fact finding consultations. For instance, the following questions were 
posed to the European Commission in the 1970s by an MEP: a) how many itinerant 
people are there in the Community? b) are they concentrated in any particular countries 
or regions and what origins do they have? c) what nationalities they have and whether 
they have any problems in relation to nationality? d) to what extent they benefit from 
social services in the Member States?
4
  As noted by Roma activist and MEP Livia 
Jaroka, the European Parliament essentially ignored marginal communities, and 
specifically, in regard to the Roma community there was minimal knowledge.
5
 The 
latest phase of EU discourse on Roma has constructed the community as the ‗minority in 
Eastern Europe.‘ ‗Roma‘ replaced ‗Gypsy‘ as the predominant term in the mid-1990s, 
and the Roma question was assigned an Eastern European territoriality.  As the 
enlargement process continues to include Eastern Europe states, the topic of Roma is a 




6.3 The European Union and Roma Advocacy 
The 2008 Roma Summit organized by the European Commission as the first high level 
EU conference on Roma issues, demonstrated the importance of Roma inclusion as an 
issue of political significance. The Summit included representatives of EU institutions, 
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member state governments, civil society, and participating states in the Decade of Roma 
Inclusion.
7
 The unprecedented institutional response by the EU was an outcome of 
sustained Roma activism, but also alarming events involving the Roma community in 
Italy.
8
  The turbulent events in Italy in 2007/2008 illuminated systemic discrimination 
and violence against Roma communities in Western Europe; contrary to the belief that 
the exclusion of Roma is a unique problem of Eastern European countries.  It also 
signified the minimal progress of EU institutions in addressing the marginalization of 
Roma in member states.
9
  
December 2007 marked the first time the European Council, as the foremost political 
body of the EU specifically addressed the issue of Roma, emphasizing the role of 
Member States in improving the status of Roma communities, as well as highlighting the 
role of the Commission in evaluating policies and instruments. The European Parliament 
in January 2008 called for the immediate drafting of a ‗comprehensive European 
Framework Strategy on Roma Inclusion.‘ The insistence to form a strategy was 
reiterated by the European Roma Policy Coalition (ERPC) composed of the predominant 
national and international NGOs working to improve the situation of Roma.
10
  
As an update of the 2000 Lisbon Strategy, the Renewed European Social Agenda 
includes a report assessing the policies and instruments for Roma inclusion. The 2008 
European Commission report was not a ‗strategy,‘ however, but merely stated that a 
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‗framework exists at the EU level for promoting Roma inclusion.‘ The report referred to 
the ‗different tools that are available and used by Member States.‘ Optimistically, 
‗lessons can be learned from the experience to date and generate improvements.‘
11
At the 
2008 Roma Summit, Commission President Barroso maintained a similar position 
highlighting the gravity of the Roma situation, but stressed the divergent roles of the 
Commission and Member States.  Barroso argued the primary responsibility for 
implementation and improvement of the Roma situation was with Member States; the 
Commission would facilitate and provide instrumental support.
12
  
The European Roma Policy Coalition thought the Commission‘s position to be vague 
and insufficient. The Commission relegated responsibility to Member States and did not 
suggest a critical role beyond ad-hoc policy instruments, effectively rejecting the 
proposal for a European Platform for Roma Inclusion.
13
 In August 2010, the French 
government expelled hundreds of ‗illegal‘ Roma residents, demolishing settlements in a 
move to increase the ailing public support of President Sarkozy.
14
 The Commission after 
closely ‗monitoring‘ the expulsions provided, perhaps, the most critical stance on Roma 
affairs concerning a Member State in the history of the Commission. Viviane Reding, 
Vice President of the European Commission and EU Commissioner for Justice stated: 
“I personally have been appalled by a situation which gave the impression that people are being removed 
from a Member State of the European Union just because they belong to a certain ethnic minority. This is 
a situation I had thought Europe would not have to witness again after the Second World War. This is not 
a minor offence in a situation of this importance. After 11 years of experience in the Commission, I would 
even go further: This is a disgrace. Let me be very clear: Discrimination on the basis of ethnic origin or 
race has no place in Europe. It is incompatible with the values on which the European Union is founded. 
National authorities who discriminate ethnic groups in the application of EU law are also violating the 
EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, which all Member States, including France, have signed up to. I 
therefore find it deeply disturbing that a Member State calls so gravely into question, by the actions of its 
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administration, the common values and the law of our European Union. I am personally convinced that 
the Commission will have no choice but to initiate infringement action against France.”
15 
The ERPC while applauding the European Commission statement reiterated the proposal 
for a European Framework Strategy on Roma Inclusion. Although the September 
resolution on the situation of Roma and free movement in Europe was adopted by the 
European Parliament, France continued the dismantling of camps and deportation of 
Roma.
16
 The actions of Italy and France demonstrate the lack of political interest and 
discrimination regarding the Roma community among Member States. In EU progress 
reports and international arenas, Macedonia, Serbia and other candidate countries are 
criticized for their neglect and oppression of Roma communities. However, as European 
political bodies and international criticism are not taken seriously by EU Member States, 
it provides validation for inaction in accession and candidate countries. Humanitarian 
rhetoric by EU institutions and Member States is viewed as a legitimate recourse to the 
actual implementation of Roma-related policy. The following discussion will proceed to 
analyze some of the main EU initiatives and instruments to support Roma inclusion. 
6.4 International Instruments for State Compliance on Roma Inclusion 
Roma and the Structural Funds 
Macedonia as an EU candidate and Serbia designated as a potential candidate country 
are eligible for pre-accession assistance (IPA funds) to compensate for inequalities 
between them and Member States.
17
 It is necessary here to briefly discuss the EURoma 
Network, a trans-national initiative created in June 2007, to improve the use of structural 
funds for the inclusion of the Roma population in Member States.
18
 The strategy and 
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activities of the network will influence how Roma inclusion policy and programs are 
realized in the future, impacting development and implementation in Macedonia and 
Serbia. 
The EURoma Network was created in the context of broadening trans-national 
cooperation between government authorities and civil society in the EU. The network 
seeks to focus on the enhancement of institutional and information sharing mechanisms, 
including data collection. The European Council‘s consensus on the 10 Common Basic 
Principles for Roma Inclusion
19
 serve as a basis for on-going discussions on common 
methodologies, mutual knowledge sharing, and harmonized activities for the effective 
use of Structural Funds. The goals of the network are to provide a ‗coordinated, 
integrated approach‘ and ‗create a forum for debate‘ regarding Roma issues.
20
 
An integrated approach reflected by the standardization of experiences, or ‗best 
practices‘
21
 is an ineffective strategy regarding the development and implementation of 
Roma inclusion policies. International organizations such as the OSCE, Council of 
Europe
22
 and initiatives such as EURoma have focused on the emulation mechanism in 
policy making. The political context, national culture and unique situation of Roma 
communities in each state should be considered before adopting a policy that has been 
effective in a neighbouring country. The theoretical premise for the policy may also 
change over time, and this should impact the decision making process.
23
 Empirical 
studies and scholars of policy diffusion have noted that policy adoption is not always a 
rational process. Political actors can be influenced by mediocre policies in neighbouring 
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countries, rather than looking for global alternatives. Policies that are not adapted to 
local context can result in suboptimal results.
24
 
Structural Fund Implementation: Challenges  
In recent years there has been a substantial increase in structural funding for Roma 
communities. However, no clear strategy exists specifically for the Roma community in 
terms of structural fund implementation and evaluation of activities.  Although structural 
funds are available, projects cannot be initiated without the participation and 
coordination between local mayors, Roma leaders, and policy analysts.  Governments 
tend to be unaware of the community‘s needs – which often makes project design an 
unsuccessful enterprise. The diversity within Roma communities suggests finding 
solutions that take into account the unique economic and social context. Limited 
information concerning the Roma community results in ad-hoc activities and funding, 
delivering ineffective projects. Additionally, government authorities are confronted with 
difficult administrative procedures and co-finance obligations when applying for 
structural funds. Limited political interest is one of the main challenges in effective 
Structural Fund implementation. Without mainstreaming Roma issues into broader 
national social policy, funding cannot have demonstrable effect in communities. As 
noted by the former Deputy Justice Minister in Macedonia  
―if we learn from the experience of some of the latest EU members – Bulgaria and 
Romania, by joining the EU the situation of Roma hasn't changed. Discrimination is still 
present, human rights violations as well. It would be more important for us to integrate 
Roma needs in the mainstream public policies since there is more money.‖
25
  
More importantly, the situation of Roma needs to be viewed within the overall context 
of poverty alleviation. Although there are specific crisis areas with the direct 
involvement of the EU, funds have not been directed toward impoverished Roma 
communities. Rural areas especially, remain invisible as the target for funding.
 26
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As in the case with Macedonian and Serbian institutions, there is a significant problem 
with coordination between agencies focusing on Roma-related policy. International 
organization activities often overlap; enhanced information sharing could result in more 
effective resource management of funding and personnel.  Within Member States, 
national projects are often implemented without taking into consideration Structural 
Fund programs. There is limited cooperation between ESF Managing authorities, and 
regional/local administration implementing programs for Roma inclusion. Furthermore, 
in both Member States and Macedonian/Serbian government structures, Roma 
representatives have been included in high level policy making, through ministerial 
positions, but have only participated to a minimal extent in the processes of planning, 
monitoring and evaluation. Similar to program implementation challenges discussed in 
Macedonia and Serbia, a long term approach needs to be adopted at the international 
level to effectively use structural funds.
27
  
Decade of Roma Inclusion 
In 2000, the Lisbon Strategy promoting social inclusion was initiated, requiring states to 
draft action plans; this was also inclusive of Roma populations. Subsequently, the 
‗Decade of Roma Inclusion (2005-2015),‘
28
 initiative directly targeting the Roma 
community, with similar components to the Lisbon Strategy was launched. As the EU 
and other international organizations
29
 are active partners, supporting Decade programs, 
it is necessary to briefly evaluate the progress and limitations of the initiative. 
Participating states in the Decade of Roma Inclusion have adopted action plans on four 
main priority areas: education, employment, housing and health. ‗Decade Watch‘, an 
initiative including Roma activists and researchers fulfils the important task of assessing 
the progress of participating states. Decade Watch reports include an assessment of 
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government policies and reforms concerning Roma inclusion in the past five years. 
Surprisingly, the 2009 report indicates that Serbia, alongside Bosnia-Herzegovina and 
Spain, is one of the leading countries making progress on Roma issues. This assessment 
revealed that while the current level of integration of the Roma community in Serbia 
was low, the reforms implemented by the government were positively impacting Roma 
integration. Comparatively, when assessing the level of discrimination toward the Roma 
community, Serbia is viewed as one of the least favourable countries. In the areas of 
education and employment, Serbia received a high evaluation. Comparatively, 
Macedonia was assessed well in the areas of employment and health.
30
  
While important steps have been taken by governments in Macedonia, Serbia and other 
Decade participating states, the 2009 Decade Watch report indicates that current policies 
and programs are not sufficient. It is believed that only a comprehensive approach 
focusing on all priority areas would have long term, sustainable impact in Roma 
communities. It is important to note that government policies, in accession-Balkan 
countries have received a positive assessment as compared to EU member states, 
specifically newer Member States. This is especially disappointing as EU member states 
have access to greater financial resources, yet policies and programs did not have 
considerable influence.
31
 More generally, the conclusions of the Decade Watch report 
that show lower state impact and results regarding Roma inclusion policy among 
Member States than accession countries, is in line with EU studies that are sceptical of 
sustainable EU conditionality reforms after accession. The EU may have difficulty 
eliciting compliance as the adoption of conditionality requirements are based on the 
incentive of membership, as compared to the norm socialization processes of learning 
and persuasion.
32
 Moreover, studies demonstrate that EU conditionality requirements are 
sometimes unclear, applied in a biased manner, and more exacting of candidates than 
EU member states. The Decade Watch report in comparing government policy impact in 
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Member States and Balkan countries supports the idea that while international 
organizations may influence Roma inclusion policy during the accession process, 
international influence post-EU membership may not have the same leverage. It is 
important then to consider conditionality as an instrument of the EU to influence Roma 
inclusion policies in candidate countries. 
EU Conditionality: Ambiguity and lack of compliance measures on minority policy 
Prior to the 1990s, the EU did not have a policy on minority protection. The EU 
‗minority rights regime‘ is a social and political construct arising from security concerns 
during the post-Communist transition process. The violent dissolution of the former 
Yugoslavia, and potential conflict between minority groups generated fear among EU 
Member States, particularly the prospect of westward migration. The European Council 
in 1993 included ‗respect for and protection of minorities‘ in the Copenhagen criteria for 
accession, without however, prior EU or international consensus on minority protection. 
By referring minority issues to the OSCE and CoE, the EU externalized minority issues 
prior to accession, as well as circumventing elaboration and cohesive articulation of its 
own minority policy. ‗The respect for and protection of national minorities‘ is 
highlighted as a key example of the EU‘s positive influence on democratization in 
Eastern Europe.  However, the EU has promoted norms that lack a firm basis in EU 
legislation and remain contentious within old and new member states. How can 
conditionality and compliance be measured without clear definition and agreement on 
minority protection? Often, ‗conditionality‘ is a flexible notion, and without clear 
indicators invites political bias.
33
 
Monitoring ‘EU Conditionality’ 
The primary instruments to monitor and assess potential EU candidates are annual 
Commission reports.  The 1995 Council of Europe Framework Convention for the 
Protection of National Minorities (FCNM) serves as the main document to evaluate 
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candidate progress in accordance with ‗European values.‘ The annual reports frequently 
criticized EU candidates on the non-ratification of the FCNM, although Member States 
were not signatory countries. This incongruity consequently, led to discussions of a 
‗double standard.‘ As argued persuasively by Sasse, the annual reports assessing the 
situation of minorities are often politicized, focusing on specific minority groups and 
replete with ambiguity as a result of unclear indicators and lack of compliance 
instruments to ensure implementation.
34
   
Studies have demonstrated that the extent of EU influence, specifically in the political 
sphere, is limited in the post-accession period.
35
 During the accession phase, EU 
institutions have greater leverage to suggest humanitarian reforms, as compliance 
measures are limited once states are full EU members. In many of the remaining post-
communist countries, however, there is much less incentive to comply with international 
norms as the prospect of membership is not guaranteed and quite distant. For many 
Eastern European candidate countries the domestic costs of compliance are quite high, 
as compared to the 2004/07 enlargement process. To meet the terms of EU accession 
criteria would require considerable domestic reforms and democratization in Eastern 
Europe. EU conditionality on many issues requires an interrogation of national identity, 
and may involve the risk of unfavourable domestic public opinion.
36
  
For political conditionality to be effective and influential is dependent on the interaction 
of domestic and international factors. Norm socialization processes such as emulation 
and persuasion generally do not triumph over domestic opposition to democratic and 
human rights reform.  Schimmelfennig‘s case study on the subject of the consistency 
and effectiveness of political accession conditionality in Croatia, Serbia, and Turkey 
demonstrates that monetary support and association agreements provided by the EU are 
viewed as minimal incentives to compliance. States need to be assured of making 
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progress toward accession soon after complying with EU conditionality requirements, or 
in contrast, will be rejected from membership in case of non-compliance.
37
 
For example, in the case of Serbia, association discussions were suspended in 2005 for 
non-cooperation with the ICTY. Serbia‘s position with the EU differed in many respects 
from other Eastern European accession countries. In 2005 Prime Minister Kostunica 
continued to promote Serbian nationalism appealing to conservative segments of the 
population. He criticized the ICTY as an ‗anti-Serbian American court‘ with illegitimate 
legal status and objected to Milosevic‘s extradition to The Hague. Kostunica‘s 
partnership with the EU was a matter of political necessity rather than a wish to 
participate in the European community. Furthermore, a minority parliament in 2004 with 
the Socialist Party limited manoeuvrability in complying with the EU. Thus, political 
factors such as forming coalitions and attracting votes can sometimes take precedence 
over association or conditionality incentives. New coalition agreements between Serbian 
political parties in 2007 improved relations with the EU and cooperation with the ICTY, 
allowing for the reinstatement of association discussions.
38
  
In summary, this section described various instruments the EU has utilized to influence 
state compliance on Roma inclusion. In discussing structural fund implementation and 
challenges, the ‗Decade of Roma Inclusion,‘ and conditionality measures it was 
demonstrated that EU instruments have not been effective. While the EURoma Network 
offers an opportunity for coordinated transnational action, similar challenges that exist at 
the domestic level have impacted effective policy implementation at the international 
level. Primarily, there is no long term strategy to develop and evaluate structural fund 
activities. Furthermore, there is limited cooperation and coordination among the various 
local, national, regional actors involved. It is also important to take into account the 
diversity within Roma communities; thus policies adopted in one country may not offer 
the best solution in another.  
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The ‗Decade of Roma Inclusion‘ as an international initiative has not been effective in 
addressing Roma exclusion and discrimination. Participating states, although adopting 
action plans on education, employment, health and housing have provided only limited 
financial resources and personnel. As reported by ‗Decade Watch,‘ current programs 
regarding Roma inclusion are not comprehensive and very limited. Furthermore, it is 
disappointing to note that while some progress is made on Roma initiatives during the 
accession period, once EU membership is attained, international influence and domestic 
reforms diminish. In discussing EU membership as an incentive to develop and 
implement Roma inclusion policies, the issue of conditionality measures required further 
analysis. The EU has often maintained a vague policy on minority protection that has 
lead to the development of unclear indicators for accession countries. Moreover, an 
inherent ‗double standard‘ regarding ratification of the FCNM and politicized annual 
reports provide an illegitimate basis for criticizing minority exclusion.  Accordingly, the 
aforementioned EU instruments utilized to influence state compliance on minority 
protection, and specifically Roma inclusion, have not been effective. 
 
6.5 The Council of Europe (CoE) and Organization for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) 
As mentioned previously the European Union has relied on two main international 
institutions, the OSCE and CoE, to develop and implement minority policies in 
candidate and accession countries. The following section describes the role and various 
instruments related to Roma policy in each institution. Within the CoE, the European 
Court of Human Rights (ECHR) as a legal mechanism has contributed significantly to 
the advancement of Roma rights. The European Roma and Travellers Forum (ERTF) has 
less frequently been an effective body in promoting Roma issues within the Council of 
Europe. The OSCE, primarily the High Commissioner for National Minorities (HCNM) 




the Contact Point for Roma and Sinti Issues (CPRSI) came to be the main organization 
within the OSCE to address the community‘s situation in Europe. 
European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) 
In joining the Council of Europe, countries ratify the European Convention on Human 
Rights, thereby consenting to the authority of the European Court of Human Rights, 
which by providing binding decisions verifies that participating states adhere to and 
protect convention principles. Increasingly, the Roma community has reframed systemic 
discrimination and violence as a human rights violation and presented cases to the 
ECHR. As the exclusion and stigmatization of Roma was understood as an issue of 
ethnic and racial discrimination, it concurred with the expansion of legislation on this 
issue in Europe, which was previously undeveloped. Until recently, the European 
Convention did not include a provision for individual cases of discrimination, mainly 
due to the lack of national legislation in this area. Protocol 12 of the European 
Convention ensuring non-discrimination (2005) and the Race Equality Directive (RED) 
(2000) prohibiting ‗direct‘ and ‗indirect‘ discrimination on the basis of race and 
ethnicity are important legislative advancements in the field. Furthermore, the RED 
requires the establishment of specific institutions in Member States that encourage and 
implement anti-discrimination measures. However, many challenges still exist in 
presenting cases of human rights violations concerning the Roma community.
39
  
Primarily, Roma representatives and claimants have often demonstrated a distrust of 
government institutions, and do not always have comprehensive information regarding 
individual rights.  Second, legal proceedings can be expensive and time consuming after 
exhausting domestic and international judiciaries, as legal assistance is not widely 
available to Roma communities. Third, class action suits representing a minority group 
may be forbidden, often courts do not evaluate empirical evidence that is essential to 
proving cases of racial and ethnic discrimination. Finally, in many Eastern European 
countries, the legal profession is highly prejudiced toward Roma communities which 
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does not allow for an unbiased and fair decision. Despite the aforementioned challenges 
concerning advocacy on behalf of the Roma community, important progress has been 
made.  In light of overwhelming evidence in the form of court applications, international 
organization and NGO reports, the ECHR began to denounce government violations 
pertaining to racial discrimination. An important part of influencing ECHR 
jurisprudence was the comprehensive documentation of discrimination toward the Roma 




The European Roma and Travellers Forum (ERTF) 
The ERTF began as an initiative of Roma activists lobbying for a pan-European body of 
elected Romani representatives. Several Member States of the CoE agreed that further 
discussions on Roma issues were required at the European level and could be facilitated 
by creating one unified Roma entity. President Halonen of Finland lobbied intensively to 
construct a new European perspective on addressing Roma issues. The Council of 
Europe seemed an appropriate venue to build the foundations of a representative and 
democratic body that would assist Member states in supporting Roma communities. The 
ERTF became operational as a NGO, funded by the Council of Europe in January 2005. 
The organization would have special status with the CoE, as an expert forum on Roma 
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In 2005, the ERTF became the largest body representing Roma issues in Europe, 
incomparable to any other Romani institution. Hundreds of organizations in the majority 
of CoE states became affiliates of the ERTF. The general assembly of the ERTF is 
composed of representatives from each national forum. The leadership of the ERTF as a 
democratic and representative body was to be chosen by the general assembly at the 
preliminary meeting of the organization. However, the ERTF has followed traditional 
Roma governing structures by granting a few members honorary titles and permanent 
status within the general assembly.  Moreover, while the ERTF has ‗special status‘ 
within the CoE, it is not viewed by international organizations and Romani activists as 
‗the institution‘ representing Roma communities in Europe, to the frustration of many of 
its leaders. The ERTF is only sometimes requested for recommendations that do not 
necessarily influence CoE policies on Roma issues. Instead, MG-S-ROM, a group of 
government appointed experts develop Roma-related policies for the CoE, and have 
limited cooperation with the ERTF.
42
  
The Committee of Ministers in 1995, established an Expert Group on Roma within the 
Council of Europe, with the acronym MG-S-ROM. It was the first inter-governmental 
body focusing on the specific situation of Roma in Europe on a systematic basis. The 
group consists of both Roma and non-Roma participants. Its primary activities are to 
support and advise the Committee of Ministers on various issues concerning the Roma 
population. The body also seeks to ‗push‘ activities currently implemented within the 
Council of Europe, as well as encouraging new proposals. MG-S-ROM has developed 
recommendations to support governments in formulating legislation and policies. 
Furthermore, the group conducts studies and field work in post-conflict regions to focus 
attention on particularly vulnerable Roma populations. The Group has existed for ten 
years; an idea initially proposed by the Dutch delegation and key Romani activists. The 
activities of the group are essential to highlighting the Roma issue on not only European 
agendas, but other international agencies such as the World Bank, UNHCR, and UNDP. 
The group seeks to establish itself as the main forum for government representatives to 
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discuss good practices and learn from past experiences. Furthermore, the group seeks to 
provide specific support to countries that have not yet developed a national action plan 
on Roma inclusion, or in instances, where Roma are not acknowledged as a national 
minority. Although MG-S-ROM denotes the importance of ‗hearing from the ERTF on 
what still needs to be improved,‘ there is the understanding that the forum exists as the 
main body to provide consultation to participating CoE states.
43
 
As argued by Nirenberg, the ERTF is predominately composed of Romani individuals 
that do not generally participate in international policy discourse, and lack 
comprehension of international organizations‘ structure and communications. Members 
of the ERTF have minimal knowledge of international lobbying tools, or realize the need 
to read background materials prior to making an informed opinion. Those Roma activists 
and leaders already engaged with international institutions generally are not members of 
the ERTF. Many Roma NGOs feel excluded from international arenas as ‗there are 
many Europeans at the conferences, but not Roma.‘
 44
  In this way, it is believed that 
Roma are not accepted as equal members. Roma are denied a role in policy making, 
simply ‗managed‘ by someone else.
 45
 According to the European Roma Travellers‘ 
Forum (ERTF) there is an oligarchy among the official European institutions concerning 
Roma inclusion. In relation to facilitating dialogue between Roma and non-Roma, there 
is powerful asymmetry in constructing the discourse on Roma inclusion.
46
 This division 
is indicative of the general trend in domestic and international arenas between educated, 
professional Roma, and those leaders purporting strong community support with a focus 
on ‗grassroots organization.‘ Although the ERTF is the largest entity on Roma issues, it 
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The Organization for Security and Cooperation (OSCE)  
The High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM) of the Organization for 
Security and Cooperation (OSCE) initially focused on the issue of Roma in 1993, as EU 
enlargement was unfolding and Roma migration from eastern states was perceived as a 
potential problem.  The 1993 HCNM report demonstrated an underlying concern with 
Roma migration from CEE countries despite similar issues of racial violence and 
discrimination in Western European states, generally depicted as refugee receiving 
countries. The Roma ‗problematic‘ was conspicuously embedded in the overall context 
of analyzing discrimination and socio-economic difficulties of the community: 
―The aim, in short, should be to improve the ‗quality of life‘ in migration-producing countries for the 
sake of such improvements, but also for the reduction in pressures on international migration.  In 
addition to commerce, investment, and development assistance leading to economic opportunity, 
efforts at addressing the specific problems of the Roma, including discrimination and violence against 
them, will contribute considerably to improving their ‗quality of life.‘ Such efforts are likely to 
encourage people to continue their lives where they already are.‖
48
 
In the following year of 1994, the Contact Point for Roma and Sinti Issues (CPRSI) was 
established within the Organization for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights 
(ODIHR) of the OSCE, as the issue of Roma became more prominent on the European 
agenda. Primarily, the ODIHR‘s mandate was in the area of ethnic conflict prevention, 
and did not specifically focus on minority groups. Previous to the establishment of the 
CPRSI, the ODIHR had not incorporated a separate department on a minority issue. This 
was an important development, as the issue of Roma was reframed within a human 
rights context, perceptibly different from the area of ethnic conflict prevention.
49
 The 
CPRSI in 1999 under the leadership of Nicolae Gheorghe supported and facilitated 
communication between the International Romani Union (IRU) and the Roma National 
Congress (RNC), as well as providing monetary and political resources to enhance 
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organizational and advocacy capabilities.  Subsequently, the International Roma Contact 
Group was established composed of IRU and RNC members, as well as activists and 
experts on Roma issues. In 2003-2005, the ERTF was formed as a result of the 
collaboration among Finnish delegates to the OSCE, the Council of Europe and Roma 
representatives in the Contact Group. As argued by the former CPRSI department head, 
this pushed Romani activism to the regional, European level.
50
  
The 2000 HCNM report signified an important change in rhetoric from a focus on the 
securitization of migration to a concern with integration in eastern and western European 
states. In contrast to the 1990s, the situation of Roma was depicted as a ‗minority rights 
issue.‘ Further investments were made at this time, particularly through the EU Poland 
and Hungary Assistance for the Restructuring of the Economy (PHARE) program which 
emphasized some factors of socio-economic exclusion in candidate countries, rather than 
a concern with Roma inclusion in the hope of thwarting the possibility of Roma 
migration in the short-term. However, as Eastern European states increasingly become 
members of the European community and as Roma ‗migrants‘ are EU citizens, the 
outcome of a vague minority policy will have deep repercussions, as recently 
demonstrated by the actions of France in destroying and evicting Roma settlements. 
Despite rhetorical commitment and funding by the OSCE and EU to improve the 
situation of Roma communities, incoherency between internal EU minority policy and 




In 2003, 55 OSCE participating States adopted the Action Plan on Improving the 
Situation of Roma and Sinti. The CPRSI has initiated projects and studies in the areas of 
political participation, discrimination and racial violence, social exclusion, security of 
residence, anti-trafficking, and refugee protection. The department has promoted the 
establishment of institutional frameworks at the local and national levels to advise 
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governments and administrations on policy making.
52
There are many criticisms of the 
Action Plan– as stated by Gheorghe the document is quite complicated, and broad in its 
political and social aims. Additionally, OSCE participating states since its adoption, 
have not integrated many of the recommendations concerning Roma inclusion.
53
 
Limitations of the OSCE’s Human Rights Interventions 
Johns evaluates the OSCE as an impartial ‗watchdog for human rights‘ and the 
organization‘s contribution to EU progress reports on minority rights that influence the 
accession status of Eastern European states.  In analyzing the impact of the High 
Commissioner on National Minorities, an inherent bias becomes apparent.  While the 
role of the OSCE is to recognize the early signs of conflict and develop preventive 
strategies for states and minority groups in all 55 participating states, there is a focus on 
Eastern Europe, while Western European states are not scrutinized with the same 
intensity. Furthermore, the majority of recommendations target Eastern Europe.  It was 
also acknowledged that the OSCE was reluctant to criticize participating states in the 
West that provided necessary funding to maintain permanent missions in the region, to 
collect information and conduct an assessment of the human rights situation. In addition, 
it was also recognized that many of the suggestions presented by the OSCE were 




Bakker argues the OSCE‘s efforts to improve the situation of Roma in Europe can only 
have impact in the areas of legislation and non-discrimination. In other spheres, policy 
implementation will only have impact in the long term. As political and economic 
exclusion are difficult to challenge, the socio-economic differences between Roma and 
non-Roma will persist.  The actions of international institutions will not have desirable 
results in the short term, but as the author argues may lead to the unintended 
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consequence of ‗ethno-political rebellion.‘
55
 As the OSCE and other international 
organizations continue to fund initiatives for NGO development, networking among 
Roma activists, and encourage the emergence of a strong cultural and political identity – 
it facilitates the prospect for collective action. Although a small minority of Roma are 
involved in political activism, this group may contribute to the progressive 
understanding within many Roma communities that their precarious existence is no 
longer tolerable. This consciousness, the author argues may lead to growing 
discontentment and result in militant political action. He states ―the difference between 
the more successful efforts to increase the capacity for political organization and the less 
successful efforts to decrease political, economic, and cultural discrimination and – to a 
lesser extent – political instability contains a potential security risk and deserves our 
attention.‖
56
 Although emphasizing that Roma should not be further stigmatized as a 
‗potential security risk,‘ essentially the author is advocating that international 
institutions, specifically the OSCE, as a security organization should play an integral 
role in preventing potential conflict.
57
 
Bakker, alongside other academics and international policy makers, while highlighting 
the precarious situation of Roma communities, and the important role of international 
organizations in capacity building, debilitates the emancipatory potential of Roma 
communities. As mentioned by a NGO activist in Serbia, the involvement of 
international institutions concerning the situation of Roma serves to support political 
stabilization in the region, as well as preventing the migration of Roma searching for a 
‗better life‘ in Western Europe.
58
  Most recently, the ERTF President and Romani 
activist Rudko Kawczynski has discussed how the political protests and reforms 
occurring in the Middle East were ‗inspiring;‘ giving the Roma ‗the courage to change‘ 
their situation. Kawczynski stated the need to not only participate in meetings and draft 
policies, but advocated a more active stance, acknowledging that changes were required 
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by Roma and non-Roma populations.
59
 The ERTF President has also warned that 
eventually the marginalization of Roma in Europe will result in violence, stating ―it will 
blow up, as Roma have no rights at all.‖
60
 Kawczynski also noted the increasing 
antagonism of Romani youth as a result of segregation, unemployment and other forms 
of alienation. The inaction of European governments and pervasive anti-Gypsyism, the 
activist argued, will radicalize Roma youth.  Furthermore, as noted by Kawczynski, 
Roma adolescents do not have faith in Romani leaders, often perceived as symbolic 




Roma activists and leaders have advocated for a coherent minority inclusion policy that 
applies to candidate and member states alike. The 2000 HCNM report although 
contextualizing Roma inequality within the frame of security and migration provided the 
impetus and tools for Roma activists and organizations to channel their claims within 
other international arenas, such as the ECHR. The inconsistency between EU accession 
conditions and actions of Member states has effectively demonstrated the impasse of 
rhetoric and implementation. As minority inclusion policies are consistently pushed in 
accession discussions, and evaluated within EU progress reports, EU states may be 
entrapped by their rhetorical commitments. It is important to now consider the 
interrelation between civil society and international organizations to analyze if Roma 
activists have been successful in pursuing their claims. 
6.6 Trans-national Advocacy Networks: Interaction between 
International Organizations and Civil Society Organizations 
In addressing the question of how social movement actors and international institutions 
seek to influence and change Roma inclusion policy in Macedonia and Serbia, it is 
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helpful to refer to the literature on transnational advocacy. As argued by Keck and 
Sikkink (1998) domestic protest groups may seek recourse at the international level, 
when their government refuses to recognize their concerns. Transnational advocacy 
networks are most likely to appear concerning issues where: 1) the linkages between 
domestic groups and governments are restricted or when communication paths are 
ineffective for conflict resolution 2) activists believe that networking will strengthen 
social movement campaigns and further promote the issue 3) international conferences 
and contacts create opportunities for network building.
62
 Thus, ‗transnational advocacy 
networks‘ are defined by the international actors that share common values, discourse, 
information and services on a specific issue. Furthermore, alliances between civil society 
actors, states and international organizations allow for increased linkages to international 
resources that activists can utilize in domestic protest activity.
63
  
It is not evident in the context of this study that the EU as an international actor ‗shares 
common values, discourse, information and services‘
64
 on Roma inclusion. As discussed 
previously, EU norms on minority protection are ambiguous and lack consensus. 
Furthermore, although the European Commission and other organizations funded by the 
institution have advocated for non-discrimination and inclusion of Roma communities, 
the actions of EU member states, such as Italy and France challenge the idea that the 
European Community shares common values. This suggests that the EU does not share a 
‗common discourse‘ on Roma inclusion as demonstrated by comparing the statements of 
the President of the European Commission, Viviane Reding, and political leaders such 
as Sarkozy and Basescu. Regarding ‗information and services,‘ as mentioned in the 
discussion of ‗structural fund implementation‘ often times, international organization 
activities over-lap and there is a lack of coordination between the ESF/national/local 
programs on Roma inclusion. The EURoma Network in the future, in this respect, may 
offer better opportunities for networking and cooperation among government authorities 
and civil society organizations. 
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International-NGO Interventions on Roma Inclusion 
The literature on transnational advocacy networks has demonstrated a strong link 
between the influence of international organizations and legitimacy of civil society 
organizations, thus facilitating NGO and activist access to national political arenas.
65
 As 
the situation of Roma increasingly became an important issue on the European agenda 
and defined within the context of ‗minority and human rights,‘ pro-Romani activists and 
NGOs gained legitimacy and support by international institutions. Although EU 
conditionality criteria has not led to significant improvements concerning Roma 
inclusion, it has led to significant links between international and civil society 
organizations, as well as highlighting the situation of Roma on domestic agendas. 
Without the support of international organizations, and vice versa, the participation of 
civil society, the issue of Roma would not have entered the debate on EU membership.
66
  
During the accession period, the EU has supported NGOs in various ways to promote 
and impact policy making on Roma inclusion. EU funding to Roma NGOs increased 
substantially in the 1990s and EU bodies continue to support programs for Roma 
communities in the SEE region. Funding was predominately provided through the EU 
PHARE program; an estimated 100 million € supported the creation of Roma positions 
and offices within national government bodies, and NGO projects.
67
 International pro-
Romani organizations such as the ERRC, ERIO, and ERTF have also been the recipients 
of EU funding. Overall, EU funding enhanced the visibility of Roma political activism 
in international and national arenas, supporting a strong partnership with the European 
Commission and encouraging a prominent role for pro-Romani NGOs in EU 
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institutions. Various educational and training opportunities were offered to Roma 




NGOs have also supported the EU by providing essential information about Roma 
communities in various states. The EU, especially in the mid to late 1990s had minimal 
knowledge concerning the situation and concerns of the community. Without the input 
of NGOs, the EU could not establish conditionality requirements for candidate states 
regarding minority inclusion, and the situation of Roma may not have been considered 
during the accession process. Pro-Romani NGOs have undertaken the important task of 
monitoring during the accession period. Organizations such as Amnesty International, 
Human Rights Watch, and the ERRC have contributed frequent evaluations and press 
releases enabling the EU to effectively assess progress on conditionality criteria. NGOs 
have also acted as lobbyists, emphasizing certain issues for the EU to address with 
national governments. The EU has sometimes used Roma and international NGOs to 
reinforce EU policies or highlight politically sensitive issues the institution cannot 
discuss. EU officials, in turn, have often visited local communities legitimating Roma 
concerns. Conferences and seminars, in addition to highlighting the situation of Roma 
on the international level, also provided European Commission officers and other 




Research has demonstrated that the results of developmental programs are a function of 
transnational linkages. A re-occurring problem of international organizations and NGOs 
seeking to provide support is the limited avenues available to collect information about 
the target group. Often transnational connections are weak, thus the monitoring and 
enforcement mechanisms of external organizations are limited. There are often 
asymmetrical power relations in terms of holding international NGOs and organizations 
accountable for their actions. International intervention is more effective if it involves 
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local agencies. Bruszt-Vedres‘ findings significantly challenge negative perceptions of 
the EU‘s role as an external actor in supporting non-state actors. Thus, ―the EU can alter 
the status quo from within, using political opportunities in a new transnational arena.‖
70
 
Bruszt-Vedres analyzing the effectiveness of local agency in international development 
programs conducted a case study of EU interventions in East and Central European 
regional development programs. From 1996-2004 the EU launched massive pre-
accession programs to support the foundation and improvement of local agencies.  After 
2004, regional development programs were nationalized, without any requirement to 
include local actors. The participation of local actors in the development and 
implementation of regional programs was dependent on their advocacy and lobbying 
abilities at the national and international levels. In order to participate as effective 
members in policy making and implement changes, local actors had to build alliances, 




The literature on EU conditionality has demonstrated that national governments in the 
post-accession period are no longer motivated to implement changes, especially 
regarding political reforms. Thus, accordingly, the study interrogates local agency in the 
post-accession phase as EU intervention is no longer as pervasive. The research 
demonstrated that quite to the contrary, local organizations were heavily involved in 
national development programs. In addition, local organizations were also more likely to 
access EU funding in the post-2004 period. Although agencies may have access to 
grants, it is important to question if they were effective as ‗agents of change.‘ The study 
found however, that as non-state actors were viewed as significant players and essential 
to the policy making process, it led to increased developmental agency. Furthermore, as 
active participants in the EU structure, local agencies were able to build transnational 
links, international partners also enabled greater agency. It was also interesting to find, 
that the resource capacities of the organization – in terms of personnel and funds – was 
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not an important factor in developmental agency.  It was noted, however, that 
progressive funding (EU projects) as monetary leverage was important for continued 
activation.  In addition, the amount of exposure to EU support in the pre-accession 
phases also developed the capacity of local actors.
72
   
In Macedonia, international organizations have initiated alliances between political 
parties, state authorities and Roma groups.  In areas where the participation of Roma 
proves difficult to encourage, primarily because municipal authorities are not obligated 
to elect minorities within their structures, international organizations have worked with 
Roma political and civic activists on issue-based advocacy campaigns. For instance, the 
OSCE Spillover Mission in Macedonia has held workshops to define the role of 
municipal committees for inter-community relations in mixed ethnic municipalities. 
Committees were created in 21 municipalities of the country. The discussion brought 
together lawyers, mayors, local officials and academics to discuss best practices and 
lessons learned on how these committees function and how municipalities can institute 
them in municipal statutes.
73
 This would be an alternative to direct participation within 
municipal government, to participate in decision making processes at the municipal 
level. 
In 2006, with the support of the Contact Point for Roma and Sinti Issues 
(ODIHR/OSCE), a Romani Women‘s Lobby Group was established in Macedonia. The 
group serves to put pressure on government institutions and the public to: 
 achieve greater representation of Romani women in politics and public life, 
especially in the decision-making process 
 improve the existing legal provisions with the purpose of improving the status of 
women, along with increased education concerning legal rights 
 provide greater participation of women in local self-government 
 raise the awareness of women about the power of voting (exercise of voting 
rights) 
 create awareness of the need to create equal opportunities. In 2000, the Women‘s 
Lobby Group successfully promoted and secured a legal obligation of political 
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parties to include 30% of female candidates on their lists at the national 
election.
74
   
 
The previous discussion has illuminated that while the EU lacks consensus on Roma 
inclusion initiatives, there has been some progress in the pre and post accession phase, 
as international institutions and NGOs forge transnational links to influence domestic 
policies on Roma. While the literature on EU conditionality suggested that reforms in 
the political sphere were limited in the post-accession period, it is important to note that 
non-state actors as ‗agents of change‘ can have an impact on national development 
programs. As previously discussed, however, while Macedonia, Serbia and other SEE 
countries have developed substantive action plans and program activities with the 
support of Roma NGOs and activists, it remains to be seen if implementation without 
EU funding can be accomplished on Roma inclusion initiatives. It is important now to 
consider how transnational advocacy networks can support protest group activities 
regarding i) issue creation and agenda setting ii) influence on the discursive positions of 
states iii) influence on institutional procedures.
75
 
Issue Creation and Agenda Setting: ‘Framing’ the Roma Issue 
The previous discussion highlighted EU-NGO cooperation that was essential to 
influencing domestic agendas concerning Roma inclusion. An important step in ‗issue 
creation and agenda setting‘ is also the construction of a ‗cognitive frame‘ that can 
enhance movement appeal to the wider public, supporting a better understanding of 
protest group goals and interests. Framing is defined as the simplification of our 
‗lifeworld,‘
76
 by emphasizing and encoding objects, experiences, situations and actions 
that are part of past or present environments. Collective action frames can be used as a 
tool to support or amplify the injustice of a social condition or re-conceptualize as an 
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unjust condition what was perhaps viewed as a tolerable situation.  However, ‗framing‘ 
an issue as immoral is not sufficient to justify a social movement cause, rather one has to 
specify blame, or convey responsibility for the rectification of a social condition.
77
 
Roma politicians and activists have been effective in framing socio-economic 
inequalities and impoverishment within Roma communities as a humanitarian issue; 
deserving the attention of domestic governments and international organizations. Roma 
leaders have contested their identity as a subservient ethnic and social class, 
reconceptualising their ‗tolerated‘ status within European societies. 
Roma have been successful in constructing a ‗cognitive frame,‘ that has appeal at the 
domestic and international level. One way the movement has been able to raise 
consciousness and change how Roma are perceived by mainstream society, the state and 
international bodies, is the reformation of their ‗political identity.‘  Across Europe, the 
Roma have had multiple identities in various states, such as ‗Gypsy,‘ ‗Tsigani,‘ that 
have derogatory connotations. Various anti-racism campaigns and programs have 
utilized the term ‗Roma‘ to contest negative images of this social group. Although the 
term ‗Roma‘ does not have resonance with the general ‗Roma‘ populace in Macedonia 
and Serbia, the emergence of ‗Roma‘ as a collective identity at the international level 
has enabled the emergence of specific organizational policies and programs that target 
discrimination and alleviate social inequality regarding this social group.
78
 Roma have 
also adopted nationalistic cultural symbols such as a flag, and anthem to assert their 
collective identity. Roma have renegotiated their political identity, as well as 
reconstructing historical and present discrimination. It is only recently that the 
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However, Roma leaders and activists have not been successful in creating an innovative, 
resonant ‗master frame,‘ essential to the success of a social movement, and without 
which mass mobilization is highly unlikely. It is important to consider that movement 
tactics are not only constrained by structural considerations, but also the initial ‗master 
frame‘ constructed by the protest group. If the ‗master frame‘ does not resonate with 
social movement constituents it will lack appeal, and be dismissed.
80
 Presently, the 
‗master frame‘ is an elite driven process that only resonates with a small number of 
Roma activists and intellectuals, participating in international arenas through 
transnational advocacy networks. As discussed previously, the majority of Roma in 
Serbia and Macedonia are not aware of their ‗human rights,‘ and lack knowledge of the 
various domestic and international instruments utilized to contest Roma rights 
violations. It was also noted by a Roma activist that as the younger generation of 
educated Roma occupy positions within government and international institutions, there 
is a widening gap between leaders of the movement and the general Roma populace.
81
 
Secondly, it is important that the ‗master frame,‘ be consistent in the values it advocates. 
As discussed previously in the empirical chapters on Roma activism in Macedonia and 
Serbia, Roma politicians often present a disunited public image, lacking a common 
platform to advocate effectively for Roma inclusion. Roma politicians once elected do 
not represent the community‘s needs; personal ambition and conflict within political 
parties often takes precedence. The monopolization of information and resources, and 
undemocratic politics practiced by many Romani leaders, does not serve to establish a 
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participatory framework that enables a mass movement. Thus, the ‗master frame‘ 
lacking ‗potency,‘ among target constituents does not enable movement longevity.
82
  
As the ‗master frame‘ does not have resonance with the general Roma community, 
‗competing frames‘ are more easily able to demonstrate the irrelevance or limitations of 
the ‗master frame.‘
83
 For example, mainstream nationalist political parties in Serbia can 
more easily practice voter intimidation and co-opt Roma political parties, having 
knowledge there is a lack of consensus among Roma politicians. As suggested by many 
Roma politicians and activists, fracturing the Romani vote among various political 
parties has debilitated efforts to push the Roma agenda in national assemblies.
84
 A 
further example of a ‗competing frame,‘ was recently constructed by the Romanian 
government attempting to oppose and renegotiate the Roma political identity. Stipulating 
concerns of possible confusion between the words ‗Roma,‘ and ‗Romania,‘ the 
parliament attempted to change the official name of the Roma to ‗Tigan,‘  a derogatory 
name widely used in the SEE region, and also associated with the enslavement of Roma 
in Romania from 1385-1856, as well as forced deportations in WWII. Many activists 
believe the name change could promote further discrimination.
85
 
This section argued that Roma activists and political leaders were effective in reframing 
the marginalization of the community as a humanitarian issue, highlighting its 
importance on domestic and international agendas. Furthermore, Roma activists and 
leaders have successfully constructed a cognitive frame renegotiating their subordinate 
social and ethnic identity. However, it has been difficult to construct a resonant ‗master 
frame‘ having mass appeal as Roma activism is predominately an elite driven process 
that does not enable the emergence of a collective ‗Romani identity,‘ nor does it present 
a common platform. Thus, ‗competing frames‘ are better able to oppose movement 
goals. 
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Influences on Discursive Positions of States: Does International Influence Matter? 
Although many international initiatives exist, to what extent can international 
organizations influence Roma-related policy and programs within a state if there is 
reluctance on the part of domestic actors and institutions? In 2008- 2009, Serbia 
presided as the chair of the ‗Decade of Roma Inclusion.‘ As the Serbian chairmanship 
began, the mayor of Belgrade evicted a Roma community from the centre of the city and 
demolished the settlement.
86
 The ‗Decade of Roma Inclusion‘ like many international 
initiatives appears as a conduit to strengthen the Roma movement, but as other Roma-
related policies have demonstrated, what appears on paper is lacking in implementation. 
As a former presidential advisor in the province of Vojvodina noted ―the Roma issue is 
not high on the priority list of the Serbian government, even if it is on the agenda.‖
87
As 
in the case of Macedonia, the creation of institutional positions, National Strategies and 
Action Plans are limited achievements in the absence of political will and interest to 
create sustainable long term policies and programs that effectively address Roma issues.  
Similarly, Klimova-Alexander‘s study demonstrates that Roma activists have been 
successful influencing the UN agenda, but are unable to implement 
procedural/institutional reforms that have political impact.  Perhaps even more striking, 
in contrast to the EU, there has not been a specific body or commission on Roma issues 
at the UN, nor has the community been the focus of discussions regarding minority and 
ethnic conflict issues in Europe, despite activists‘ efforts in the past decade. UN member 
states have demonstrated a lack of commitment by declining to sign legally binding 
commitments to address the situation of Roma. The limited success that has been 
achieved at the UN level, in regards to agenda setting, is predominately due to the efforts 
of a few individuals – Roma elites and non Romani professionals. It is not surprising 
there have been few structural developments, provided that Roma activism, in general, is 
constrained by limited finances and human resources; as well as corruption and conflict 
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between leaders in the community. However, it is important that initial steps have been 




Domestic Rhetoric on Roma Inclusion 
It has been argued that the EU with the support of Roma NGOs played an important role 
in influencing domestic agendas on Roma inclusion. Although the EU may have used 
conditionality as a tool to improve the situation of Roma communities, target states may 
only establish a ‗rhetorical commitment‘ to international norms. As the literature on the 
socialization of international human rights norms has discussed, it is through 
international declarations and statements that states are effectively ‗entrapped‘ by their 
discourse. Macedonia as a candidate country and Serbia designated the status of 
potential candidate have provided symbolic tokens of Roma inclusion, such as signing 
and participating in international initiatives such as the Decade of Roma Inclusion, and 
with the guidance of the OSCE created national and local action plans on improving the 
situation of Roma. The respective states have ‗instrumentally adapted,‘ engaging in 
‗rhetorical communication‘ to demonstrate a concession to international norms.
89
 
Initially, instrumental adaptations are viewed as minimal concessions to a larger goal, 
such as EU membership, but eventually may lead to the internalization of international 
human rights norms. 
                                                          
88
 Klimova-Alexander, I., op.cit., p. 147 Romani activism and interaction with the UN structure is focused 
on the initiatives of a few Roma leaders, and two main organizations – the International Romani Union 
(IRU) and European Roma Rights Centre (ERRC).  The IRU is the sole Roma organization with formal 
access to the UN structure. Roma organizations have either acted independently or as a subsidiary of the 
IRU to address issues within the UN. The ERRC is an international public interest law organization 
established in 1996 to address racism and human rights violations of Roma through legal research and 
defence of cases, publications, advocacy, policy initiatives, educational training and seminars. The ERRC 
has consultative status with the Economic and Social Council of the UN. The interaction of the IRU with 
the UN system is a complex narrative; this thesis is limited to only providing an overview of some 
international initiatives on Roma issues and cannot provide an extensive analysis of each organization‘s 
contribution (Klimova-Alexander, I., op.cit., p. 17) 
89
 See Risse, T., Ropp, S., and Sikkink, K., op.cit., and Schimmelfenning, F., ―The Community Trap: 
Liberal Norms, Rhetorical Action, and the Eastern Enlargement of the European Union.‖ International 




The second phase of norm socialization is the process of argumentation and persuasion. 
As noted in previous chapters discussing domestic political opportunities and constraints 
in the respective countries, there has been the creation of government positions and 
bodies in regards to Roma inclusion to demonstrate progress on international 
commitments. The combination of fulfilling instrumental interests, in addition to 
engaging in international discussions on Roma issues in various high-level meetings and 
conferences, has led to a long term commitment to satisfy international political 
obligations. Numerous pro-Romani organizations, activists, and Roma leaders seek to 
provide constant criticism while states justify their instrumental priorities, leading to 
further argumentation and persuasion. Moreover, although the EU does not have a 
coherent minority rights policy, Roma activists can still refer to EU human rights 
declarations to encourage beneficial policy direction on Roma issues. 
States, however, may exercise ‗rhetorical action‘
90
 that compromises international 
values, reframes ideas in accordance with individual priorities, and utilizes alternative 
international norms to support their perspective. For instance, some states have used the 
idea of Roma integration as a collaborative, ‗pan-European initiative‘ to absolve national 
responsibility for the situation. Greater institutional involvement on the part of European 
organizations is not the problem, but rather the re-framing of EU interest in Roma by 
some political actors as a way to further categorize and exclude the community.  By 
viewing Roma as a ‗European minority‘, they are no longer citizens of the state, 
deserving of socio-economic equality. Additionally, as the Roma community is viewed 
as the recipients of generous EU funding it may exacerbate the divide between Roma 
and domestic populations.
91
 Well known Romanian Roma activist Nicolae Gheorghe has 
noted:  
“The mass Roma migration since EU accession has served the purpose of getting the Roma people 
out of the local communities. This approach tolerates the idea of the Roma "becoming European" 
on the assumption that the Roma will leave, the westerners will take on the burden and will then 
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start to "understand our bitterness". The Roma as an EU citizen is a subtle argument but the 
solution has to be found here, in Romania. The Romanian government recently announced the 
intention to adopt a new strategy for the Roma. I think this is a bad idea because it will enable the 
Romanian authorities to shirk their responsibilities towards their fellow Romanian citizens by 




Rhetorical action such as reframing the Roma issue within the context of 
Europeanization allows for member states to maintain a consistent image without 
damaging their international reputation. This signals potential candidate countries such 
as Macedonia and Serbia to follow similar processes of norm socialization, as the 
outcome will not necessarily lead to the habitualization or institutionalization of Roma 
inclusion policies.  
Influences on Institutional Procedures 
International organizations are presumably committed to working with government 
bodies to address Roma-related issues. While this approach seems to be conducive to 
national governments taking responsibility for minority related concerns, a major 
problem is institutional inertia within post-Communist states. Roma activists as well as 
international organization representatives noted the lack of implementation as an issue of 
institutional reform in both Macedonia and Serbia. Institutional reform in post-
communist states is especially a concern as with the creation of Roma-related 
departments and positions within Macedonian and Serbian political structures, 
institutions have become the main avenue to address Roma issues, leading to few 
achievements. One would expect that democratization would allow for institutional 
innovation and discontinue previous patterns of institutional conduct.
93
 However, many 
empirical studies demonstrate that ―institutional arrangements that developed in Eastern 
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Europe before and under Communist rule remain salient even after the disjuncture of 
1989 and continued to shape distinctive trajectories in the post-Communist period.‖
94
  
As described by Thelan, institutional survival is often dependent on institutional 
transformation in order to adapt to the changing social, political, and economic 
context.
95
 However, institutional transformation does not necessarily point to 
institutional innovation. The National Strategies and Action Plans are limited 
amendments to create the appearance of Roma inclusion in Macedonian and Serbian 
societies and political structures.
96
 The inclusion of Roma-related departments and 
positions within the Macedonian political structure is a way to appease EU human rights 
regulations in order to join the European Union and the international community.
97
 
Comparatively, in Serbia, the former advisor to the President of Vojvodina commented  
―the pressure of the EU upon our government doesn‟t bring any influence; it only causes 
the need to resist among Serbian people.‖
98
 Specifically, in regards to EU-Serbia 
cooperation he noted ―the problem is that Serbia is structurally unprepared to cooperate 
with the EU because institutions are not ready to initiate projects with the EU. The 
government would prefer to just get the money and do what they want with it.‖
99
  
Furthermore, foreign aid and intervention in Serbian affairs is often perceived as 
negative, as noted by the Director of Women‘s Studies and Research  
―in Serbia currently, there is prejudice concerning foreign donors. As if they are 
enemies. So, if you say that you get money for instance, from the United States then, 
answer will be „yes,‟ but they were bombing us ten years ago.‖
100
 
Macedonian and Serbian political institutions are a construction of old and new 
structures and policy legacies that have only transformed slightly to accommodate 
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changes within the external social and political context. These structures are now 
shaping opportunities and threats for protest group and government action in the 
contemporary period. As stated alternatively by an OSCE representative in Serbia: 
“One has to take into account that this is a country in transition in general -- 
economically, socially, and constitutionally I think that all reforms are being affected by 
the inertia which exists within the ministries. We have this problem now for example 
with the Roma National Strategy Secretariat in the Ministry of Human and Minority 
Rights. There are four staff members -- and there's now a freeze on the recruitment of 
new staff because of the financial crisis. But, at the same time they have dozens of 
drivers, and support staff. The institution itself needs to be reformed. If there was a 
reform of the institution it could create possibilities both to recruit needed staff -- in this 
case the Roma, but also free up resources to be used for initiatives such as Roma 
inclusion. So, there is a general problem of the institutions themselves. I mean we've had 
that now with the Ministry of Education for example, where we have a very dynamic 
state secretary in the Ministry of Education. Along with a number of key staff who are 
very dynamic. But, the reality is that majority of the staff have been working there for 
many years and they are the staff of the old regime. It‟s a different mindset -- so 
achieving change is a bit of a struggle sometimes.”
101
 
Change within Macedonian and Serbian political institutions is difficult but not 
impossible. In order to conform to international human rights norms and become an EU 
member state, changes proposed by international organizations have been accepted to 
some degree regarding the formulation and implementation of Roma inclusion policy 
and programs. But, there has been a lack of initiative and will to implement major 
structural reform and have real impact within Roma communities. Thus, the formation 
of transnational advocacy networks that facilitate NGO and activist access to national 
arenas has not been effective in promoting Roma inclusion. Although Roma activists 
and NGOs have gained attention at the international level through various mechanisms 
of the EU and initiatives such as the ‗Decade of Roma Inclusion,‘ the domestic political 
opportunity structure in Macedonia and Serbia is ‗closed,‘ due to repressive and unstable 
government regimes, political corruption, discriminatory attitudes, and limited 
cooperation among various Roma inclusion offices, Roma civil society actors and 
politicians. However, it is not only domestic opportunity structures that offer limitations 
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for Roma advocacy, the strategies of international institutions have also debilitated 
protest group activities. 
6.7 International Organizations and a Needs Based discourse 
Many international and government reports describe the situation of Roma in extensive 
detail, noting inequalities in housing, education, employment and social services. This 
information is viewed as important to include as state bodies and international 
organizations base funding allocation on statistics. State requirements for the official 
census serve the dual purpose of one, controlling a settlement and secondly, to make 
decisions regarding resources.  This information then allows ‗experts‘ to authenticate 
‗needs,‘ and allows for state institutionalization of these services. The needs discourse 
serves as a mediating connection between social movement actors and professionals to 
translate political claims into objects of state departments. The understanding and 
meanings assigned to needs are not viewed as problematic – rather it is natural that one 
becomes a ‗client‘ of the state and as such, people are classified along class, gender and 
ethnic divisions. It is a continuous struggle between social movement actors and the 
state to interpret needs satisfaction.
102
  
In Macedonia and Serbia, NGOs are unable to create and assert an alternative to 
hegemonic development discourses. Many that work on Roma issues have depoliticized 
needs and presented movement goals and objectives to be managed by the state and 
international institutions.  It is not the purpose of this discussion to undervalue the 
specific challenges that the majority of Roma confront on a daily basis. However, it is 
important to note that the evaluation of ‗needs‘ is separated from personal experiences 
and does not encourage political participation.  It is thus, essential that social movement 
actors realize novel approaches to discuss needs satisfaction and therefore, redefine 
development discourse.  
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Capacity building’ and ‘Small-Scale Projects’ debilitating Roma Activism? 
The domestic political opportunity structure is one factor accounting for the lack of 
implementation on Roma issues. However, it is also important to analyze the kind of 
influence international organizations are exerting as mediators and allies of the protest 
group. Macedonia and Serbia as ‗closed regimes‘ will not become more ‗open,‘ unless 
the strategies of international organizations are amended. What other factors can account 
for the lack of sustainable and effective change concerning Roma-related issues? One of 
the main strategies employed by international organizations is through the development 
of ‗small-scale projects‘ and ‗capacity building.‘ In the post-1999 period, subsequent to 
the Kosovo conflict, many organizations contributed to the building of a ‗thriving‘ civil 
society in the South Eastern European region. ‗Capacity building,‘ would resolve all 
challenges in post-communist states, especially in regards to ethnic/minority problems. 
Many times, however, the outcomes of ‗capacity building‘ as international initiatives 
have been disappointing. There is, generally, minimal regard for the political 
environment in which the civic organizations are expected to implement programs.  
Furthermore, the role of civil society is often idealized – viewing it as one of the primary 
actors in processes of democratization and institutional change. Often times, there are 
too many expectations of civil society‘s role in ethnically based conflicts.
103
 
There has been a proliferation of Roma-related NGOs funded and affiliated with 
international organizations that ‗voice‘ the concerns of the community and advocate for 
their claims, acting as the main agent between domestic governments and the 
community. International organizations by providing financial and technical support, 
organizing conferences and meetings with domestic government representatives are a 
cheap alternative to helping democratize state structures, and contributing to the political 
participation of minority groups. Roberto Belloni, using Bosnia as a case study refers to 
a similar argument regarding the involvement of international organizations, and the 
development of civil society as a less expensive alternative to extensive institutional and 
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economic reforms. As Belloni states ―one is led to believe that the discourse on civil 
society is the new ideological antidote for the failures of official aid and the resulting 
diffuse sense of pessimistic attitudes toward the Balkans.‖
104
 
Roma politicians and activists have observed how international funding has supported 
the proliferation of NGOs that seek to create a ‗Romani industry‘ based on the 
humanitarian needs of a severely marginalized population.
105
 Some have vociferously 
criticized actions of the international community in regards to NGO funding. One 
politician stated  
―to be honest the Roma minority never really benefited from those funds. If Roma 
problems were solved previously by these funds – directed correctly toward the Roma 




There are over 1000 Roma organizations within Macedonia and Serbia, with very few 
effectively serving the needs of the community.
107
 Furthermore, some NGO activists 
criticized international organizations for working on initiatives that did not correspond to 
the needs of the Roma community in Macedonia and Serbia. Civil society organizations 
were not solicited for information regarding the actual needs of the community, nor were 
their ideas taken into account.
108
 Many international organizations adopt a top-down 
approach, with Roma activists merely acting as field workers implementing short-term 
projects with limited effect on the community.
109
 If an NGO did have an effective 
program in place, at times, international organizations would withdraw funding, as it had 
been decided that other issues were a priority. The NGO would then draft an extensive 
project proposal in response to abstract ‗project proposal calls‘ attempting to fit 
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international organization objectives rather than meeting the needs of the Roma 
community.
110
 In general, NGO and international organization project proposals can 
seem quite extensive and convey the idea that Roma ‗activism‘ exists. However, in 
essence, many of the projects implemented simply are not effective in meeting the needs 
of the Roma community and present a very deceptive view on paper.
111
  
Emphasizing the role of civil society and its importance in building a social movement, 
serves to conceal the ineffectiveness of international institutions in promoting a stable 
government structure, and reconciliation between ethnically divided communities. It is 
often the case that international organizations want a short term ‗fix‘ for complex 
societal problems and thus, do not always plan a comprehensive approach. International 
organizations are often criticized for advocating a hierarchical approach to implementing 
programs; international institutions by supporting civil society can belie an alternative 
sphere that empowers local communities.
112
 It is difficult to focus on the empowerment 
of marginalized communities when international agencies are stressing NGO 
effectiveness and provision of services. Instead, the NGO sector are merely ‗contractors‘ 
providing a temporary substitute for social and public services that should be under 
government auspices. NGO accountability, then, is no longer channelled toward 
representing the interests of a disempowered community. Consequentially, marginalized 
communities may not feel empowered as the NGO sector is viewed as an externally 
driven process, committed for only a short duration. As development goals and plans are 
formulated by international agencies, beneficiaries are not active agents and as such are 
alienated from projects, not enabling any value in contribution.
113
 At times, international 
organizations prevent a participatory politics.  
In order for civil society to present an effective, oppositional role, civil society actors 
must construct an independent political sphere, while continuously conflicting and 
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engaging in argumentative discourse with state authorities, and without international 
organizations initiating the interaction. The coordination and facilitation of meetings 
between the civil sector and state authorities is generally the result of internationally 
initiated research and agenda-setting. Civil society representatives and Roma political 
activists are relegated to observational roles, acting within the confines of internationally 
conceived ideas and discussions. As noted by prominent Romani activist Nicolae 
Gheorghe  
“The lack of confrontation is also due to the fact that we who are educated and took the 
responsibility to portray ourselves as leaders – in the sense of influencing perceptions of 
Roma and about Roma – are clients or employees of foundations and international 
organizations, sometimes beneficiaries of affirmative action policies, so we are not 
political fighters. I see a clear need for confrontation among ourselves and I think we 
are not urging such possibilities enough.”
114
  
It is not the intention of this argument to criticize international institutions for taking 
initiatives, but to focus on the need for Roma political actors to further develop an 
independent voice that is not guided by international institutions and their member 
states. 
There is an additional difficulty with civil society not being viewed as an independent 
actor. In Serbia, specifically, there is considerable influence and intimidation on the part 
of nationalist parties concerning NGO activity and civil society development.  
International institutions are not always viewed as legitimate actors. Civil society 
activities are seen as a temporary intervention and superfluous, rather than a meaningful 
and integral part of the national political environment, influential in defining the state 
interest. The corrupt nature of Macedonian and Serbian political structures prevents the 
development of a thriving civil society that can influence political events and contribute 
to a tolerant and multicultural society.
115
  
As discussed by many NGO and international organization representatives, what is 
lacking on the part of international actors is long term strategy and vision. Too often 
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short term guidelines dictate Roma-related policies and programs that are changed 
frequently. The lack of monitoring and experience in the field is a major limitation of 
international organizations. The over-emphasis on paper work creates a very deceiving 
impression that Roma activism exists, but without implementation it ceases to be a 
social movement. As stated by a member of CARE International ―there are too many 




6.7 Conclusion  
This chapter has provided an overview of the main international initiatives on Roma 
inclusion. The Roma community historically ignored by international institutions 
became the focus of discussion within the European Commission and Council in 2007-
2008. The position of European institutions on the situation of Roma, however, has often 
remained vague and incoherent demonstrated in the use of ad-hoc policy instruments 
and disarticulation of a European Platform on Roma Inclusion. Furthermore, although 
European Commission reports evaluate and monitor EU candidate progress on minority 
protection, an inherent double standard is visible as often Member States do not promote 
the same humanitarian values.  The prospect of EU membership is utilized as the main 
compliance instrument to adopt ‗European values‘ in the remaining post-communist 
states. This, however, is not a very effective tool as while states may integrate 
conditionality reforms during the accession period, compliance deteriorates post-
membership, specifically concerning humanitarian reforms. 
In addition to compliance measures, the European Commission has funded various 
bodies within the CoE and OSCE to improve the situation of Roma communities. The 
ERTF, while the largest conglomerate of Romani organizations in Europe is not very 
influential in developing Roma inclusion policy due to the lack of professionalism and 
expertise among members. The CPRSI and ECHR have contributed significantly to the 
advancement of Roma rights. The former through the formulation of an Action Plan on 
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Improving the Situation of Roma and Sinti to which 55 participating states are 
signatories, as well as numerous projects implemented by OSCE field offices. The 
presentation of cases pertaining to racial violence and discrimination within the ECHR 
has provided further legitimacy to Roma concerns regarding government violations of 
their human rights. 
The internationalization of Roma advocacy has allowed for the transpiration of 
transnational advocacy networks, such as the EURoma Network that seeks to support the 
diffusion of Roma inclusion policies and enhance cooperation between government 
authorities and civil society. The dual impact of EU and NGO involvement has 
influenced domestic agendas on improving the situation of the Roma community. 
Substantial funding by the EU has enhanced the visibility of Roma activism at the 
national and international levels, but monetary contributions through initiatives such as 
the EU PHARE program and NGO projects have no demonstrable effect in Roma 
communities. Additionally, NGOs have provided information and monitored 
government implementation of Roma inclusion policies, without which the EU would 
not be able to effectively evaluate humanitarian reform in candidate states. However, 
states may only instrumentally adapt to international political obligations, engaging in 
rhetorical commitments, which does not allow for the institutionalization of 
humanitarian norms.  
Transnational advocacy networks as applied to the case of Roma inclusion in Macedonia 
and Serbia has only had limited success. Although NGOs and international organizations 
have formed strong links to influence domestic agendas, the lack of political will and 
institutional inertia in the respective states has not allowed for significant reforms. There 
are also many limitations to how international institutions contribute to building civil 
society in Eastern Europe; that would hopefully democratize closed political systems 
such as Macedonia and Serbia.  ‗Capacity building‘ and ‗small scale projects‘ are 
ineffective strategies to implementing integrated national and international programs that 
would have long term results in post-communist states. International institutions should 

































In concluding the thesis, it is important to revisit the initial aims and research questions 
of the project. Two main propositions were investigated to assess the divergent treatment 
of Roma communities in Macedonia and Serbia:  
1) Roma mobilization is likely to succeed when the domestic political opportunity 
structure is favourable  
2) A ‗closed‘ domestic political opportunity structure shifts the focus of Roma 
activism to the international level. 
In order to assess the effectiveness of Roma political activism in Macedonia and Serbia 
the following research questions were addressed: 
 How has the political opportunity structure in Macedonia and Serbia facilitated 
or constrained Roma advocacy? 
 
 Do institutional mechanisms exist at the domestic level to promote Roma 
inclusion? 
 
 Are Roma political parties and civil society actors coordinated in their actions to 
promote Roma issues? 
 
Regarding the transnational sphere, the following questions were relevant: 
 
 How has the internationalization of Roma advocacy affected movement activity? 
 
 What instruments are available to international institutions to guarantee state 
compliance on international obligations and are they effective? 
 
 How do international institutions and social movement actors (transnational 
advocacy networks) seek to influence and change Roma-related policy in 
Macedonia and Serbia?  
 
In order to analyze, explain and compare the relative level of Roma advocacy success, 
the following factors of political activism were utilized: 




 Level of institutional access 
 Usage of influential domestic and international allies 
In the following discussion, I will demonstrate how the case studies relate to the key 
concepts of brokerage, diffusion, and collective action. This will assist in comparing the 
various components of Roma mobilization. It is important to recapitulate what these 
concepts mean: Brokerage refers to the ―production of a new connection between 
previously unconnected sites.‖
1
 Diffusion is defined as the “spread of a form of 
contention, an issue, or a way of framing it from one site to another.”
2
 The mechanisms 
of brokerage and diffusion enable coordinated action defined as “two or more actors‟ 
engagement in mutual signalling and parallel making of claims on the same object.”
3
 
An upward scale shift refers to coordinated action at a higher level;
4
 that is, Roma 
activists and international institutions that seek to influence domestic Roma inclusion 
policy. Emulation occurs when structural conditions (internationalization and 
communication), social mechanisms (brokerage), and pathways (diffusion) are 
conducive to action.
5
   
Finally, it is important to discuss, in relation to the study‘s main findings, if Roma 
mobilization and political activism can be designated and understood as ‗coordinated 
action.‘ The concluding chapter also includes a discussion of potential directions for 
future research, focusing on the political activism of Romani women, and policy 
diffusion regarding Roma inclusion.   
The subsequent discussion will elaborate on the following conclusions: 
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 In regards to state repression/facilitation – Macedonia offers comparatively 
greater political stability and opportunities for democratic reform, specifically in 
regards to minority inclusion 
 In considering ‗institutional access,‘ Macedonia and Serbia have had limited 
success in promoting Roma inclusion initiatives within their respective state 
organizations 
 In regards to influential domestic and international allies, the coordination of 
civil society organizations and political party participation proved slightly better 
in Macedonia as compared to Serbia 
 Finally, this study expected to find that international advocacy would be a more 
successful avenue for Roma activists to pursue due to it being more open than 
the domestic context. However, the thesis‘ ‗surprising‘ finding points to how this 
was not the case. Roma activists appear to face the same type of challenges 
domestically, as well as internationally. 
Roma Political Activism: A Cross Case Comparison  
7.1 State repression/facilitation 
In the former Yugoslavia, distinctions between various national communities, rather 
than promoting the idea of ‗brotherhood and unity,‘ perpetuated an ethnically based 
hierarchy that has impacted contemporary minority relations. The Macedonian nation, 
prior to 1944 did not exist, but upon recognition was made equal to other republics. 
Historically and presently, the idea of a ‗Macedonian identity‘ has been contested. 
International recognition of Macedonian independence in 1991 was not easily attained; 
neighbouring states in the SEE region have consistently challenged its territorial 
sovereignty. However, the political and security situation in Macedonia is relatively 
stable. The 2009 presidential and municipal elections were peaceful, generally meeting 
international standards for democratic and transparent electoral procedures; leading to 
the victory of VMRO-DPMNE, a coalition of Macedonian, Albanian, and smaller 
minority parties. 
The Ohrid Framework Agreement (2001), approved by the international community, 




introducing significant public administration reforms. Furthermore, it stipulated specific 
minority rights in the areas of propositional representation and use of language. It 
favours larger minority communities by requiring a 20% threshold for territorial 
division. This provision, however, does not provide for the adequate representation of 
smaller minority communities, such as the Roma, which only represent a majority in 
Shuto Orizari. Implementation of the Ohrid Agreement remains limited, due to 
inadequate finances and human resources. Thus, the Decentralization Act promoted as a 
mechanism for greater citizen involvement in municipalities has not facilitated minority 
inclusion. Accordingly, Roma are not adequately represented in the public service and 
government structures – significant public administration reforms are required.  
Serbia as a former Yugoslav state, similarly promoted a hierarchical classification of 
ethnic groups within an ‗institutionalized multinational state system.‘ In the mid-1980s, 
ethnic conflict in the region intensified as nationalist fervour led to ideas of a ‗Greater 
Serbia.‘ In the early 1990s, political fragmentation along ethnic lines in the former 
Yugoslavia culminated in the outbreak of war. The Serbian national identity was 
reconstructed in opposition to other ‗enemy‘ Yugoslav nationalities by political leaders, 
intelligentsia, and the Orthodox Church; focusing on state securitization, and 
perpetuating violence. In regards to the Roma community, inter-ethnic relations were 
especially precarious in the Kosovo region.  
Political turbulence in Serbia has not facilitated a democratic transition. In the 1990s, 
nationalist, anti-Western parties continued to receive popular support; advocates of the 
Milosevic regime still had a pervasive presence in government structures. In 2003, 
Zoran Djindjic a proponent of democratic reforms was assassinated, mainly as a result of 
supporting the extradition of Milosevic to the Hague Tribunal in 2001. This 
consequently, led to further destabilization in the state. The 2000 election victory of the 
18 party DOS coalition had significant challenges; personal and political conflict among 
members provided for an unstable government. The December 2003 elections marked 
the end of the fragile DOS coalition and the promise for reforming an autocratic, quasi-




corruption, organized crime, ethnic conflict, weak coalition governments and 
government institutions, and a political culture of intolerance and undemocratic values.  
In comparing the political context in Macedonia and Serbia, it is evident that the former 
offers greater opportunities for democratic reform. Following the demise of the 
Milosevic government, Serbia has had numerous elections and political leaders, due to 
low voter turnout and lack of coalition building among minority political parties. In 
comparison, the political and security situation in Macedonia is more stable allowing for 
the government to focus on domestic and economic growth.  The discussion will 
proceed to compare institutional access, political party and civil society organization, as 
well as the role of international institutions in the respective states regarding Roma 
inclusion. 
7.2 Increased Institutional Access? 
In Macedonia, the offices of the Minister without Portfolio – Nezdat Mustafa (MP) and 
Ministry of Labour and Social Policy are the main government institutions implementing 
the national strategy and action plans in the context of the ‗Decade of Roma Inclusion 
(2005-2015).‘ As discussed previously, there is limited inter-departmental cooperation 
or „brokerage‟ between various government departments working on Roma inclusion. 
This prevents progress on initiatives for Roma communities. Romani government 
officials have not developed a collaborative approach to implementing the national 
strategy and action plans. Furthermore, the project-oriented approach to implementing 
Roma initiatives has short term effect and does not enable wider reforms necessary for 
substantive impact.  
An additional difficulty is the delegation of responsibility for Roma inclusion programs 
to Romani staff in government institutions. This practice supports the idea that only 
‗Roma should be responsible for Roma issues,‘ without the effective participation of 
‗ethnic Macedonians.‘ Problems within the Roma community are only discussed among 
Romani government employees; effectively excluded from high level decision making 




inclusion cover four priority areas (employment, health, housing, and education), each 
ministry does not have a representative that focuses on the specific situation of the Roma 
community. These challenges inhibit the mechanism of diffusion, as the idea of Roma 
inclusion and ways of seeking solutions to Roma marginalization are not addressed 
among ‗ethnic Macedonians.‘ The implementation of Roma inclusion policies is further 
limited by the racist and discriminatory attitudes of ethnic Macedonian staff in 
government institutions that perceive Roma as unprofessional and incompetent.  
In Serbia, the main government institutions concerned with Roma inclusion policies and 
programs are the National Council for Roma (Republic Council for National Minorities), 
Office for the Roma Decade League, Agency for Human and Minority Rights, and 
Secretariat for the Roma National Strategy. Similar to Macedonia, institutional reforms 
regarding the inclusion of Roma communities in Serbia have resulted from participating 
in the ‗Decade of Roma Inclusion,‘ and subsequently, the development of national 
strategies and action plans for Roma communities. Pro-Romani civil society 
organizations have criticized the National Council of Roma extensively, mentioning the 
difficulty of working with staff and exclusive membership criteria based on political 
party and interest group affiliations. Challenges also arise due to the general incoherence 
of national minority council functions and responsibilities. Furthermore, as national 
minority representatives are responsible for funding various Roma initiatives, 
monopolization has disallowed a participatory and democratic politics. Thus, the 
mechanism of „brokerage‟ has not transpired.  
There are many similarities in comparing the institutional structures for Roma inclusion 
in Macedonia and Serbia. Primarily, it is the limited cooperation or absence of 
„brokerage‟ between government bodies concerning Roma initiatives that have 
debilitated progress. It is also important to note that government officials working on 
Roma inclusion in both Macedonia and Serbia recognized the often unclear mandates 
and responsibilities of various government institutions that further constrained the 
effective implementation of the national strategy and action plans. Furthermore, personal 




have not led to a coordinated approach in implementing Roma inclusion initiatives. An 
additional difficulty is the monopolization of resources and information, as well as 
exclusive decision making promoted by Romani leaders in government institutions that 
does not lead to democratic representation and effective advocacy of the diverse 
problems within Romani communities. Thus, ineffective communication among Romani 
political leaders has led to the absence of „diffusion‟ within the relevant government 
departments. 
Some important differences were recognized in comparing government structures 
implementing Roma inclusion policies and programs.  In Macedonia and Serbia thus far, 
the institutionalization of Decade initiatives, limited funding and resources has not led to 
significant improvements in Roma communities. However, it should be mentioned that 
strategically locating the Secretariat for Implementation of the National Strategy in the 
Ministry of Human and Minority Rights in Serbia has enabled better communication 
with government departments. Comparatively, in Macedonia, as in other SEE countries, 
the creation of the Unit for Implementation of the National Strategy within the Ministry 
of Labour and Social Policy has not facilitated synergies with relevant government 
bodies, debilitating the mechanisms of brokerage and diffusion. It is important to 
acknowledge, however, that while the Secretariat for the Implementation of the Decade 
exists at the national level, Belgrade has yet to establish a Roma inclusion office 
providing services specifically for the Roma community. Additionally, academics and 
government officials noted the limited institutional cooperation among 
regional/national/local bodies on Roma inclusion in Serbia. Although national initiatives 
exist, discrimination among municipal authorities and lack of implementation at the 
local level seriously debilitate actions to improve the situation of the Roma community. 
In discussing Roma inclusion initiatives with government officials in Macedonia and 
Serbia, it was interesting to find that Romani personnel in Serbia were less likely to 
critically evaluate government actions. Romani government representatives in Serbia, in 
distinction to Macedonia, did not present an opinion concerning discrimination or racism 




Roma issues‘ in Serbia as well; however, there was no discussion of this bias during the 
course of the interviews. Instead, a rather optimistic opinion of government cooperation 
and communication was presented. One of the main limitations noted in Macedonia was 
the lack of a long term program structured approach that integrated Decade action plan 
activities within all government departments. It is uncertain, however, whether 
institutional developments in Serbia indicate there may be more effective coordination 
among the government agencies that should be involved with Roma inclusion initiatives. 
Thus, institutional access has only had limited success in Macedonia and Serbia – the 
absence of brokerage and diffusion has not led to „coordinated action‟ among relevant 
government bodies. 
7.3 Influential Allies for Roma Activism? (The Role of NGOs and 
Political Parties) 
Romani NGOs 
Many Roma NGOs in Serbia and Macedonia have focused on meeting the immediate 
humanitarian needs of the Roma community; implementing short term projects, rather 
than investing in the long term development of communities. Short-term strategies have 
consequently, led to limited improvements in the lives of Romani people. Romani 
NGOs, often in response to abstract ‗project proposal calls‘ by international 
organizations, engage in a diverse array of projects, rather than implementing ‗in-depth 
activities‘ in accordance with NGO capacities that are congruent with the interests of the 
Roma community. Roma NGOs need to construct an alternative political sphere that 
enables continuous engagement with state authorities and empowers marginalized 
communities.  
As conflict subsides in the SEE region, international funding for humanitarian issues 
will recede. It thus becomes increasingly important to coordinate, network and agree on 
a common platform; pooling resources and expertise to effectively advocate for Roma 
inclusion.  NGOs in the future will need to find alternative sources of funding, as there is 




organization representatives often mention the lack of organization, advocacy skills and 
professionalism among Romani NGOs in Macedonia and Serbia, resulting in the 
distribution of funds to non-Romani led NGOs. Although criticisms are not unwarranted, 
this characterization of Roma civil society perpetuates negative stigmatization of 
community leaders and activists, without reflecting on internal conflict among non-
Romani personnel in NGOs and international institutions.  
In Macedonia and Serbia, Roma students are increasingly employed in NGOs and 
international organizations that offer lucrative short-term contracts. This is an appealing 
offer as the transition to a market economy in post-communist states has resulted in high 
unemployment especially among recent graduates. However, there are many 
reservations with this approach, as a professor at the University of Novi Sad noted, 
several students frequently do not finish their academic studies, and while obtaining 
skills in project development will not have the necessary credentials to find long term 
employment in other industries. Furthermore, as Roma from the NGO sector are 
increasingly employed within government positions created to implement the national 
strategy and action plans in the context of the Decade of Roma Inclusion; it may be 
challenging to critically engage on issues of concern and lobby effectively.  
Although many limitations of the NGO sector have been discussed, it is necessary to 
recognize that some progress has been made through the involvement of Roma and pro-
Romani organizations. Without an NGO presence, supported by international 
organizations, there would be minimal activity on Roma inclusion, as Macedonian and 
Serbian government authorities have no interest or political will to improve the situation 
of the community. The above examples have demonstrated how new ‗sites of 
contention,‘ in the form of alliances with government authorities and international 
organizations, has facilitated Roma activism, but also presents challenges unless an 
alternative political space is created. Thus, the mechanism of „brokerage‟ is present. 
It is also important to take into consideration the political context in which Roma NGOs 




society‘ is novel. Government authorities do not always view NGOs as legitimate actors‘ 
integral in providing a critical perspective of state policy, thus enhancing democratic 
reforms. Often, and especially in Serbia, political parties intimidate civil society actors, 
or attempt to influence NGO activities. In the case of Macedonia, Roma political parties 
envious of NGO-international organization partnership have also attempted to take 
ownership of NGO activities, or actively tried to destroy organizations. There are some 
successful examples, however, of NGO activities, such as Sumnal in the Roma 
settlement of Topaana in Skopje, providing much needed assistance to school age 
children. Other examples of successful coordination and planning are RNVO 2002, an 
amalgamation of numerous NGOs working on issues such as discrimination, 
employment, housing and healthcare initiatives. Thus, while brokerage is present, 
diffusion and coordinated action has not transpired, as there is limited communication 
and consensus among pro-Romani civil society and political party representatives. 
Furthermore, the closed political opportunity structure in Macedonia and Serbia does not 
facilitate the effective participation of civil society organizations. 
The current decentralization process in Macedonia has devolved greater responsibility to 
municipalities. This may offer opportunities in the future for integrating Roma issues in 
local development initiatives. In Macedonia and Serbia, coordinators have been hired to 
enhance cooperation between Roma NGOs and the local government. Presently, many 
constraints recognized at the national level hinder progress on Roma inclusion at the 
local level, such as political party/NGO conflict, and corruption among councillors hired 
in Roma information centers. Specifically, effective leadership and greater community 
involvement could build Shuto Orizari, the world‘s largest Romani settlement into a 
thriving municipality. Similarly, in the case of Serbia, local coordinators are not familiar 
with problems in the Roma community, or lack knowledge of local politics and 
government structures. As noted by an employee within the provincial government of 
Vojvodina, Roma associations in local municipalities do not cooperate on initiatives, 




The model of decentralization as applied in neighbouring SEE countries under the 
direction of international organizations has not been very successful. In Serbia, 
currently, international organizations are taking piecemeal steps to reduce the number of 
negative consequences.  Institutions in Serbia as in other post-communist states are slow 
to implement reforms.
6
Local municipalities are confronted with a severe shortage of 
funding as national authorities have not taken into account the differences between local 
economies. Each municipality will receive the same percentage of national funding to 
implement programs and services placing an additional burden on local governments to 
raise funds within the municipality.
7
 In regards to the implementation of Roma-related 
programs, as noted previously, severe discrimination and inaction on the part of local 
authorities has led to minimal improvements concerning the situation of the Roma 
community. Decentralization is the key to ensuring that the National Strategy and Action 
Plans on Roma have an impact, as priority areas such as employment, health, education 
and housing are best addressed at the local level. However, as state funding to municipal 
governments decreases, local authorities are unlikely to find a source of funding to 
improve the situation of the Roma community.
8
 Thus, a closed domestic political 
opportunity structure, and the absence of brokerage and diffusion do not lead to positive 
outcomes for Roma activism within municipalities. 
There are many similarities in comparing the limitations of civil society organizations in 
Macedonia and Serbia. However, there are some important differences that should be 
mentioned. It is widely recognized among Roma politicians and activists that civil 
society organizations are well established in Macedonia and perhaps, as compared to 
other countries in the SEE region, the most effective and organized. It should be 
acknowledged, however, that in discussing Roma political activism in Serbia, conflict in 
the region (1990-1999) prevented any action on humanitarian issues. Thus, there has not 
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been extensive NGO activity on Roma inclusion in the state, and it is only quite recently 
that organizations have initiated programs. 
It is also important to take into account the debilitating effects on inter-ethnic relations 
in Serbia due to nationalist and discriminatory rhetoric perpetuated by the Milosevic 
regime. This was especially apparent in the Vojvodina region, which compared to other 
areas of Serbia, was historically portrayed as a tolerant, multi-ethnic society. As a result 
of state centralization, rescinding former areas of provincial autonomy, the Milosevic 
regime contributed to changing minority relations. It will take some time to engender 
peaceful reconciliation among the different minority communities, and subsequently, to 
provide institutional support through state-funded NGO projects. As noted previously, 
there have been some initiatives in this respect, through the Roma Inclusion Office in 
Novi Sad, Vojvodina, and Roma national minority boards. However, the situation of the 
Roma community, as in other regions of Serbia, remains precarious.  
Civil society organizations in the provisional state of Kosovo under the auspices of 
UNMIK, Serbian and Kosovo governments deserve special mention as advocacy for the 
Roma community has been very challenging in this region. There is no comparison to be 
made in relation to Macedonia, as the Roma community in Kosovo has suffered 
immensely as a result of Milosevic‘s intervention in the region, as well as the further 
politicization of minority relations subsequent to the conflict. International institutions 
have not supported the development of Romani civil society, rather efforts of the Roma, 
Ashkali, and Egyptian (RAE) minority to effectively participate in the political system 
and decision making bodies are constrained. Implementation of a ‗human rights 
approach‘ has at times exacerbated ethnic differences as international donors reinforce 
the divide among various political organizations. International funds have also 
contributed to increased tension between ethnic communities, specifically as Roma 
NGOs are thought to derive special benefits. Furthermore, Romani activists are often 
unable to effectively advocate for the community using the political language and 




Thus, in comparing the similarities and differences of Roma civil society organizations 
in Macedonia and Serbia, it can be surmised that due to the exceedingly repressive 
tactics employed by the Milosevic regime and consequently, the ramifications of the 
conflict on inter-ethnic relations in Serbia, specifically in the regions of Vojvodina and 
Kosovo, the establishment and coordination of pro-Romani civil society organizations in 
Macedonia was more effective as compared to the Serbian case.  
Although brokerage has presented some opportunities for Roma activism in Macedonia 
and Serbia, diffusion and coordinated action has not transpired. It is important to note 
that both mechanisms led to similar (negative) outcomes in the respective states.  
Additionally, in comparing the political opportunity structures in Macedonia and Serbia, 
it is evident that the former provided many challenges, debilitating civil society 
organization. It is also important to note that although international funding is decreasing 
in the SEE region, Macedonia may increasingly be eligible for EU structural funding; 
specifically for minority inclusion and Roma communities. Comparatively, Serbia is not 
in a similar position, as EU candidacy will not be forthcoming in the near future.  
Roma Political Parties 
In Macedonia, minority and Roma political parties generally form coalitions with 
VMRO-DPMNE. The Albanian-Macedonian political struggle has however, often led to 
the exclusion of other minority groups in the political process. Moreover, the absence of 
brokerage and diffusion has not led to coordinated action among Roma political parties. 
Specifically, personal conflict among Roma political parties has debilitated efforts to 
present a common political platform and effectively advocate on behalf of the Roma 
community. Fragmented political leadership and limited knowledge of community 
concerns do not allow for effective representation, and presents a weak public image. 
Generally, Roma political parties have limited financial and technical resources; 
difficulties are further compounded as leaders lack political knowledge and acumen. 
Constitutional recognition in Macedonia since 1991 has not improved the situation of 




national identity and territorial sovereignty, as neighbouring states have aggressively 
opposed the idea of an autonomous nation. The disintegration of Yugoslavia along 
ethnic lines, promoted an ‗ethnic party system‘ in many states, demanding the assertion 
of a strong public identity that Romani political parties have not represented. 
Furthermore, Roma political parties, as compared to those of the Albanian minority have 
not used the Ohrid Framework Agreement to advocate for additional political rights, 
perpetuating the idea that Roma are easy allies for ethnic Macedonian political parties to 
utilize. Although the Roma community is often the decisive factor in determining the 
election outcome between VMRO-DPMNE and SDSM, Roma political parties have not 
used this as a bargaining tool to gain concessions. Thus, while a connection has formed 
between mainstream and Roma political parties in Macedonia, diffusion has not 
transpired, or more specifically, framing the issue of Roma votes to negotiate further 
political rights, and reduce inequalities in Roma communities. 
In comparing the abilities of Roma political parties to advocate effectively, there are 
many similarities in Macedonia and Serbia. Many interviewees in Serbia noted the lack 
of effective organization, financial, and professional capacities within Roma political 
parties. Personal conflicts among Roma political leaders, often in public political 
spheres, demonstrated their limited cooperation, which similar to the Macedonian case, 
does not enable effective representation or the negotiation of concessions from 
mainstream parties. Thus, the occurrence of brokerage – realization of a ‗new site of 
contention‘ between mainstream and Roma political parties did not lead to mechanisms 
of diffusion and coordinated action, as Roma political leaders were not able to capitalize 
on Roma votes or present a common platform. 
There are many important differences, however, in comparing Roma political 
representation in Macedonia and Serbia. Primarily, the new election law introduced in 
Serbia in 2008, presented many technical and financial difficulties for minority political 
parties, not enabling democratic participation. In addition, Roma politicians and 
international organization representatives have criticized mainstream political parties in 




2009 OSCE-ODIHR election reports noted fair election proceedings in various ethnic 
communities.  It is important to note, as stated by Vitomir Mihaljovic (MP) Roma Social 
Democratic Party, that although Roma political parties have not coordinated their efforts 
to advocate on behalf of the Roma community, one of the main limitations for effective 
political representation and participation is the repressive tactics of mainstream political 
parties in Serbia.  
It is also important to discuss the cases of Roma political representation in Kosovo and 
Vojvodina, as special circumstances in the two regions required further discussion. In 
Kosovo, the intervention of the international community has not been conducive to the 
representation of the RAE community during final status negotiations, regarding 
political party leadership or as previously discussed, Roma civil society organizations. 
As stated by Roma activists, internationals have supported only one Roma politician 
representing the United Roma Party of Kosovo (PREBK), without constituency support 
who has not promoted the equal representation of community members in public 
administrative roles or decision making bodies. In the case of Vojvodina, Roma activists 
and academics criticized the undemocratic actions of the Roma Inclusion Office, 
mentioning that the department head as a participating member of parliament for the 
Democratic Party (DS) has often accredited Roma inclusion initiatives to the party, 
which have been the initiatives of individual activists and NGOs in the region. The 
Roma Inclusion Office has been criticized for promoting a specific party ideology, and 
funding of NGO projects is not a transparent process.  
The occurrence of brokerage and absence of diffusion led to similar (negative) outcomes 
in Macedonia and Serbia. That is, the lack of coordinated action among Roma political 
parties in presenting a common platform and negotiating with mainstream Macedonian 
and Serbian political parties. As the mechanisms of political activism have a similar 
outcome in the respective states, it becomes apparent that the domestic political 
opportunity structure in Serbia as compared to the Macedonian case, presents additional 




As discussed previously, fragmentation along ethnic lines in the former Yugoslavia 
created an upsurge of nationalism that has not been conducive to promoting a multi-
ethnic and tolerant society. Many Roma political leaders and activists are of the opinion 
that repressive tactics challenging minority representation are a remnant of the Milosevic 
period that promoted nationalism and discrimination in Serbian politics. It is also evident 
as discussed in the introductory chapter, that while the Roma community attained 
limited social mobility during the Communist period, there were very few examples of 
political participation for minority communities in the former Yugoslavia; mainly, as a 
result of general ethnic identity suppression. Thus, while Macedonia is one the few 
Yugoslav nations that has recognized Roma as an ‗ethnic community‘ in the 
constitution, the Albanian-Macedonian rivalry, as well as the lack of consensus among 
Roma political parties has consequently, not led to effective political representation and 
advocacy on behalf of the community. In comparing the situation of Roma political 
parties in Macedonia and Serbia, however, it is the conclusion of this study that 
Milosevic‘s legacy, repressive election laws, and the often undemocratic actions of 
mainstream political parties have been excessively debilitating to effective Roma 
political participation. Thus, presently, the Macedonian political opportunity structure 
provides slightly better possibilities for minority inclusion. 
In suggesting reforms to improve Romani political participation, Roma politicians in 
Serbia mentioned the need to set up a forum to mobilize Roma political parties, pro-
Romani NGOs, and intellectuals that are involved in the emancipation of Roma 
communities. It was emphasized that those participating in the forum should not 
promote their political affiliation; rather it should be a ‗transparent process‘ with a 
specific agenda and democratic election to important bodies. It was recognized in 
Macedonia and Serbia, that the mainstream political parties did not have an agenda for 
vulnerable groups. It was also acknowledged that Roma political party coalitions with 
mainstream ethnic Macedonian and Serbian political parties were not effective. In order 
for political parties to effectively advocate for the Roma community, it was essential to 




from varying socio-economic, cultural and national backgrounds. Most importantly, it 
was noted that Roma political leaders had to agree on a common political platform, only 
then could a difference be made.9  
7.4 Transnational Advocacy and Roma Mobilization 
Are Transnational Advocacy Networks Effective in Promoting Roma Mobilization? 
This chapter discusses the effectiveness of ‗transnational advocacy networks,‘ 
facilitating access to domestic political arenas by creating links between civil society 
and international organizations. As noted previously, transnational advocacy networks 
predominately appear regarding issues where: 
1) the linkages between domestic groups and governments are restricted or when 
communication paths are ineffective for conflict resolution 
2) activists believe that networking will strengthen social movement campaigns and 
further promote the issue  





Three main mechanisms were noted in order to analyze the internationalization of Roma 
mobilization: diffusion, scale shift, and emulation. In this regard, it is useful to 
differentiate between relational and mediated diffusion. Relational diffusion refers to 
―emulation of new forms of contention on the part of actors with pre-existing 
relationships of trust, intimacy, or regular communication.‖
11
 Mediated diffusion is 
defined as the ―emulation of new forms of contention on the part of actors with no pre-
existing ties to those who have initiated those forms through intervention of third parties 
who maintain relationships of trust with both initiators and adapters.‖
12
 Scale shift as 
described earlier refers to coordinated action at a higher level than its initiation, and 
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involves new actors and institutions.
13
 Emulation is defined as the ability of multiple 
actors to adopt similar ideas and practices leading to greater influence and dissemination 
of protest goals. Moreover, emulation occurs when structural conditions 




Chapters four and five demonstrated how the political opportunity structure in 
Macedonia and Serbia is closed, presenting various challenges for Roma activists. The 
factors of political activism (state repression/facilitation, institutional access, civil 
society organizations, and political parties) described why Roma mobilization has not 
been successful at the domestic level.  Roma activists were thus required to circumvent 
the state and organize at the international level – forming alliances with the European 
Union and affiliated organizations to influence domestic policy on Roma inclusion. This 
process subsequently leads to the formation of ‗transnational advocacy networks.‘   
As described in chapters four and five, there is limited cooperation among pro-Romani 
civil society organizations and political parties. In addition, there is minimal cooperation 
between various government departments working on Roma inclusion. Thus, relational 
diffusion has not transpired, as various domestic actors are not able to network and agree 
on a common platform. Relational diffusion is further complicated as the closed 
domestic political opportunity structure presents activists with many challenges for 
political and public participation. Rather, mediated diffusion – the emulation of new 
forms of contention has occurred with the support and participation of third parties (such 
as the EU, OSCE, and COE) that attempt to coordinate Roma activists and politicians, 
Western NGOs and government authorities. For example, advocacy networks supported 
the substantial funding of Roma inclusion projects and national offices. NGOs, in turn, 
supported EU initiatives by providing information about Roma communities and 
monitoring progress in candidate countries. Developments at the regional level, for 
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instance, the participation of Roma NGOs in Hungary, Romania etc. have been integral 
to highlighting Roma issues at the EU level.  
Although the ‗international opportunity structure‘ as described through the various 
actions and policies of international institutions in chapter six is more ‗open‘ to Roma 
claims-making, it has not been very effective in influencing domestic policy and 
programs on Roma inclusion. The European Union has attempted to influence Roma 
inclusion policy at the domestic level through various conditionality measures. This has 
not been effective, however, as instrumental adaptation does not impact domestic norms 
on Roma inclusion.  
The incoherence of EU minority inclusion policy and the actions of Member States 
inhibit a legitimate basis for accession conditions in states such as Macedonia and 
Serbia. The EU as an international actor lacks consensus on Roma inclusion, as 
demonstrated by the often repressive tactics employed by EU member states, such as 
Romania and France.  As EU accession and member states have not institutionalized 
suggested political and humanitarian reforms, there has been minimal activity on Roma-
related policies and programs, leading to ‗general inertia.‘ However, international 
attention and ‗commitment‘ to the development of various policies and programs has 
provided Roma activists with the relevant tools to advocate for inclusion in European 
governments and society. European states are effectively ‗entrapped‘ by the discourse on 
minority and Roma inclusion.  
In regards to Roma activism, a „downward scale shift‟ has not enabled coordinated 
action at a more local level than its initiation. Rather, an „upward scale shift‟ involving 
coordination of collective action at a higher level (national, regional, international) has 
occurred, moving contention beyond its local origins, integrating the interests and values 
of new actors.15 By providing information to the EU and other international agencies, 
activists‘ goals were absorbed by international institutions and programs. This shift of 
focus has debilitated Roma advocacy.  
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International organizations while integral to highlighting Roma issues on domestic 
agendas, have promoted an elite-driven activism.  Often local Roma NGOs are merely 
viewed as implementing partners, with minimal participation in decision making 
processes. Additionally, many international organizations adopt a top-down approach, 
implementing vague project proposals without taking into account the political context 
or community interests, preventing a participatory politics emerging. Civil society 
development viewed as a short-term, externally driven process does not allow for 
community involvement, or the creation of an alternative political space, necessary to 
promote effective opposition to state policies.  At times, the international community has 
adopted a ‗one size fits all‘ policy that generally applied to all ethnic groups in the state 
– this has many consequences, and as noted by the director of OSI Roma Education ―we 
are losing money, time, energy, and people‘s lives,‖ by continuing within this frame of 
reference.
16
   
The „upward scale shift,‟ has promoted the institutionalization of Roma advocacy. Thus, 
according to Kriesi, the institutionalization of a movement organization results in the 
formalization of a SMOs internal structure, moderation of its goals, adoption of a more 
conventional action repertoire and integration into established systems of government. 
Institutionalization involves a shift from the direct participation of a movement‘s 
constituency to delegation to professional organizers. Thus, the possibility of 
commercialization becomes apparent, that is the transformation of a movement 
organization in the direction of a service organization.17 As argued by Trehan, the 
‗NGOization of human rights‘ has not led to the emergence of an independent voice 
among Roma communities in Europe.18 The promotion of neo-liberal values and the 
‗human rights approach,‘ as advocated by international institutions in post-communist 
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states, may have diminished the opportunities for informal activism among Roma 
communities that may have resulted in a more transformative politics. 
In analyzing diffusion and scale shift as integral mechanisms of transnational advocacy 
networks – it becomes obvious that emulation will not be an outcome. Although the 
international opportunity structure is more ‗open‘ as compared to the political 
opportunity structure in Macedonia and Serbia, political and humanitarian norms in 
regards to Roma inclusion have not been institutionalized by accession or Member 
States within the European Union. Moreover, conditionality measures have only 
influenced domestic Roma inclusion policy in an instrumental fashion. The EU‘s 
ambiguous minority protection policy has not led to clear indicators to evaluate 
accession state progress on conditionality requirements. Moreover, while European 
Commission progress reports criticize candidate states‘ non-ratification of documents 
such as the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (FCNM), 
there is an inherent ‗double standard‘ as many EU Member States have not ratified the 
document. In addition, studies have demonstrated that while the EU may exert influence 
during the accession process, compliance is difficult after state membership, specifically 
within the political sphere. The domestic consequences of obtaining EU membership are 
often too high; thus, norm socialization processes are not influential when considering 
ramifications such as unfavourable public opinion and electoral defeat at the national 
level. Thus, while brokerage has enabled new sites of contention – connecting Roma 
activists and EU institutions, the structural conditions for emulation to occur are largely 
absent. 
The mechanism of mediated diffusion has supported networking among pro-Romani 
NGOs, government authorities and international institutions. Mediated diffusion has 
enabled the construction of a ‗cognitive frame‘ that supports a better understanding of 
Roma mobilization. Re-framing Roma problems as a ‗human rights issue,‘ has directed 
attention to impoverishment within Roma communities, as well as reconceptualising the 
Roma identity as an oppressed underclass.  However, the absence of relational diffusion 




domestic level, as well as the coordination of Roma political activism at the international 
level (upward scale shift) has not led to emulation.  
In addition to many of the political and social challenges discussed, one of the main 
obstacles to realizing contention at a local level (downward scale shift) is the limited 
cooption of the general Roma populace in Macedonia and Serbia as participants fear 
repression by authorities. In relation to Roma in South Eastern Europe, historical and 
ethnically based repression by majority groups can dissuade potential participants from 
protesting. As stated by Keck and Sikkink, one of the most important features of 
network issues is their inability to sustain mass mobilization. Thus, the problematic of 
constituent mobilization is one reason for the prevalence of advocacy lobbying tactics in 
lieu of mass mobilization campaigns.19  
While the mechanism of mediated diffusion is present; upward scale shift, limited 
structural conditions and the absence of relational diffusion did not lead to emulation – 
that is, the process of multiple actors adopting similar ideas and practices to influence 
Roma inclusion policy and disseminate protest goals.  It is thus, the main finding of this 
study that while opportunities exist at the international level for Roma advocacy; 
transnational advocacy networks are not effective in influencing domestic policies on 
Roma inclusion. 
7.5 Roma mobilization: Coordinated action? 
In seeking to provide a conclusive summary of Roma political activism in Macedonia 
and Serbia, it is useful to recall the definition of coordinated action as ―two or more 
actors‟ engagement in mutual signalling and parallel making of claims on the same 
object.‖
20
 The above discussion noted that in regards to institutional access, Macedonia 
and Serbia were both limited in facilitating Roma claims. Despite various institutional 
arrangements in government agencies; developing national strategies and action plans 
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resulted in limited progress on Roma inclusion initiatives. This was primarily due to 
limited cooperation between government bodies, minimal funding for Roma inclusion 
initiatives, unclear mandates and responsibilities in implementing Roma inclusion 
policy, lack of a long term strategy, personal conflict and differing political ideologies 
among Roma government officials, as well as the monopolization of resources and 
information by some Romani politicians. The absence of brokerage and diffusion did not 
lead to coordinated action among relevant government bodies. 
Regarding Roma civil society organizations in Macedonia and Serbia, NGOs have 
frequently focused on short term strategies having minimal effect on improving the 
situation in Roma communities. There is also limited coordination and networking 
among Roma NGOs. Competition between them does not facilitate effective advocacy 
or support resource mobilization. Other difficulties include the repressive political 
context in which Roma NGOs are expected to perform, as civil society organizations are 
not always viewed as legitimate actors. At times, political parties in Macedonia and 
Serbia have attempted to sabotage NGO activities. Without the involvement of pro-
Roma and Roma NGOs, however, there would be minimal activity on Roma inclusion at 
the national level, as state authorities lack interest and political will.  Although 
brokerage presented some opportunities for Roma activism in Macedonia and Serbia, 
diffusion and coordinated action did not transpire. Taking into account the ramifications 
of inter-ethnic conflict on community relations in Vojvodina and Kosovo, it was 
surmised that the political opportunity structure in Serbia provided additional challenges 
for civil society organization. Thus, civil society development and coordination is more 
effective in Macedonia in distinction to Serbia. 
Concerning Roma political parties, mobilization efforts have not been effective, as 
disunity and personal conflict fragment Romani leadership. There are limited 
organizational, financial and professional competences within Roma political parties 
debilitating efforts to mobilize the Roma community and advocate effectively. In 
discussing alliance formation, Lipsky conceives of protest activity as a ‗bargaining 




other actors to bargain with the protest group, as there are limited political resources to 
trade.
21
 As noted previously, mainstream parties in Macedonia and Serbia often require 
the Romani vote in order to ensure electoral success. However, Roma political parties 
have not utilized constituency support to gain concessions. In the particular case of 
Serbia, it is important to consider the repressive tactics of mainstream parties that 
practice ‗vote buying‘ in Roma communities, thus debilitating the political participation 
of Roma representatives. In general, according to Roma activists and politicians, 
Milosevic‘s legacy on inter-ethnic relations in Serbia, has consequently prevented the 
effective participation of minority parties in Serbian politics. The occurrence of 
brokerage and absence of diffusion led to similar (negative) outcomes in Macedonia and 
Serbia. Roma political parties were not coordinated in presenting a common platform 
and negotiating with mainstream Macedonian and Serbian political parties. It was 
concluded, however, that Macedonia, in regards to political representation, offered a 
slightly ‗more open‘ opportunity structure in comparison to Serbia.  
In regards to international allies for Roma mobilization, transnational advocacy 
networks have facilitated the ability of Roma activists in Macedonia and Serbia to 
highlight the precarious situation of Roma communities on domestic and international 
agendas. Although international institutions and NGOs have been essential in 
conducting research and compiling reports on discrimination and socio-economic 
inequalities regarding the Roma community, it is questionable if the international 
community has made a concerted effort to comprehensively address Roma inclusion in 
Eastern Europe. International organizations have expended considerable monetary 
resources on Roma inclusion. In the 1990s, an estimated 100 million € supported the 
development of NGO projects, and Roma inclusion offices in national government 
institutions. These activities however, have not been effective – as domestic rhetoric, 
short term projects, and an incoherent EU minority protection policy often lead to 
minimal progress on Roma issues.  The mechanism of mediated diffusion has supported 
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networking among pro-Romani NGOs, government authorities and international 
institutions. However, the absence of relational diffusion – limited communication 
among pro-Romani activists and politicians at the domestic level, as well as the 
coordination of Roma advocacy at the international level (upward scale shift) has not led 
to emulation.  
In comparing institutional access, political parties, civil society organizations and the 
role of transnational advocacy networks in Macedonia and Serbia, it is the conclusion of 
this study that Roma activism has not led to coordinated action. Furthermore, it is 
important to emphasize the while brokerage, diffusion, and emulation led to similar 
(negative) outcomes in Macedonia and Serbia, it is the closed political opportunity 
structure in Serbia that presents additional challenges for Roma activism, and 
subsequently led to the conclusion that Macedonia offers slightly better opportunities for 
coordinated action.  While Roma have been effective in establishing organizations and 
networks, recruiting participants, and coordinating public meetings and demonstrations, 
– the actions of Roma activists and politicians have not presented a sustained challenge 
to power holders in Macedonia and Serbia. As stated by prominent Romani activist 
Nicolae Gheorghe  
“Roma are still taking a rather comfortable approach to politics, and this is a criticism 
not only to my generation but also to the next generation as well. We still tend to believe 
that rights are granted somehow mechanically by laws and policy documents. After 15-
20 years of such "resolution-driven" Romani activism, we could learn that the adoption 
of such documents, while useful, is far from being enough.”22 
 According to Gheorghe and other leading Romani activists, Roma organizations are not 
yet a ‗social movement.‘ The activist noted 
 “we don't have enough followers because the discussion about Roma issues takes place 
among ourselves, Roma activists, and to tell you frankly, I see a serious, even widening 
disconnection between us, the „clubs‟ of Romani (national and international) political 
elite and the Romani communities in each country and in the world Romani Diaspora. It 
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is a reminder that we may generate a movement only if we manage to find ideological 
tools and messages to capture the feelings, the interests and the social imagination of 
the population in the grass-roots Roma communities and/or in the general public (as, for 
example, various groups of mainstream human rights activists).”
23
 
Research Directions for the Future 
Romani Women Activism 
In conducting research on Roma activism, it was readily apparent that women were not 
well represented as political actors. While the thesis generally focused on the 
effectiveness of Romani activism in Macedonia and Serbia, an important aspect to 
include in the future, as Romani women‘s activism progresses, are their mobilization 
efforts at the domestic and international levels. As recognized by Oprea, when prominent 
Roma activists are mentioned, there is no acknowledgment of the notable and 
groundbreaking work of female Romani activists in the sphere of international, national 
and Romani politics. Often the gender dimension is not discussed in international and 
national discourses on Roma exclusion. There are considerable difficulties in ‗becoming‘ 
an activist as a Romani woman, but also in contributing to NGO activities as frequently 
their work is defined as peripheral to ‗mainstream Romani issues.‘ By advocating for 
women‘s rights, it often means challenging the hierarchical relationships within their 
families and communities, or disconnecting from loved ones. Romani women are often 
conflicted with presenting a ‗united front‘ in challenging racism and discrimination, 
limiting their ability to discuss inequalities in their community. In order to participate in 
the ‗Roma movement‘ Romani women must frequently choose to marginalize gender 
issues in a racist society, consequently suppressing their exclusion in their own 
communities. In addition, although female Romani staff are present in Roma 
organizations – they often do not participate as leaders. Furthermore, as Oprea argues, 
western feminist discourse has generally ignored Romani women as significant political 
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Initiatives by Romani women activists to discuss the inter-relationship of gender, racism 
and exclusion were considered by Romani men as a challenge to their leadership and 
dominance – an opposition to patriarchal community structures. Frequently, it is quite 
difficult for Romani women activists, to defy traditional norms. Many women in the 
Roma community are silent voices, and do not consider interrogating patriarchal 
structures and relations. At times, the activism of Romani women is viewed as an 
exaggeration, thus as stated by one conference participant ―women‘s rights are an excuse 
by women who are unable to express themselves in other ways. I do not think that 
anyone has the right to interfere with the life of a family.‖25 As a NGO representative 
and Romani women‘s rights activist commented ―this was one of our challenges: to try 
to find the real way to deal with Roma women‘s issues without attacking frontally the 
patriarchal structure of Roma families and communities.‖26
  
Presently, as the issue of Romani women is increasingly discussed in international and 
domestic policy arenas, there is the criticism that analyzing the particular exclusion of 
Romani women on the basis of race and gender, excludes Romani men from European 
policy discourse. This is an interesting suggestion as Romani women activists often have 
to contend with the dilemma of criticizing patriarchal community structures, without 
supporting negative stereotypes of Roma.
27
 Similarly, Oprea argues that Romani women 
activists have been criticized for negatively portraying ‗Roma culture;‘ reinforcing the 
Western perception of the Roma community as ‗backwards,‘ and ‗primitive.‘ However, 
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as Oprea argues, it is important to interrogate patriarchal structures as a ‗natural‘ 
element of the Romani culture. 
Although international institutions have focused on Roma rights, the specific violations 
of Romani women‘s rights have remained inadequately addressed. International 
discourse concerning discrimination and racially motivated violence has not included a 
discussion of domestic violence, trafficking and gender discrimination in Roma 
communities. In general, there are very few studies on Romani women in Eastern 
Europe. Access to limited information is further complicated by the reluctance of the 
Roma community to discuss issues within the ‗private sphere,‘ regarding gender and 
sexuality.  
In analyzing the Decade Action plans on housing, employment, health and education, 
Oprea acutely recognizes the omission of gender based inequalities within Roma 
communities as a priority concern.  A comprehensive overview is required to analyze 
the impact of various issues on Romani men and women. Specifically, in relation to 
women, there is no acknowledgment of issues such as premature marriage, virginity 
tests, domestic violence, prostitution, and access to birth control. The Action Plans 
although referring to inequalities in education and employment, fail to address the 
particular role of patriarchal structures that undermine Romani women‘s access to 
education or employment. While many of the Decade Action Plans have mentioned in 
the final paragraph that priority areas should be considered in relation to gender issues, 
there are no specific goals or indicators that would measure specific strategies for gender 
equality. Many of the national action plans, by only referring to the overall inequalities, 
obscure the multi-faceted discrimination of Romani women.
28
 
Policy Diffusion and Roma Inclusion 
This study has utilized the literature on social movements to examine the domestic and 
international factors impacting Roma mobilization. Transnational advocacy networks 
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enabled an analysis of the inter-relationship between states, NGOs, and international 
organizations, demonstrating that international influence has not led to significant 
domestic reforms in Macedonia and Serbia. Research in the future could be expanded to 
analyze the policy mechanisms of international organizations to influence domestic 
policies and action on Roma inclusion. 
Research studies on the policy diffusion process have demonstrated the arbitrary nature 
of policy making. Policy leaders do not always engage in a systematic, logical 
assessment of external models in the international arena. In an influential study on the 
policy diffusion process concerning pension privatization in Latin America, Weyland 
refers to cognitive psychology studies that discuss the use of ‗inferential short cuts‘ to 
facilitate the analysis of extensive information and avoidance of uncertainty. Hence, the 
abundance of information available dissuades individuals from actively searching for 
alternative models, although a rational approach would suggest otherwise. 
Consequently, drawing inferences and filtering information allows for analytical bias 
that impacts the quality of decision making.
29
 The following discussion will focus on the 
diffusion mechanisms that impact adoption of a particular policy in a country and 
provide further clarification on how domestic and international actors interact to 
influence the policy process in a state. 
 
An important aspect of the study on policy diffusion regarding Roma inclusion could 
include an analysis of coercive diffusion, analyzing how powerful nations can influence 
policy preferences in weaker countries by exerting control through international and 
nongovernmental organizations; manoeuvring which opportunities and constraints are 
available. To initiate policy reform in the target country, coercive measures may include 
the controlling of information/expertise, as well as the availability of financial resources.  
Dominant countries take advantage of power asymmetries to enforce their policy choices 
on weaker nations, assuming that without external influence target countries would resist 
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policy reform. The willingness and ability of the powerful actor to manipulate the 




Additionally, learning and emulation mechanisms could provide alternative theoretical 
explanations. In reference to ‗learning,‘ Hass refers to the creation of social knowledge 
as ‗the sum of technical information and of theories about that information which 
commands sufficient consensus at a given time among interested actors to serve as a 
guide to public policy designed to achieve some social goal.‘
31
 Knowledge diffusion 
among ‗epistemic communities‘ regarding effective policies is especially influential in 
the learning process. This mechanism involves common communication networks that 
support ‗policy innovation,‘ and the frequency of contact among elites impacts policy 
diffusion. In this regard, international organizations provide the space to exchange ideas, 
persuade, negotiate and influence policy transmission. Generally, the probability of 
policy reform domestically is influenced by the evidence of achievements or limitations 
in comparable countries.
32
 In regards to emulation mechanism, policy analysts speculate 
on „best practices‟ concerning specific issues, but are not always able to evaluate which 
policy is most effective. This perspective on policy diffusion suggests that ―theory and 
rhetoric often serve as the basis of decision making. But theory and rhetoric change over 
time, and as they do, social meaning is constructed and reconstructed. Thus, the same 
policies can have different meaning over time.‖
33 Ideas concerning which policy players 
are involved, and subsequent actions, especially concerning human rights have diffused 
globally. Countries often sign international declarations to support humanitarian norms, 
although various organizations demonstrate on-going rights violations in those areas. 
Thus, adopting global norms may serve a symbolic purpose, although countries are not 
able to implement them (i.e. due to resource and capacity limitations). For advocates of 
the emulation approach, how policies are adopted as social norms is important to 
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analyzing their diffusion. Similar to the learning process mentioned above, ‗epistemic 
communities‘ consisting of academics and NGO representatives can promote a policy 
and provide an ‗objective‘ evaluation. Experts can support governments in finding 
solutions, but also in defining problems.
34
 It may be difficult to evaluate the mutually 
inclusive mechanisms of coercion and emulation when analyzing the impact of dominant 
countries. 
Concepts within the policy diffusion literature allow for greater comprehension in 
analyzing the process of norm internationalization and the concurrent adoption and 
adaptation of Roma-related policies in Macedonia and Serbia.  However, scholars of 
policy diffusion have not yet developed a comprehensive framework and many concepts 
are based on generic assumptions. For instance, the influence of coercion, learning, 
competition, and emulation mechanisms is not viewed as variable, dependent on the type 
of government and political context. The model also assumes that each mechanism has 
equal value in influencing policy adoption; it is questionable, for instance if learning and 
coercion have comparable impact. It is likely multiple mechanisms of policy diffusion 
are shaping policy adoption in a country.
35
It is also important to take into account 
domestic context and how this impacts policy diffusion. Ideological preferences and 
perceived political opposition or approval influence how political actors expedite and 
adopt policies. ‗Best practices‘ incompatible with domestic ideologies, electoral success 
or legislative approval are unlikely to be adopted. Thus, it is essential to understand how 
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Interview Questions – 
Questions for State Departments 
 
1) When was the National Strategy Secretariat created? Are there any other government 
agencies/departments that are specifically related to minority and Roma groups? 
 
2) Which action plans/legislation exist specifically relevant to Roma populations? 
 
3) What measures does the action plan/legislation include that is relevant for Roma 
populations? 
 Combating racism and discrimination 
 Social rights (adequate housing, living conditions, access to health 
care) 
 Economic rights (access to employment) 
 Education policies 
 Participation in public and political life (i.e. voting rights) 
 
4) Does anti-discrimination law exist? 
a) Which areas of discrimination are included? Does it cover specific                                                                                                                                                                
segments (housing, employment) or does it cover all spheres of life?  
b)  Is the establishment of a specialized body included in the law? 
 
5) How often is the action plan/legislation reviewed? 
6) Does a specialized office exist to oversee implementation of the Action/Plan 
legislation? 
7) Does an independent support structure that includes Roma exist (Ombudsman, 
specialized body, human rights institution)? 
8) What mechanisms have been established at the national level to implement the 
action plan/legislation at the local level? And to promote accountability of local 
authorities to citizens belonging to the Roma community?  
9) How is the action plan/legislation monitored? 
10)  Are there any effective policy measures to recommend as ‗good practices‘ regarding 
the Roma community? 







Roma- Majority Relations: 
12)  Has the department conducted any surveys among the national populace concerning 
their opinion of minorities and Roma in particular? 
13)  Do any integration/multicultural educational programs exist to promote inter-ethnic 
tolerance? 
 
International influence on domestic policy: 
14)  Has international policy on human rights impacted the formulation of legislation or 
policy/programs on Roma? 
15)  Has the state increased program funding, commissioned studies, or created 
consultative bodies to respond to increasing concerns of the Roma population? 
 
State-Roma, IO coalition building: 
15) Which NGOs are working on Roma – related strategies in the country? 
16) Has there been any state-NGO cooperation regarding the formulation and 
implementation of Roma – related policy and programs? 
17) Have state departments concerning minority affairs contacted or developed 
policy/programs with international organizations? 
 
Questions for Roma NGOs 
1) Does the NGO have accessibility to state authorities dealing with minority 
affairs? (Has the political system been conducive to Roma asserting their 
claims)? 
2) Does the state make available funds for Roma NGO programs? 
3) Has the state initiated any educational initiatives concerning the Roma 
community? 
4) Does the mainstream education curriculum include anti-racism, diversity 
programs? 
5) Do Roma based NGOs network with other human rights NGOs, Roma initiatives 
in other states? And does this influence NGO program 
formulation/implementation? 
6) Have there been any coalitions/alliances with religious groups, domestic NGOs, 
or other minority groups to promote Roma issues? 
7) Have international organizations supported Roma activism? By making funds 
available? Coalition building with other Roma NGOs/activists? Or setting up 




8) As Serbia seeks membership in international organizations such as the EU, has 
this benefited the community (greater publicity for the Roma issue, more 
resources for programs)? 
9) Is there a wide gap between NGO activity/programs and impact on the Roma 
population? 
10) Do the existing state policy/programs on Roma have an impact on the 
community? 
11) Have Roma protest activities/reports/discussions with state authorities had any 
impact on minority rights in Serbia/Macedonia? 
12) What challenges and limitations does the NGO encounter? 
13) Do NGOs and individual activists share the same concerns/issues or are there 
differences among activists within the Roma community as how to advance 
Roma issues? 
14) Has Roma NGO/activism and international attention improved the situation of 
the community? 
15) What contesting/opposing groups exist that may counter NGO 
activities/strategies? 
16) Has there been any survey/report conducted on how the mainstream population 
views the Roma community? 
17) Has the Roma community been reactive to increasing nationalism, xenophobia, 
racism in the country? 
18) Has the media contributed to promoting a positive view of the community or has 
it enticed anti-Roma sentiment? 
19) Has the issue of Roma refugees in the country impacted how the community is 
viewed by the general population? (i.e. greater discrimination) 
20) Have processes of democratization, transition to a market economy hindered 
Roma integration, mobility and access to basic services? 
21) Roma activism has only recently had a platform at the international level, to what 
extent has activism existed locally (from 1989-present)? 
22) Has there been any leadership in the Roma community? 
23) Has state identification of ‗Roma‘ as a minority changed their status? 
24) Has there been construction of a Roma identity in the country?  
 
Questions for International Organizations 
1. How has (name of organization) been supportive to the Roma community in this 
country? What programs currently exist? 
2. Have international organizations been able to influence domestic state 
policy/programs concerning Roma?  
3. Has (name of organization) supported coalition building among mainstream and 
Roma political parties? 
4. Has there been the promotion of alliances with other human rights 
NGOs/communication at international conferences and informal networking to 




5. Has there been communication/cooperation with domestic state agencies?  
6. Have state authorities been receptive to formulating and reforming 
Roma/minority policies, legislation and programs? 
7. How has the media viewed the Roma community? 
8. Have Roma activists/NGOs had impact on international organization program 
development and implementation? Have Roma been able to participate in 
formulating and highlighting priority concerns of the community? 
9. Should Roma concerns be presented within the general human rights framework? 
Or should state/international organizations view Roma as a specific issue to deal 
with?  
10. Has the European Court of Human Rights (Roma cases) been able to influence 
domestic state policy? 
11. Has the Decade of Roma inclusion—national action plans helped to advance the 
community‘s concerns regarding education, employment, health, housing, 
poverty, discrimination, and gender? 
12. How successful has the Decade of Roma Inclusion been in promoting Roma 
issues? 
13. Has state identification of ‗Roma‘ as a minority changed their status? 
14. What counter-movements or challenges/limitations does the Roma community 
face? 
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